Andrzej Chraca v. State of Illinois

OPINION

GAGLIARDO, J. This matter is before the Court following an evidentiary hearing before Commissioner Madigan. Closing arguments and briefs were provided and multiple stipulations to evidence and exhibits have been submitted. Claimant and Respondent have submitted written post-hearing briefs. Both the transcripts from the Cook County Circuit Court trial and the transcripts from this evidentiary hearing have been received and reviewed. The Court being fully advised in the premises, finds as follows:

BACKGROUND

On April 19, 2004, Claimant, Andrzej Chraca (“Claimant” or “Chraca”), was traveling southbound on Wright Boulevard (“Wright Boulevard” or “Wright”) in a black GMC Suburban.

Steven Miles (“Miles”), an employee of the Illinois Department of Transportation (“IDOT”) was traveling eastbound on Frontage Road (“Frontage Road” or “Frontage”) in an orange IDOT work truck. A collision occurred between the two vehicles in the intersection of Frontage and Wright in Schaumburg, Illinois. Claimant was familiar with this intersection, as he traveled through it frequently (TT p. 1393), and Miles was also familiar with driving the eastbound path on Frontage. (TT pp. 755-756, 787).¹ On April 19, 2005, Claimant filed a Complaint against the State of Illinois in the Court of Claims, alleging that the State, through its employee, Miles, was negligent in the operation of the IDOT motor vehicle, resulting in the collision. Claimant further alleged that such negligence was the proximate cause of Claimant’s serious injuries. (Complaint, pars. 4, 5). The Respondent’s position is that Claimant cannot meet his burden and show by a preponderance of the evidence that Miles negligently ran a red light on April 19, 2004, and Respondent further claims that it was Claimant who failed to keep a proper lookout and ran a red light that day.

In general, any person who files a claim in this Court shall, before seeking final determination of his or her claim, exhaust all other remedies and sources of recovery, whether administrative or judicial; except that failure to file or pursue actions against State employees, acting within the scope of their employment, shall not be a defense. (705 ILCS 505/25). Prior to filing the Complaint against the State of Illinois before this Court, Claimant filed a claim against ¹ “TT” references the pages of the 6-volume trial transcript from the Circuit Court of Cook County, tried before the Hon. William J. Haddad, August 27, 2009 to September 8, 2009. [*78]

Miles, individually, in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Chraca v. Miles, Cook County Case No. 04 L 9461.

A jury trial was held in the Circuit Court of Cook County in 2009. At that time, numerous witnesses, including experts and a police officer from the Schaumburg Police Department, testified regarding all issues, including liability and damages. A diagram of the accident scene was prepared by an expert and was utilized during the trial. A model of the intersection was also utilized. (Claimant's Exhibit 2).

Claimant's Circuit Court action resulted in a jury verdict in favor of Claimant against Miles, which was affirmed by the Illinois Appellate Court.

On August 10, 2012, Claimant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment requesting that the Court of Claims find in his favor as a matter of law and enter judgment against the State of Illinois. Claimant argued that res judicata applied, and that this Court should enter judgment in his favor in the amount of the jury verdict in the Circuit Court case. Respondent, State of Illinois, filed a response, along with its own Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing, in part, that Claimant's claim before this Court was barred by the doctrine of election of remedies. After oral argument was held before the Court of Claims, this Court issued an Order denying Claimant's Motion, and granting the Respondent's Motion. This Court reviewed and addressed the arguments made by Claimant and Respondent, and found that Claimant's claim fell under the authority of the Department of Central Management Services ("CMS") and the Central Management Services Law providing for indemnification. This Court further found that, if Claimant's claim is denied by CMS, Claimant's remedy is a mandamus action seeking enforcement and collection of the prior judgment where proper jurisdiction lies in the Circuit Court, noting that a mandamus suit properly brought in the Circuit Court is distinguishable from the present claim against the State in which the Court of Claims is the only proper jurisdiction.

On August 22, 2014, Claimant filed a Motion to Reconsider pursuant to 705 ILCS 505/15 and Court of Claims Rule 790.220 (74 Ill. Adm. Code 790.220), requesting that this Court vacate its Order granting the Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, and conduct an evidentiary hearing on the merits. On August 26, 2016, this Court granted Claimant's Motion to Reconsider, and ordered that there be a de novo hearing.

At the de novo trial before the Court of Claims, the Claimant and Respondent, State of Illinois, stipulated to the use of the testimony of the liability witnesses from that Circuit Court jury trial as evidence in this matter. Seven independent individuals testified about the collision at the jury trial, in person, or by deposition. The Claimant and Steven Miles also testified at the jury trial, and each presented expert witnesses.

The Circuit Court trial transcript has been provided to this Court in six volumes, with 2,208 pages. This trial transcript has been reviewed by this Court. In addition to the trial transcript, the Parties provided pre-trial memoranda, deposition transcripts (including that of Pat Woods), and expert reports. This Court also heard live testimony from multiple witnesses, which included testimony about Claimant's injuries and damages. Lastly, the Parties provided post-trial [*79] briefs. All the evidence and legal issues have been reviewed de novo, in accordance with this Court’s ruling on August 26, 2016.

The critical factual issue in this case is whether the lights on southbound Wright Boulevard and eastbound Frontage Road were red or green at the point the respective vehicles entered the intersection. Seven independent witnesses testified about the collision at the jury trial. In addition, the Claimant, Chraca, and the IDOT worker, Miles, testified, as did their experts. As discussed more fully below, the facts which come from the testimony of these witnesses, as well as the experts, are in conflict. What is undisputed is that none of the independent witnesses saw either Claimant’s vehicle enter the intersection, or the collision.

FACTS

On April 19, 2004, the intersection of Wright Boulevard and Frontage Road was controlled by an electronic traffic signal. Frontage Road was a one-way road with two lanes for eastbound traffic. Wright Boulevard, which runs north and south, had two through lanes for southbound traffic and a left-turn lane for southbound traffic to turn east onto Frontage Road.

There were also northbound lanes on Wright. Miles, who was acting within the scope of his employment, was driving eastbound in the left lane of traffic on Frontage Road in a large IDOT work truck. Claimant was in the right lane of southbound Wright Boulevard in a black GMC Suburban. Larry Toye (“Toye”) was driving in the northbound lanes of Wright Boulevard, and was stopped at the light, planning on turning right on red onto east Frontage Road. Toye’s stopped car was hit by Claimant’s Suburban after the collision with the IDOT truck. (TT p. 1881).

Due to the layout of the intersection, Miles’ view of southbound Wright traffic was obscured as he approached the intersection, and Claimant’s view of eastbound Frontage traffic was also obscured as he approached the intersection. (TT pp. 1926, 1927). Claimant was aware that his view of eastbound Frontage traffic was obscured until right before the intersection (TT p. 1395), and Miles testified that his view of southbound Wright traffic was obscured until he was about two car lengths, or 40 feet, from the intersection. (TT pp. 752-753).

While the sequence of the lights from green to yellow to red stays the same, the timing, i.e., how long a light is green, yellow or red, changes. (TT pp. 1467, 1477-1478). IDOT does not keep records regarding the duration of the color of lights, and there is no way to tell whether the duration examined years later was the same as it was on the day of the collision. (TT pp. 1469- 1471). According to Jonathan Nelson (“Nelson”), a former IDOT Engineer, while a combined 6 second yellow and red light is common, there are locations that have a longer combined time. (TT pp. 1494, 1499). The clearance interval can go up to 25 seconds. (TT p. 1597). He also testified that the duration of a yellow light cannot be less than 3 seconds (TT p. 1480), and is normally in the range of 4 to 5 seconds (TT p. 1481), with the red clearance between 1.4 seconds and 1.6 seconds, or a little higher. (TT p. 1482). Based on the speed limit on Frontage being 40 mph, and the speed limit on Wright 30 mph, the duration of the yellow light on east Frontage could be longer, because of the higher speed limit. (TT p. 1504).

[*80] Claimant presented the testimony of a qualified retained expert, Michael Rogers ("Rogers"), an accident reconstructionist. Rogers inspected the intersection where the collision occurred in 2008, four years after the collision. (TT p. 920). In describing the sequence of lights, Rogers testified you only get a green left turn arrow if there are vehicles in the left-turn lane waiting to turn left off southbound Wright Boulevard onto east Frontage Road. (TT pp. 880-881, 886). In that event, the southbound through traffic would have a green light, there would be a green arrow for the southbound left-turn lane onto east Frontage, and the northbound traffic on Wright would have a red light. (TT pp. 880-81, 886). If there is no vehicle in the left-turn lane, then you immediately go from the all red to green for northbound and southbound traffic. (TT pp. 880-881, 886). This is consistent with the testimony of Nelson, who testified that there are sensors under the left-turn lane, so if there are no cars in that lane, the left turn signal would not be tripped. (TT p. 1502). In that circumstance, southbound Wright traffic would not have a green light ahead of the northbound Wright traffic. Rogers also explained the concept of "clearance interval." Typically, following the yellow, there is a period of time where both directions of traffic have red lights, and that is to allow vehicles and pedestrians to clear the intersection. (TT pp. 874-875). Consistent with Nelson's testimony, Rogers testified that where intersections involve higher speeds, you want a longer duration of yellow to give people an opportunity to stop before it turns red. (TT p. 883).

According to Rogers, Claimant was approximately 58 feet past the Stop Bar into the intersection, approximately halfway through the intersection, when the collision occurred. (TT p. 869). In terms of the point of impact, the front of the IDOT truck struck the right front side of the Suburban. (TT p. 857). The damage to Claimant's vehicle from the IDOT truck was midway along the passenger door, to the front corner of the vehicle, with some damage on the front end. (TT pp. 870-872).

While Claimant has said that he was going 25 mph (TT p. 823), Rogers testified that was not true. (TT p. 924). He said Claimant's average speed prior to the collision was 32 mph. (TT p. 860). While Claimant said that he was traveling in the southbound center through lane on Wright Boulevard (TT pp. 824-25), Rogers testified Claimant was actually traveling in the right lane, i.e., the curb lane. (TT p. 925). With regard to the speed of Miles' vehicle, Rogers testified that his average speed in the seconds prior to the collision was close to 40 mph. (TT p. 863).

The Schaumburg Police Department conducted an investigation that began shortly after the collision, and concluded that: the lights were functioning properly (TT p. 823); they could not determine the color of the lights at the time of the collision (TT p. 826); and speed was not a factor in the collision. (TT p. 826). While Rogers admitted that the Schaumburg Police Department was unable to determine who had what color light at the time of the occurrence, he nonetheless opined that Claimant's light was green when his vehicle entered the intersection, and that traffic for southbound Wright had a green left turn arrow. (TT pp. 890, 893, 898, 932). He based this, in part, on the testimony of Claimant (TT p. 926), and witnesses who were also traveling southbound on Wright. (TT pp. 890-891, 926-927). His opinion was not affected by the fact that Claimant was wrong as to his speed and lane of travel. (TT pp. 926-927).

On cross examination, Rogers admitted that he previously prepared an expert report, discussed in his deposition, but not at trial, that set forth 3 scenarios, and each scenario had [*81] Claimant entering the intersection on a red light going between 30 and 34 mph. (TT pp. 945-958). Rogers testified that those scenarios were based on errors he had made in preparing his report. (TT pp. 945-958). He further admitted that he reviewed the report for accuracy before it was finalized, knowing it was going to be produced to opposing counsel in the Circuit Court case, and that he would be asked questions about the report. (TT pp. 947-948).

In contrast to Rogers' testimony, Miles presented the testimony of a qualified accident reconstruction expert, David Sallman ("Sallman"). (TT p. 1870). He testified that Miles' vehicle was traveling between 30 and 40 mph at the time of impact (TT p. 1894), and it did not appear that Miles applied the brakes on his vehicle prior to impact. (TT p. 1894). As to Claimant, Sallman testified that Claimant accelerated as he was approaching the intersection. (TT p. 1929). Claimant was driving 32 mph, then 34 mph, and the speed dropped to 30 mph in the last second before impact, when he applied the brakes. (TT pp. 1929-1930).

Sallman visited the scene of the collision in August 2007, over 3 years after the collision. (TT pp. 1888-1889). One of the measurements he took was of the timing of the yellow light, which was a range of 4.1 to 4.5 seconds, and the timing of the red clearance, which was a range of 1.4 to 1.6 seconds, for a total of approximately 6 seconds. (TT pp. 1888-1890). However, he could not testify that the ranges or combined total were the same on the date and time of the collision. (TT p. 1916). Based on the absence of information identifying the duration of the yellow and red lights on the day of the collision, he testified that he was not able to determine the color of the lights at the time of the collision. (TT pp. 1882, 1883). He further testified that, for the same reason, it was his opinion that a reconstructionist could not determine the color of the lights at the time of the collision to a reasonable degree of certainty. (TT pp. 1883, 1922).

Independent witnesses, Brian Daniel (driver), Anthony Bryant (Daniel's passenger), Timothy Lukes (driver), Pat Woods (driver), Jason Biliari (Woods' passenger), and Mark Lachin (Woods' passenger), were in vehicles in the left through lane of southbound Wright Boulevard. Daniel's vehicle was first in line followed by Lukes' vehicle, then Woods' vehicle. Five of these witnesses testified live at the jury trial; only Pat Woods testified at the trial by submission of a deposition transcript as evidence. Larry Toye, another independent witness who testified, was traveling in the northbound lane on Wright, and was stopped at the light, waiting to turn right on the red light.

All witnesses testified there were no other cars in the intersection at the time of the collision, and the lead car in the southbound left lane on Wright had not started to enter the intersection, and was still behind the white Stop Bar at the time of the collision. (TT pp. 1069-1070, 1213, 1218). The vehicles driven by Lukes and Woods remained behind Daniel's lead car. As discussed below, none of the witnesses in the vehicles in the left through lane of southbound traffic on Wright saw Claimant's vehicle pass them in the curb lane, and none saw Claimant's vehicle at the time it entered the intersection. Finally, none of the independent witnesses saw a vehicle in the southbound left-turn lane on Wright, until after the collision. A brief summary of the relevant testimony of the seven independent witnesses, Claimant, Miles, and Schaumburg Police Officer Greenaway follows, with reference to the trial transcript or deposition transcript.

[*82] Brian Daniel

Brian Daniel (“Daniel”) testified that he was driving his red ’95 Eagle Talon in the left through lane of southbound Wright Boulevard. (TT pp. 1065, 1066, 1067, 1087). He was traveling with a friend, Anthony Bryant. (TT p. 1065). The light was red when they pulled up to the intersection and there were no vehicles in front of them, so they were the first vehicle in their lane. Daniel did not notice any vehicles to the right of him. (TT pp. 1065, 1066, 1073). There was a left-turn lane to his left, which is discussed below. (TT p. 1066).

While he was waiting for the red light to change, his head was turned to the right, as he was talking to his passenger, Anthony Bryant. (TT pp. 1084-1085, 1089-1090). He testified that he did not really know what was going on in the intersection, because he was looking at his friend. (TT p. 1091). Daniel continued his conversation with his friend, with his head turned to the right, while he began to shift his manual transmission into first gear as the light on Frontage was changing to yellow. (TT pp. 1084-1085, 1089-1090). When his passenger said, “Oh My God,” it made him turn his head to look at the intersection, and he saw the Suburban and the IDOT truck in the intersection. (TT pp. 1069-1070, 1073, 1089-1090). He was not looking straight into the intersection when the collision occurred (TT p. 1074), and his attention was not focused on traffic in the intersection prior to the collision. (TT p. 1070). It was the collision that drew his attention to the intersection. (TT p. 1070). When the impact occurred, he was still talking with his friend. (TT p. 1073).

Although he had begun to shift his car into gear, he had not yet started to enter the intersection. He was still behind the white Stop Bar at the time of the collision. (TT pp. 1069-1070). Even though he was starting to move his vehicle, he did not know the color of the light, because he was looking at his friend. (TT p. 1086). After the collision, he stopped his car behind the white Stop Bar. (TT pp. 1069-1070, 1092).

At the time of the collision, the black SUV and IDOT truck were the only cars in the intersection. (TT p. 1079). He did not see either of the vehicles prior to hearing the crash. (TT p. 1070). Specifically, he did not see the black SUV before the collision (TT p. 1075), and he was not sure whether the black SUV had a red or green light, as he did not see it enter the intersection. (TT p. 1077). Like his vehicle, none of the other southbound vehicles on Wright were in the intersection at the time of the collision. (TT pp. 1069-70, 1079) As to the light on southbound Wright, he never saw it turn green prior to the collision. (TT p. 1092). He only saw a green light for traffic on southbound Wright Boulevard after the collision happened. (TT pp. 1067, 1092).

When he was getting out of his car after the collision, he saw a Chevy Blazer in the left-turn lane (TT p. 1094), and he saw someone in the Blazer calling 911 on the telephone. (TT p. 1098). He did not see the Blazer in the left-turn lane until after the collision occurred. (TT p. 1094). His statement to police and testimony at trial was consistent, that it was a Chevy Blazer in the left-turn lane after the collision. (TT pp. 1079, 1098).

[*83] In a statement given to police right after the collision, while still at the intersection, Daniel made a diagram and incorrectly showed the black Suburban traveling east on Frontage and the IDOT truck traveling north on Wright. (TT pp. 1076, 1085).

Harold Anthony Bryant

Harold Anthony Bryant (“Bryant”) testified that he was the front seat passenger in Brian Daniel’s vehicle. (TT p. 1210). Daniel’s vehicle was traveling southbound on Wright Boulevard in the middle through lane between the left-turn lane and the other through lane for southbound traffic. (TT p. 1210). Bryant testified that as they “rolled up”, the light for southbound Wright was red and the car was in neutral, but as they approached the intersection, it turned green. (TT pp. 1210-1212). Bryant said he could not see the light for eastbound Frontage. (TT p. 1220).

Bryant said that after the traffic light turned green for their direction of travel, Bryant looked down at the gearshift in Daniel’s car because he wanted to see how it worked, and as Daniels shifted into gear, Bryant heard the collision. (TT pp. 1212, 1214, 1237). When he looked forward, he saw the vehicles colliding. (TT p. 1214). The only two vehicles in the intersection were the black SUV and the IDOT truck. (TT p. 1218).

Bryant’s attention was drawn to the intersection after he heard the collision, and he testified that he had not seen either vehicle prior to the collision. (TT pp. 1215, 1219, 1234).

Specifically, he did not see the black Suburban pass Daniel’s car in the right through lane before the collision (TT p. 1220), and he did not see the black Suburban strike the red and white work truck driven by Toye, after colliding with the IDOT truck. (TT pp. 1240-1241).

According to Bryant, when he looked up at the traffic control light for southbound Wright Boulevard after the collision, the light was green. (TT p. 1216). It was only 1-2 seconds between the time of the light on Wright turning green, and the collision. (TT pp. 1219, 1239- 1240).

Bryant testified that Daniel immediately stopped his vehicle upon hearing and seeing the impact, and Bryant exited the vehicle. (TT p. 1245). Daniel’s car had not reached the Stop Bar at the time of the collision. (TT pp. 1213, 1218). Prior to the collision, Bryant did not see any vehicles in the left-turn lane. (TT pp. 1217, 1219-20). When Bryant exited the vehicle, he saw a black vehicle sitting in the left-turn lane after the collision that he thought was a Jeep. (TT pp. 1217-1218, 1242).

Although Bryant said he did not see either vehicle prior to the collision, he was impeached with his earlier statement prepared for the Schaumburg Police Department at the accident site about an hour after the collision (TT p. 1220), where he stated that he saw the black SUV accelerating down the exit ramp going east to beat the light on Frontage, and that he saw the orange truck going north on Wright. (TT pp. 1231-1232). In that statement, he also said he saw the black SUV speed through the light and plow into the orange truck. (TT p. 1232).

[*84] Timothy Lukes

Timothy Lukes (“Lukes”) testified that he was driving a Chevy S-10 pickup truck on southbound Wright Boulevard. The light was red as he approached the intersection. (TT pp. 1131-32). He came to a complete stop, and remained at a complete stop at the time of the collision. (TT pp. 1132). He does not remember how long he was at a complete stop. (TT p. 1132). He testified that he was in the left through lane with a turn lane to his left, and he had one vehicle in front of him (TT pp. 1131-1132), a red Talon (Daniel’s vehicle). (TT pp. 1132).

Lukes gave conflicting testimony at trial regarding the Wright signal, and his testimony was impeached. At trial, Lukes testified that, while his light was red and he saw the eastbound Frontage Road signal turning from yellow to red, he looked down in his car momentarily when something fell, and then he heard the collision. (TT pp. 1135, 1139, 1142). When he looked back up, he said the light was green for the southbound direction of traffic (TT pp. 1139, 1145 and 1154), and he said he could also see that the light for eastbound Frontage Road traffic was red. (TT p. 1142). However, this was in direct conflict with his sworn deposition testimony given years earlier, in which he testified his light on southbound Wright was red at the time of the collision. (TT pp. 1144, 1146).

Lukes testified that the only two cars in the intersection at the time of the collision were the black SUV and the orange IDOT truck. (TT p. 1141). No other southbound vehicles had entered the intersection at the time of the collision. (TT pp. 1140). When he looked up, the red car was still in front of him. (TT p. 1141). As with all of the other witnesses who were traveling southbound on Wright, he never saw the black SUV drive past his vehicle in the right lane (TT pp. 1145, 1150-1151), and he did not see that vehicle enter the intersection, so he could not testify that he saw the color of the light at the time Claimant entered the intersection.

Similar to Daniel and Bryant, Lukes’ description of the collision to police shortly after the accident wrongly had a black Tahoe going east on Frontage hit a GMC construction truck going north on Wright. (TT p. 1150).

Pat Woods

Pat Woods (“Woods”) testified that he was driving his Chevy Blazer southbound on Wright Boulevard. (Woods dep. pp. 24-25). Woods said that he was slowing down as he approached the red light, and the light for his direction of traffic changed from red to green. (Woods dep. pp. 24-25). However, he did not actually see the light turn green, but assumed it did because traffic started to move. (Woods dep. pp. 14, 25, 42-43). The impact then occurred. He heard the collision before he saw it. (Woods dep. p. 24). The first time he saw the IDOT truck was at the time of impact. (Woods dep. p. 21).

As to the left-turn lane, Woods did not see any vehicle in that lane. (Woods dep. pp. 20, 37, 51). He drove his Blazer into the left-turn lane after the collision and parked at the white Stop Bar, facing south on Wright. (Woods dep. pp. 25, 31-32). Passenger Jason Bihari called the emergency service personnel from Woods’ Blazer while parked in the left-turn lane. (Woods dep. pp. 25, 31-32). After the police arrived, he and his passengers wrote their respective [*85] statements to police while seated in the Blazer that was still parked in the southbound left-turn lane on Wright. (Woods dep. pp. 25, 29).

Jason Bihari

Jason Bihari testified that he was a passenger in the pewter-colored Chevy Blazer driven by Pat Woods. (TT p. 718). He was in the front passenger seat next to Woods, and in front of Mark Lachin, who was seated in the back. (TT p. 718).

Their vehicle was traveling southbound on Wright Boulevard in the center through lane. (TT pp. 718-719). The light was red when their vehicle first approached the intersection, and the vehicle came to a complete stop. (TT p. 719). They were approximately 20 to 25 feet away from the intersection. (TT p. 719).

While their vehicle was stopped, the light turned from red to green after a very short time. (TT p. 720). After the light turned, their vehicle started moving and that is when he heard the crash. (TT p. 720). He is sure that the crash happened after the light turned green for southbound Wright traffic. (TT pp. 720-721). He also testified that the crash was instantaneous with the light turning green; like the snap of a finger. (TT pp. 722, 731-732). The second he started moving, he heard the sound of the impact. (TT p. 729).

He said the impact was between a black Suburban and an orange work truck, and he had not seen either vehicle before the impact. (TT p. 721). He does not know what direction either vehicle was going prior to the impact. (TT p. 721). Specifically, he did not see the black Suburban going southbound past Woods’ vehicle, and he can’t say whether the Suburban had a green light, because he did not see the vehicle enter the intersection. (TT pp. 726-27). He further testified that after the crash, the vehicle he was in pulled into the left-turn lane and parked, and he exited the vehicle. (TT p. 723). He did not see any vehicles in the left-turn lane on southbound Wright Boulevard. (TT p. 727).

Mark Lachin

The last occupant and witness from the Chevy Blazer was Mark Lachin. He testified that he was in the rear seat of the Blazer in the left through lane of southbound Wright Boulevard. (TT p. 660). His vehicle came to a complete stop for a brief moment. (TT p. 661). He was not paying attention to the stop light, and he did not see it red or green. (TT pp. 661, 668). He assumed the light was green because the vehicle he was riding in started rolling and then he heard a big impact, within a couple of seconds. (TT pp. 662, 664, 673). He did not see either vehicle prior to hearing the crash, and did not see the black Suburban go past him in the right lane. (TT pp. 662, 670). Further, he does not know what direction either vehicle was going prior to the impact. (TT pp. 662-663). Finally, he did not think he saw any cars in the left-turn lane on southbound Wright Boulevard. (TT p. 668).

[*86] Larry Toye

The final independent witness was Larry Toye. Toye testified that he was traveling northbound on Wright Boulevard. (TT p. 1110). He was familiar with the intersection of Wright and Frontage and traveled through it many times a day. (TT p. 1109). Toye was driving a red and white Ford flatbed. (TT p. 1108).

The light was red for his direction of travel as he approached the intersection, and he came to a complete stop. (TT p. 1110). The light turned red when he was about one-half block away, and he was only stopped for 3-4 seconds before he heard the crash. (TT pp. 1115, 1123, 1124).

He intended to turn right on red onto east Frontage Road and had a clear view of the intersection. (TT p. 1118). However, when he looked to his left, the IDOT truck was in the intersection heading east on Frontage, so he did not make his turn. (TT pp. 1109-1111, 1117). The IDOT truck was already in the intersection when he saw it, and he did not see any other vehicles in the intersection. (TT pp. 1111, 1122). After he saw the IDOT truck, he looked at his light again, which was on the pole next to his truck, and it was still red. (TT p. 1112). Toye was waiting for the IDOT truck to clear the intersection before he could turn on red. (TT pp. 1117, 1119).

According to his testimony, the sequence of events was that his light was red; he looked to his left and saw the IDOT truck in the intersection by itself; he looked back to the light on a pole next to his truck which was still red; and then he heard a boom and saw the Suburban coming straight at him. (TT pp. 1112, 1116). Toye testified that the northbound light on Wright was still red at the time of the collision. (TT p. 1116). His truck was struck by the Suburban after it collided with the IDOT truck. (TT pp. 1113-1114).

Toye did not see Claimant’s vehicle before the impact with the IDOT vehicle, and there were no other vehicles in the intersection at the time of the collision other than the IDOT truck and the Suburban. (TT pp. 1111, 1120). Toye was the only witness to have a clear view of the intersection and the light, and correctly testify that the IDOT vehicle was going eastbound on Frontage Road before the collision. (TT p. 1117).

He remembers two or three other cars coming southbound on Wright Boulevard at the time of the crash. (TT p. 1115). Toye testified twice that he did not see a car in the left-turn lane for southbound Wright Boulevard traffic (TT pp. 1118-1119, 1121), and then testified that he did not know if there was a car in the left-turn lane. (TT p. 1126). He was more concerned with the location of the IDOT truck than he was with the southbound vehicles. (TT p. 1127). However, he was paying attention to the intersection, and he did not testify that a car turned in front of him from the left-turn lane of southbound Wright. Moreover, the only vehicle he ever saw in the intersection was the IDOT truck, until the collision.

[*87] Andrzej Chraca

The Claimant, Andrzej Chraca, testified that he was proceeding southbound on Wright Boulevard in a black Suburban, approaching the intersection with Frontage Road. (TT pp. 1358, 1392). Although he testified he was in the middle lane, he was actually in the right southbound lane. (TT pp. 1393, 1405). Although he stated he was driving 25 mph, he accelerated up to 34 mph before the collision. (TT p. 1397). At trial, he admitted he was wrong about his speed and lane of travel. (TT pp. 1405-1406).

In summary, Claimant testified that when he was approaching the traffic control device for his lane of traffic, that light turned green when he was 30-40 feet from the Stop Bar (TT p. 1414); that he accelerated his vehicle (TT p. 1394); that he was going 32-34 miles an hour (TT p. 1414); that he did not see southbound traffic to the left, right, or in front of him (TT p. 1403), but he did see the northbound traffic on Wright stopped at the intersection (TT pp. 1393-1395); that he did not reduce his speed (TT pp. 1414-1415); that he proceeded through the intersection, and the collision occurred 2-4 seconds after the light turned green (TT pp. 1360-1361, 1418). After he entered the intersection, his vehicle was struck by the IDOT truck being driven by Miles. (TT p. 1363). Claimant testified that he saw the IDOT truck and hit the brakes. (TT p. 1362). He further testified that, while he did not see other southbound vehicles, he did see a green left turn signal for the southbound lanes. (TT p. 1403).

Steven Miles

Steven Miles, the IDOT truck driver, testified that he was traveling eastbound on Frontage Road at approximately 35-40 mph, and he was very familiar with the intersection at Wright and Frontage. (TT pp. 751, 787). He testified that he saw the light was green when he was approximately an eighth of a mile to the west of the Wright and Frontage intersection, but then said he thought he was closer than 660 feet. (TT p. 750). He said that as he was about two car lengths, or approximately 40 feet from the intersection, he looked to his left at southbound Wright traffic, and to his right at northbound Wright traffic, and then looked at the light for his direction of traffic which was still green. (TT pp. 751-756). He testified multiple times that the light was green when he entered the intersection. (TT pp. 755, 762, 769-70, 780, 781). He also testified that he never saw his light turn yellow or red (TT pp. 755-756), and concluded that the light was green as he entered the intersection. (TT pp. 755, 761-762). On cross-examination, Miles testified his specific recollection that the light was green came about after he was in litigation with the Claimant. (TT p. 764). Miles testified he did not slow down as he approached the intersection (TT p. 790), and he did not hit his brakes, sound his horn, swerve or otherwise try to avert the impact, because it happened so fast. (TT p. 792). He did not remember seeing the other vehicle involved in the collision. (TT p. 792). The last recollection he had was entering the intersection, right before the impact. (TT pp. 768-769).

Miles’ testimony regarding his conversation with a police officer while hospitalized was contradictory. Miles testified that he did not recall the contents of a conversation he had with a police officer while hospitalized. (TT p. 780). He also testified that he told the police officer he had no independent recollection of the light being green as he entered the intersection (TT p. 760), but that he told the officer it must have been green, because it was not yellow or red. (TT [*88] pp. 757-758, 781). In contrast to that testimony, he said he believes he may have told the officer that he did not remember the color of the traffic light. (TT p. 784). He finally testified he told the police officer that he had no independent recollection of the accident. (TT p. 784). Miles did not have an independent recollection of the collision before trial, or during the trial. (TT p. 784). He testified he did not know if his vehicle struck Claimant’s vehicle. (TT pp. 765-766). However, he never testified that he did not remember the events leading up to the collision, just the collision itself. (TT pp. 746-756, 765-766, 782-784). In fact, he described the events leading up to the collision, as indicated above. (TT pp. 746-756, 782-784).

Police Officer Thomas Greenaway

Schaumburg Police Department Officer, Thomas Greenaway (“Officer Greenaway”), testified that he was in the accident investigation unit of the Police Department for 7 years, and he was dispatched to the scene, shortly after the collision was reported, in order to perform an investigation. (TT pp. 803-804, 821). He investigated the scene, along with another officer, a certified accident reconstructionist. (TT p. 820). Upon arriving on the scene, the officers closed the roadway, and began the investigation which included a visual inspection; the taking of photos by an evidence technician; preservation of evidence at the scene by having an evidence technician mark all significant issues at the accident scene; and taking witness statements at the scene, as well as of Claimant and Miles, while hospitalized. (TT pp. 804-806).

Officer Greenaway interviewed Claimant the day after the collision, while he was hospitalized. (TT p. 818). Claimant could not write a statement because of his injuries. (TT p. 830). During the interview, Claimant told him that the light was red as he approached the intersection of southbound Wright and Frontage and he was slowing down, but when he was 20 to 30 feet before the intersection, the light turned green, and he accelerated. (TT p. 819).

Claimant also told Officer Greenaway that he was going 25 mph, and was in the left through lane heading southbound on Wright. (TT pp. 823-825).

Officer Greenaway was able to interview Miles eight days post-occurrence, while he was still in the hospital. (TT p. 816). Like Claimant, Miles could not write a statement because of his injuries. (TT p. 822). Officer Greenaway did not determine the competency of Miles, and did not find out whether Miles was on pain medications. (TT pp. 826-827). Miles told Officer Greenaway that he did not remember the color of the light for his direction of travel (TT p. 818), but he would have stopped if the light was yellow or red. (TT p. 822). Officer Greenaway did not testify that Miles had no independent recollection of the accident.

Officer Greenaway, who has a certification in accident investigation, was able to determine the direction of the vehicles, as well as the location of the impact. (TT pp. 803, 806, 807, 809). He further testified that, based on the investigation, the lights were functioning properly (TT p. 823); the Schaumburg Police Department could not determine the color of the lights at the time of the collision (TT p. 826); and speed was not a factor in the collision, for either vehicle. (TT pp. 815, 826).

[*89] LEGAL ISSUES

Whether Claimant has met his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Miles was negligent in the operation of the IDOT motor vehicle, resulting in the collision and that such negligence was the proximate cause of Claimant’s serious injuries?

Whether Respondent has met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Claimant was negligent in the operation of his vehicle, and, if so, the extent to which Claimant’s negligence was the proximate cause of his injuries?

APPLICABLE LAW

Pursuant to 705 ILCS 508/8(d), the Court of Claims has “exclusive jurisdiction” of enumerated matters, specifically including “[a]ll claims against the State for damages sounding in tort . . .” In any negligence action, the Court must examine the following four elements: duty, breach of duty, causation and damages. Hoekstra v. State, 38 Ill. Ct. Cl. 156 (1985); Houston v. State, 32 Ill. Ct. Cl. 143 (1977).

The Illinois Civil Pattern Jury Instructions (“IPI”) contain principles relevant to this Court’s analysis of the facts and legal issues: * IPI 10.01 defines “negligence” as the failure to do something which a reasonably careful person would do, or the doing of something which a reasonably careful person would not, under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence. * IPI 10.02 provides that “ordinary care means the care a reasonably careful person would use under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence.” * IPI 10.03 provides, in relevant part, it is the duty of the plaintiff, before and at the time of the occurrence, to use ordinary care for his own safety. A plaintiff is contributorily negligent if 1.) he fails to use ordinary care for his own safety and 2.) his failure to use such ordinary care is a proximate cause of the alleged injury. If the plaintiff’s contributory negligence is more than 50% of the total proximate cause of the injury or damage for which recovery is sought, the defendant shall be found not liable. See also, 735 ILCS 5/2-1116. * IPI 21.01 defines the burden of proof and provides that the finder of fact “must be persuaded, considering all of the evidence in this case that the proposition on which a party has the burden of proof is more probably true than not true.”

The general speed restrictions set forth in 625 ILCS 5/11-601(a), are also relevant to the Claimant’s claim, as well as any issue of comparative fault on the part of the Claimant. That section provides, as follows:

Sec. 11-601. General speed restrictions.

[*90] a) No vehicle may be driven upon any highway of this State at a speed which is greater than is reasonable and proper with regard to traffic conditions and the use of the highway, or endangers the safety of any person or property. The fact that the speed of a vehicle does not exceed the applicable maximum speed limit does not relieve the driver from the duty to decrease speed when approaching and crossing an intersection, approaching and going around a curve, when approaching a hill crest, when traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway, or when special hazard exists with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of weather or highway conditions. Speed must be decreased as may be necessary to avoid colliding with any person or vehicle on or entering the highway in compliance with legal requirements and the duty of all persons to use due care.

The Court applies these legal standards to the facts to evaluate whether Miles, Claimant or both were negligent in their duty to use ordinary care; i.e., did they fail to do something a reasonably careful person would do under the circumstances similar to those at the time and place of the collision?

ANALYSIS

A. Liability

Although there is conflicting testimony of the lay and expert witnesses, as well as that of Claimant and Miles, this Court concludes that Claimant has met his burden of proof by a preponderance of evidence that the Respondent, through the actions and/or omissions of its admitted agent, was negligent in the operation of the IDOT truck, and that negligence was the cause of Claimant’s serious injuries. This Court further concludes that Respondent has not met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Claimant was negligent in the operation of his vehicle.

B. Damages

Testimony regarding the damages sustained by Claimant as a result of this collision included the live trial testimony of Danuta Loane, Justyna Chraca, and the Claimant. The testimony of Dr. William Livesay from the Circuit Court jury trial was presented for consideration by this Court and the Claimant also presented Dr. Gary Yarkony for live testimony at the Court of Claims trial. Respondent submitted two reports from Dr. E. Franklin Livingston for this Court’s consideration. The testimony, in total, established that the Claimant sustained a spinal cord injury with resulting paraplegia, chronic pain, leg spasms, neurogenic bowel and bladder and sexual dysfunction. These conditions are permanent. Further complications from these injuries include urinary tract infections, pressure ulcers, a lower extremity fracture, carpal tunnel syndrome, depression and sleep disturbance.

The elements of damages claimed by Claimant are for past medical bills, future medical bills, disfigurement, past pain and suffering, future pain and suffering, past loss of normal life [*91] and future loss of normal life. No claim for lost wages has been presented for this Court's consideration.

As stated above, the live testimony regarding damages included the testimony of Danuta Loane. Ms. Loane testified that she is the older sister of the Claimant. She testified extensively regarding the pleasurable aspects of life that the Claimant enjoyed prior to the collision. She further testified regarding Claimant's enjoyment and fulfillment from his activities in the family business, as well as an active homeowner who enjoyed working on his home and vehicles. Ms.

Loane testified regarding the distinct change in personality of Claimant, including her belief that he is "depressed" as a result of the injuries. She finally testified regarding the difficulties that Claimant has during his normal activities of daily living. This includes his bowel and bladder problems, as well as his inability to move and get around throughout the day.

Justyna Chraca testified that she is the wife of the Claimant. Mrs. Chraca testified that they have two children, Lucas, who was 10 and Alexander, who was three. She testified that as a result of the injuries and Mr. Chraca's difficulty with weather conditions in Chicago, they have moved to Arizona. She testified that although this move has been beneficial so that Claimant does not have to deal with the snow, it has made it more difficult for him to be around his friends and family. Mrs. Chraca also testified about the change in Claimant's activities of daily living.

She and Claimant enjoyed an active lifestyle prior to this incident and the injuries sustained by him have significantly changed this. Prior to the collision, that included numerous vacations, as well as activities, including sports.

Mrs. Chraca testified regarding the challenge that she and her husband had in conceiving their two children through in vitro fertilization. She further explained the difficulties that Claimant has with engaging with his children and being able to provide for them as a father and interact with them on a daily basis. Mrs. Chraca testified at great length regarding the normal activities of a day for Claimant after his injuries. These included his daily bathroom routine, which on a good day can take two hours and on bad days can take up most of the day. This bathroom routine often interferes with their daily plans. It furthermore causes consternation on behalf of the Claimant. Additionally, he is no longer handy around the house due to his limitations from his injuries. Finally, she testified regarding the pain that she has witnessed Claimant experiencing, the medication and efforts he makes to relieve this pain, and the Claimant's difficulty sleeping and the need to catheterize during the night.

Dr. Livesay testified at the Circuit Court jury trial of this cause. He is a treating physician of the Claimant and testified that he diagnosed Claimant with paraplegia, neurogenic bowel, neurogenic bladder and neurogenic pain. All of these conditions are related in his opinion to his injuries from this motor vehicle accident. (TT p. 191). He testified extensively regarding his expectations for the future, which would include worsening of the conditions as Claimant ages, as well as complications such as infections, fractures and limitations from his paraplegia. (TT pp. 1311-1321).

Dr. Gary Yarkony testified live at the Court of Claims trial. Dr. Yarkony is a boardcertified physician in the field of physical medicine and rehabilitation. Dr. Yarkony was hired by the Claimant in order to review certain documents, including medical records, deposition [*92] transcripts, and further examine Claimant personally. Dr. Yarkony has examined Claimant on two different occasions; in 2007, and then a re-examination in 2017. Dr. Yarkony opined that Claimant is a complete paraplegic because he has no rectal sensation. He testified regarding the neuropathic pain as well as localized pain at surgical sites. Furthermore, he testified regarding the spasms in his right leg which complicate Claimant’s sleep. Dr. Yarkony confirmed the diagnosis of bowel and bladder incontinence of the treating physicians and explained the difficulty with bowel movements and the reason that Claimant continues to have bladder accidents and painful bowel impactions. Dr. Yarkony also explained why Claimant has fertility issues as a result of his spinal cord injury.

Dr. Yarkony opined that Claimant continues to require physical therapy to help him move, including the limited walking that Claimant is able to do. Furthermore, this physical therapy would be useful with range of motion and upper body conditioning. Dr. Yarkony reviewed the current medical plan, including medications that Claimant is taking. Dr. Yarkony opined regarding numerous areas of limitations and issues that Claimant has currently, and will have permanently. Dr. Yarkony claimed that his life care plan opinions relate to the minimal care needs as Claimant ages. Namely, Dr. Yarkony testified regarding the medications, physical therapy and medical treatment that Claimant will need in the future. Dr. Yarkony also opined that Claimant will require professional assistance at home. He opined that Claimant currently needs approximately 8 hours of care a day, assuming his wife is able to assist him at other times of the day. Dr. Yarkony testified that Claimant’s life expectancy at the time of this trial was 33.4 years and that he will have more difficulty as he ages, including a need for additional professional assistance at home.

A day in the life video was presented for this Court’s consideration which demonstrates the activities of Claimant during a standard day. It was offered by the Claimant to demonstrate the difficulties in many of the areas herein discussed. (See Day in the Life Video Claimant’s Exhibit 13(A)).

In rebuttal, the Respondent submitted two reports of Dr. E. Franklin Livingston. Dr.

Livingston is a physician who was retained by the Respondent to review materials pertaining to this case. Dr. Livingston met with the Claimant at his home in Arizona and conducted a physical exam and interview. Dr. Livingston’s report is submitted as Respondent’s Exhibit F. Dr.

Livingston opined that the Claimant was independent in all activities of daily living and able to ambulate, albeit minimally. Dr. Livingston disagreed with Dr. Yarkony on the continued need for physical therapy throughout Claimant’s life and stated that he believed only four (4) more years of occupational therapy and physical therapy would be appropriate. Anything after that would be on an “as needed” basis. See Livingston report, Respondent’s Exhibit F. Dr. Livingston further disagreed with Dr. Yarkony and did not believe that the Claimant needed more than two hours of household assistance.

The task of determining damages is to be done on a case-by-case basis. Dorsey v. State, 63 Ill. Ct. Cl. 177, 204 (2007); see also Barry v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 282 Ill. App. 3d 199, 207 (1st Dist. 1996). There can be no dispute that the injuries sustained by the Claimant are catastrophic and life altering injuries. Claimant sustained a spinal cord injury rendering him a paraplegic for the remainder of his life. This Court was provided with significant evidence of the [*93] extensive injuries sustained by the Claimant as a result of this collision. Every minute of Claimant’s life has been altered as a result of the injuries he sustained on April 19, 2004. He can no longer properly walk, does not have normal sexual function, has a neurogenic bowel and bladder and lives with constant pain. The evidence presented to this Court confirms the disruption to the Claimant’s life on a consistent, permanent, daily basis. Accordingly, this Court awards the Claimant a total of $16,000,000.

CONCLUSION

Based on the testimony and evidence in the record, the Claimant has sustained his burden by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent, through the actions and/or omissions of its agent, was negligent during his operation of the IDOT truck. Accordingly, this Court finds in favor of the Claimant on the issue of liability, and judgment is entered in favor of the Claimant in the amount of $16,000,000.