Edwin E and Mary Lou Ridgeway v. State of Illinois

OPINION

BIRNBAUM, CJ.

The parties have stipulated to the sworn deposition testimony provided by both the Claimants and Brandon Johnson. These transcripts have been provided in lieu of live testimony given the ongoing restrictions posed by the current pandemic. Additionally, the parties have stipulated to the admission of Claimant Mary Lou Ridgeway’s medical records and invoices and that the treatment and bills were reasonable and necessary for the injuries she sustained in this collision. The parties have also stipulated to admit photographs of the vehicles following the collision.

I. Procedural History

On December 13, 2016, Claimants, Edwin Ridgeway (“Edwin”) and Mary Lou Ridgeway (“Mary Lou”) filed a Complaint against Respondent, Illinois Department of Transportation (“IDOT”). An Amended Complaint was filed on October 17, 2017. The Amended Complaint alleges that on February 2, 2015, at approximately 9:45 a.m. the Ridgeways were traveling southbound in the left lane in Illinois on I-57 near milepost 236. The Claimants’ vehicle was operated by Edwin with his wife, Mary Lou, riding in the passenger seat. An IDOT snowplow operated by Brandon Johnson was traveling in the right lane directly in front of the vehicle in which the Ridgeways were traveling. Johnson was acting within the scope of his employment by clearing ice and snow from the roadway when he crossed over the left lane directly in front of Mr. Ridgeway’s vehicle upon approaching a median crossover. There was not sufficient time for Johnson to reach the median before coming into contact with the Claimants’ vehicle. Mr.

Ridgeway attempted to slow his vehicle and avoid a collision, but he was unable to do so in time and collided with the snowplow causing Mary Lou to sustain serious and permanent injuries. The Ridgeway vehicle sustained damage to the front driver’s side, and the snowplow sustained damage to the rear passenger side. No damages are being sought by the Ridgeways for the damage to their vehicle.

The parties submitted written briefs in June and July 2020. During the briefing process, Mary Lou passed away on July 4, 2020. A suggestion of death was filed thereafter. Pursuant to Illinois Court of Claims Rule 790.80, Edwin was approved by the Court to prosecute Claimant Mary Lou Ridgeway’s claim as Executor of her Estate.

[*148] II. Undisputed Facts

The parties have stipulated to Mary Lou’s medical bills in the amount of $250,439.62.

Mary Lou is claiming $750,000 for pain and suffering, loss of a normal life/disability, and emotional distress. Edwin Ridgeway is claiming $250,000 for loss of services and $250,000 for loss of consortium. The total sought by Claimants is $1,500,439.62.

III. Evidence

The depositions of Edwin Ridgeway, Mary Lou Ridgeway, and Brandon Johnson were presented and admitted into evidence in lieu of live testimony, as stipulated by the parties.

A. Edwin Ridgeway (driver) Edwin stated that he was driving an orange 2007 Dodge sedan southbound on Interstate 57 in the left lane about a mile before the I-72 turnoff when he approached the slower moving snowplow being operated by Mr. Johnson. It was a cold, but clear day. The road was wet, but not snowy. Edwin stated it was a big orange snowplow and it had its flashers on. Due to the position of his vehicle, Edwin was not sure whether the plow had its turn signal activated. Edwin was traveling “somewhere around” 65 miles per hour (the speed limit was 70 miles per hours). Edwin was already traveling in the left lane when he first saw the snowplow. Edwin began to pass Johnson’s slow-moving snowplow. Just as Edwin’s vehicle reached the back end of the snowplow, Johnson unexpectedly turned left in front of him to access the median turn around.

Edwin turned the wheel to the right and slammed on the brakes, but was unable to avoid striking the snowplow. His vehicle went off the highway and over the right-hand shoulder.

Johnson approached the Claimants’ vehicle after the collision. Edwin testified that Johnson apologized to him and said that he did not see the Ridgeway vehicle the first time he looked, and he thought he could miss hitting the Ridgeway vehicle.

Mr. Ridgeway drove his vehicle home. Although Mary Lou was shaken up, she was not taken to the hospital that day. The ISP Trooper did not ask the Ridgeways if they needed medical care.

The stipulated photographs set forth in Respondent’s Group Exhibit A depict the extent of damage caused to the Claimants’ vehicle. The Claimants’ vehicle was beyond reasonable repair, and subsequently rendered a total loss, though no damages are being claimed for the vehicle.

B. Mary Lou Ridgeway (passenger) Mary Lou could not remember many details about the collision. The Court will, therefore, rely on Edwin and Mr. Johnson’s testimony for same.

Mary Lou testified that she was an active individual prior to the collision. She was primarily responsible for the household duties such as cooking, cleaning, and washing clothes.

[*149] She enjoyed crocheting and embroidering. She was a career homemaker. Since the collision, however, she has not been able to pursue her hobbies. She has lost feeling on the right side of her body. Her hands shake uncontrollably which causes her complications. Edwin is now the primary caretaker. Edwin performs all of the tasks around the house that Mary Lou used to handle and makes sure she receives her medicine and other necessities.

Edwin testified that he washes the dishes, does the laundry, cooks, and assists Mary Lou with anything she needs to do. Edwin further testified that Claimant Mary Lou is unable to walk on her own. He has to assist her with getting in and out of the car, as well as with anything else they need to do. Mr. Ridgeway also testified that his wife complains of pain in her knees and back (Cl’s Ex. E, pgs. 18-19). However, his wife does do exercises in her chair. She had a physical therapist, who has since stopped coming to see her. The physical therapist used to walk to the corner with her. (Cl’s Ex. E, pg. 27). Mary Lou still has a nurse visit her periodically in her home. Both Claimants testified that prior to the collision they frequently vacationed together.

They have been unable to travel since the collision, however, due to Claimant Mary Lou’s injuries and physical limitations.

C. Brandon Johnson (snowplow driver) The physical condition of the road where the collision occurred “seemed fine” to Johnson. (Johnson Dep. 15). Johnson testified that the roads did not require clearing that morning. Johnson stated that there was a “little bit of snow and slush on the roads” and he had been sent out to clear the ramps. Johnson had finished clearing one ramp, and right before the collision, he was going to turn around so that he could clear the ramp on the other side of the Interstate. Johnson had his flashers on. He testified that he “saw the gap” to pass the Ridgeway vehicle. Johnson thought he had enough time to make the turn but he “got clipped.” Johnson admitted that he did not look over his shoulder to check for traffic before initiating the left turn.

Rather, he simply judged traffic through his side mirror, which distorted his view of the oncoming cars.

Contrary to Claimant’s allegations and Edwin’s testimony, Johnson testified that his vehicle was positioned on the side of the road (not the right lane) waiting to turn around into the median to head the other direction. He was either stopped or engaged in a slow roll. He testified that he had both his flashers and turn signal on. Johnson proceeded to make his left turn. He hit his brakes about halfway into the median so he would not slide onto the other side of the road.

He then heard a thump, which he initially thought was salt falling down from the bed of his truck, but quickly realized he had been hit. He did not see the Ridgeway vehicle hit his snowplow. His testimony was that at the time of the collision, the snowplow was positioned mostly in the median. Johnson did not know how much of the snowplow might have been sticking out in the left lane at the time of the collision.

Johnson testified that this collision occurred during his first week as an IDOT employee.

At the time of the collision, Mr. Johnson had received three hours of training in an empty snowplow. That was the only other time he had ever driven such a vehicle. The morning of the collision was the first time he had driven the snowplow by himself with a full salt spreader, [*150] which significantly increased the weight of the vehicle, thereby slowing the ability to accelerate.

Johnson really did not know this route.

Johnson testified that there were no directions given to him as to how long the job that morning should take: “They said be safe. And that’s where I messed up.” (Johnson Dep. 17). He further testified that “I felt like I was at fault,” and “I feel they (the Claimants) were driving safe.” (Johnson Dep. 18, 21). However, since the collision, Mr. Johnson believes that he was not at fault because of the fact that he had his flashers engaged and feels that the Ridgeway vehicle should have slowed down upon approaching his vehicle.

Johnson believed that the Ridgeway vehicle was either speeding or traveling too fast for conditions but indicated that he could not tell how fast the Claimants’ vehicle was actually traveling. No one informed the police officer of the speed of the Claimants’ vehicle at the time of the collision.

D. Mary Lou’s Injuries

Mary Lou, then age 81, presented to Taylorville Memorial Hospital Emergency Department on Friday, February 5, 2015, following the automobile collision the previous Monday. She had been experiencing significant back pain following the collision, mostly in the posterior chest/midline. She was discharged that day with a diagnosis of head trauma, chest pain, back pain, and flank pain. She was encouraged to return if she experienced any further right upper quadrant pain, fever, vomiting, or any other concerns. Dr. Naeemuddin Jatoi, Claimant Mary Lou’s primary care physician, first saw her on February 12, 2015, following the automobile collision. Dr. Jatoi indicated that Mary Lou suffered from myalgia, ordered a urinalysis culture, and prescribed her with various medications, a walker and physical therapy.

Mary Lou attended physical therapy at Taylorville Memorial Hospital, as ordered by Dr.

Jatoi. Her initial evaluation began on February 18, 2015, where it was noted that she was experiencing lumbar, thoracic, cervical, and scapular pain. Mary Lou indicated at physical therapy that she “can’t stand right and her legs are weak.” She further reported that she had fallen the day before when her right leg had given out from under her and needed assistance to stand back up. Edwin informed the physical therapist that Mary Lou’s balance and gait were much worse that day, and that she required assistance to get in and out of a vehicle.

On February 23, 2015, Mary Lou returned to Dr. Jatoi with numbness in her right leg that had been present for several days. Dr. Jatoi recommended that Mary Lou be taken to St. John’s Hospital Emergency Room for further work up. Mary Lou was seen at St. John’s Hospital on February 24, 2015, by Dr. Garcia Raymond. Dr. Raymond noted that Mary Lou arrived for physical therapy the previous week and had to be sent back to the Emergency Room because of her lack of strength. He further noted that Mary Lou was experiencing acute weakness and numbness in her right leg and right arm, as well as back pain. Dr. Raymond referred Mary Lou to Dr. Todd Elmore (neurologist) for further treatment and follow-up with labs and an MRI. Dr.

Elmore concluded that Mary Lou was suffering from diffuse musculoskeletal pain and was worried about the possibility of right femoral neuropathy. Dr. Elmore referred Mary Lou to neurosurgery, ordered a CT scan, and prescribed aggressive physical therapy. The CT scan [*151] revealed prominent osseous retropulsion at the L2-L3 level contributing to significant stenosis, as well as severe spinal canal encroachment at L4-L5.

Mary Lou followed up with her neurosurgeon, Dr. Jose Espinosa, on February 26, 2015, who requested a cardiovascular preoperative assessment in advance of surgery. Dr. Richard Holloway provided the assessment on February 27, 2015, and cleared Mary Lou for surgery. Dr.

Espinosa indicated that the condition would only become worse if surgery was not performed.

Following the approval of Dr. Holloway, on February 27, 2015, both Dr. Espinosa and Dr.

Stephen Pineda performed a laminectomy decompression from the C3 to C6 region, and a fusion from C3 to C6. The procedure was without complication. Upon awakening, Mary Lou was able to move her lower extremities and flex her hip and knee to a modest degree. She continued to have neck pain, though her legs felt more functional. She continued to be confined to a wheelchair. Mary Lou was discharged from St. John’s Hospital on March 6, 2015. While she was feeling better than when she entered, the doctors felt that it was in her best interest to be discharged to a skilled rehabilitation facility. Mary Lou was ordered to stay in their care until fully healed.

On March 6, 2015, Mary Lou was transferred to Meadow Manor Nursing Home for rehabilitation services. She resided at Meadow Manor from March 27, 2015, until July 1, 2015.

During the day, she was to wear a Miami J Collar, but was allowed to take it off when going to bed. She was on many medications but appeared stable. While at Meadow Manor, Mary Lou received monthly B12 injections, as well as monthly injections of Prolia. She improved throughout her time at Meadow Manor. Upon her discharge, she was able to move herself throughout the facility in her wheelchair. But it was determined that her continued use of the wheelchair was necessary. Mary Lou followed up multiple times with Dr. Espinosa following surgery. The first of these occurred on April 9, 2015. At that appointment, Dr. Espinosa indicated that Mary Lou continued to have weakness, but the strength in her upper limbs had improved.

Before releasing her, he ordered that she continue to wear a cervical collar. At her last follow-up on May 21, 2015, Dr. Espinosa noted that Mary Lou did not have any pain down her arms or neck pain, but still had difficulty ambulating mainly due to the significant loss of proprioception in the right lower extremity.

E. Medical Bills

The parties have stipulated that Mary Lou incurred $250,439.62 in medical bills. The parties have also stipulated that her bills were caused by the collision.

IV. Analysis

A. Public Official and Statutory Immunity is Inapplicable Contrary to Respondent’s arguments, public official immunity and the limited immunity granted by 625 ILCS 5/11-205(f) are inapplicable. A State employee driving an emergency vehicle owes a duty to operate with due regard for the safety of the motorist public. Dorsey v.

State, 63 Ill. Ct. Cl. 177, 199 (2011) citing 625 ILCS 5/11-205(e); Koepp v. State, 46 Ill. Ct. Cl. 344 (1993); see also IPI (Civil) 70.00. The duty arises independently of the employee’s status as [*200] N.E.2d 318 (3rd Dist. 1990), affirmed 148 Ill. 2d 151, 592 N.E.2d 977 (1992), 625 ILCS 5/11- 205(c)(3) and 5/11-205(e)(1).

Claimants must then establish a duty owed to them, a breach of that duty, and damages proximately resulting from that breach. Koepp, supra; Ward v. K-Mart, 136 Ill. 2d 132, 140, 143 (1990).

B. Respondent was Negligent The first element (whether Respondent owed a duty) is easily resolved. Respondent had a duty to operate its snowplow with due regard for the safety of the Ridgeway vehicle. Dorsey, 63 Ill. Ct. Cl. at 199. As to proximate causation and damages, the parties stipulate that the collision caused Mary Lou’s injuries and that her medical bills are reasonable and were incurred due to the collision. This case, therefore, comes down to whether Respondent breached its duty to Claimants. If so, the Court must assess the amount of damages and examine whether there was contributory negligence.

The Court concludes that Respondent breached its duty to Claimants.

As to the conduct of the snowplow driver, for all intents and purposes, Johnson admitted that he was at fault. His testimony, while not a formal stipulation of liability is, nevertheless, germane to resolving the issue of whether Respondent breached its duty. Johnson testified, “They said be safe. And that’s where I messed up.” “I thought I had a big enough clearing [to turn] and I was wrong,” and “I felt like I was at fault.” (Johnson Dep. 17, 21, 23) Johnson further testified that he “cleared one ramp and I was going to turn around and get the other side. And I saw the gap. I thought I had enough time to make that and I didn’t. I got clipped.” (Johnson Dep. 14-15). Edwin testified that Johnson “said that he didn’t see me the first time, and then he told me that he thought he could miss me…” (Edwin Dep. 11). Johnson testified that he did not look over his shoulder to view oncoming traffic. (Johnson Dep. 55). Rather, he assessed the turn only through his mirror, which impaired his ability to determine the speed or distance of the Claimants’ oncoming vehicle. (Johnson Dep. 55). Johnson also apologized to Edwin after the collision.

Based on this testimony, the Court concludes that Respondent breached its duty. Before turning to damages, the Court must first assess contributory negligence.

C. Contributory Negligence

Respondent argues that Claimant Edwin Ridgeway was guilty of contributory negligence.

The Court agrees. A major factor in the collision occurring was Johnson failing to keep a proper lookout before he made a sudden left turn across the left lane of traffic on Interstate 57. However, the Court also believes that had Edwin been driving more carefully, the collision also would not have occurred.

[*153] A complicating factor in this case is ascertaining and visualizing where the vehicles were positioned when they collided. Edwin testified that Johnson’s snowplow was driving slower than he was (he does not say by how much). When Johnson immediately turned in front of Edwin, Edwin turned his vehicle to the right to try and avoid the plow but could not, striking the rearpassenger side of the plow with the front, driver’s side of his (Edwin’s) vehicle. Although Edwin indicated he applied his brakes and turned his steering wheel to the right to avoid the collision, it is unclear whether Edwin’s vehicle was still in the left lane when the vehicles collided. Although Edwin simply was not very specific about the positions of the vehicles immediately prior to the collision, the Court is left with the impression that Edwin maintains the collision occurred in the left lane as Edwin was steering and braking hard toward the right lane. Edwin certainly did not testify that any part of the snowplow had made it into the median at the time of impact.

Respondent maintains, however, that while Johnson did not see the collision, his snowplow was off on the right shoulder (not the right lane), either stopped or slowly rolling immediately before he engaged a left turn into the median. He applied his brakes in the median, and it was at this point that he heard a thump, which turned out to be the Ridgeway vehicle hitting the plow. In other words, the collision occurred when at least the front of the snowplow was already in the turn-around median. Assuming that Edwin was within the bounds of the left lane, Edwin would have hit the part of the snowplow that was sticking out in the left lane of traffic.

In analyzing the issue of contributory negligence, Edwin was appropriately in the passing lane upon approaching the IDOT snowplow, which was off to the right, whether in the right lane or on the shoulder. It is unclear how long Edwin had been in the left lane prior to the collision, i.e., was he driving in the passing lane or simply there to pass the plow. Edwin admitted the road was wet but not snowy. Johnson acknowledged that there could have been some snow in some places on the roads, but the road condition was pretty decent overall. Edwin maintained that he was not speeding as he was traveling somewhere around 65 miles per hour. Johnson felt Edwin was speeding but was unable to quantify Edwin’s speed. Neither vehicle was ticketed. Based on this testimony, it simply is unclear whether Edwin was speeding. Edwin did acknowledge the snowplow had its flashers on.

On the other hand, Edwin saw the plow with its flashers engaged, signaling the presence of an emergency vehicle. He did not see the plow’s turn signal engaged because he was already in the left lane. He does not explain how his driving in the left lane would have impaired his ability to see the snowplow’s left turn signal. Nevertheless, Edwin does not dispute that Johnson had engaged his turn signal. The plow was moving slowly (as compared to the Ridgeway vehicle) in the right lane close to the turn-around. There was no evidence presented that the plow was spreading salt or plowing the side of the road as the Ridgeway vehicle approached it. Just the opposite: Johnson testified that his sole purpose of having his plow positioned where it was at the time of the collision was to make a turn-around in the median so he could go clear a ramp of snow.

The Court concludes that given the position of the snowplow relative to the median, the engagement of its flashers and turn signal, its slow speed, the weather conditions (there was a recent snow and the road was at least wet), and the lack of the plow being engaged in spreading [*154] salt or plowing the side of the road, a reasonable driver would have at least concluded that it was possible, if not likely, that the plow was attempting to imminently make a turn in the median of the Interstate. The Court also concludes that a reasonably prudent driver would have slowed his or her vehicle down given these facts.

Depending on how fast, if at all, the snowplow was traveling before initiating the left turn, there was approximately a 65 mile per hour speed differential between the two vehicles.

There was no evidence offered that Edwin slowed down his vehicle upon approaching the snowplow. He was already driving, for unknown reasons, in the left lane. The Ridgeway vehicle was traveling somewhere around 65 miles per hour in a 70 miles per hour zone; therefore, it is unknown exactly how fast the Ridgeway vehicle was actually traveling. While the Court does not conclude it was unreasonable, per se, to pass the snowplow, the Court does conclude that Edwin did not exercise appropriate caution before doing so, especially when a reasonably prudent driver should have concluded that the plow was potentially attempting to make a turnaround in the median. At the very least, the Ridgeway vehicle should have slowed down, especially where, as here, the plow had its flashers engaged and was either stopped or moving slowly. To proceed at 65 miles per hour in this situation posed risk.

Illinois law provides:

The driver of a vehicle shall yield the right-of-way to any authorized vehicle obviously and actually engaged in work upon a highway whenever the vehicle engaged in construction or maintenance work displays flashing lights as provided in Section 12-215 of this Act. 625 ILCS 5/1 1-908(b).

Claimants suggest in their brief in another context (addressing immunity under 625 ILCS 5/11-205(f)) that the plow was not engaged in work on a highway. The Court disagrees. Johnson was driving the snowplow for the purpose of turning around so he could go plow snow on the ramp. He was not, for example, traveling to or from his home. Therefore, under 625 ILCS 5/11- 908(b), the Claimants' vehicle had a duty to yield (slow down) as it was approaching the snowplow. It did not.

Respondent also appropriately raises another provision of the Illinois Vehicle Code.

Pursuant to Section 11-601 of the Illinois Vehicle Code all drivers have a statutory duty:

To drive at speeds reasonable and proper under the conditions that existed, so as not to endanger the safety of persons or property, and to decrease speed as necessary to avoid colliding with persons or vehicles. 625 ILCS 5/11-601.

While Edwin was possibly driving under the speed limit, the road was not in an ideal condition as it was wet. It was February, and there was at least some snow on other portions of the Interstate. In addition, the snowplow was moving slowly - a lot slower than Edwin's vehicle - with its flashers on. There is no evidence that Edwin decreased his speed as he approached the snowplow.

[*155] There is also a very serious question whether the snowplow was already in (or partially in) the median when the vehicles collided. This is supported by both Johnson’s testimony and the photos. It seems odd that the front driver’s side of the Ridgeway vehicle hit only the rearpassenger side of the snowplow if the collision happened as Edwin maintains, i.e., the plow suddenly turned in front of him as both were traveling southbound. The Court also finds it not credible that Edwin was unable to see Johnson’s left turn signal if, in fact, Edwin was driving behind Johnson. If, on the other hand, the snowplow was perpendicular (or partially perpendicular) to Edwin’s vehicle at the time of impact, it makes sense that Edwin would not have seen the turn signal engaged because, in that scenario, Johnson would have been well into his left turn across the Interstate.

The Court concludes that it does not need to determine the precise positions of the vehicles at impact. Either way, Edwin was not driving at speed that was reasonable and proper under the conditions that existed on the day of the collision. Therefore, the Court concludes that Edwin was contributorily negligent.

The Court views the percentage of Edwin’s contributory negligence as a close call. While the Court has concluded that Johnson was negligent, based in large part on his admissions, Edwin also bears some fault. After carefully reviewing and balancing the evidence, the Court concludes that Claimant Edwin Ridgeway was 25% at fault, and Respondent was 75% at fault.

D. Damages

During the briefing process, Mary Lou passed away. There is no evidence that her passing was due, in any part, to the collision.

The Court notes that no physician testimony was provided regarding a formal diagnosis of Mary Lou’s condition, causation, or prognosis. Nevertheless, the parties have stipulated to the medical bills and depositions. There is no evidence that Mary Lou had any major physical limitations prior to the collision. Respondent is also not contesting causation. Therefore, the Court concludes the collision was the proximate cause of Claimant’s injuries.

As far as Mary Lou’s damages, she experienced considerable pain and suffering in the years following the collision. She had considerable physical limitations. The precise nature of those limitations is not entirely clear. Edwin testified that Mary Lou could not walk but did admit that when the physical therapist was coming, Mary Lou had recently walked to the corner, though it is not clear whether that was with or without a walker. Mary Lou testified that she could not walk without a walker, and her right side was “paralyzed” (there was no physician testimony confirming paralysis). Mary Lou testified that she could do some limited tasks related to laundry and used an exercise bike twice per day. Prior to her passing, she was able to go to the bathroom by herself and get up out of the chair by herself as long as she held on to something.

Mary Lou could not drive and had trouble with stairs. In short, it is undisputed that Mary Lou had extensive medical treatment following the collision and at the time of her evidence deposition. At a minimum, she had great difficulty walking and was primarily homebound.

[*156] V. Award

Mary Lou Ridgeway incurred $250,439.62 in medical bills. Given the stipulation of the parties, the Court concludes that this amount is reasonable.

The Estate of Mary Lou Ridgeway is also claiming $750,000 for Mary Lou’s pain and suffering, loss of a normal life/disability, and emotional distress. Mary Lou had extensive medical treatment and pain and suffering for over 5 years. She was healthy and had an active lifestyle prior to the collision. Therefore, the collision had a major, adverse impact on her physically and emotionally. The Court concludes that a substantial amount of pain and suffering occurred. The Court concludes that $500,000 is a reasonable amount.

Edwin Ridgeway is claiming $250,000 for loss of services and $250,000 for loss of consortium. There is no doubt that Edwin Ridgeway did lose his wife’s services and consortium as a result of the collision. The Court agrees that $250,000 for loss of services and $250,000 for loss of consortium are appropriate amounts.

Therefore, the total damages for Claimants are as follows:

$250,439.62 for Mary Lou’s medical bills $500,000 for Mary Lou’s pain and suffering and loss of a normal life $250,000 to Edwin for loss of services $250,000 to Edwin for loss of consortium Total: $1,250,439.62 ($750,439.62 for the Estate of Mary Lou and $500,000 for Edwin) The Estate of Mary Lou Ridgeway is hereby awarded $750,439.62. Edwin Ridgeway is hereby awarded $375,000 ($500,000 x .75). The total award is $1,125,439.62.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED.