Arthur George Jaros v. State of Illinois

OPINION

BIRNBAUM, CJ.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 7, 2016, Claimant, Arthur George Jaros, Jr., filed his Verified Complaint in the Court of Claims seeking to recover reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fee, pursuant to Section 10-55(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Mr. Jaros asks for recovery of fees and expenses he incurred in successfully defending what he alleges to be unreasonable and untrue disciplinary charges brought against him by the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC).

On February 16, 2017, Respondent filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. Respondent argues: 1) The ARDC is not an “agency” as defined under the APA; 2) The doctrine of separation of powers prohibits interpreting the Act as applying to the ARDC; and 3) Section 10- 55(c) of the APA does not apply to attorney disciplinary proceedings.

On March 2, 2017, Claimant filed his Objection to the Respondent's Motion. Claimant objects that the Court has not ruled on Claimant's February 9, 2017 request to admit and/or to direct Respondent to answer. On March 17, 2017, Respondent filed its reply to Claimant's Objection to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. On March 22, 2017, Claimant filed his reply to Respondent's Motion or, in the alternative, to order Respondent to Answer or comply with the Request to Admit.

Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment raises a pure issue of law: Whether the ARDC is subject to Section 10-55(a) Administrative Procedure Act.

A discovery request may properly be quashed where a court has before it sufficient information upon which to decide a motion to dismiss. Yuretich v. Sole, 259 Ill. App. 3d 311, 317 (4th Dist. 1994).

Also, where discovery is not necessary to assist the nonmoving party to respond to the motion, a stay of discovery is proper. Adkins Energy, LLC v. Delta-T Corp., 347 Ill. App. 3d 373, 381, 806 N.E.2d 1273, 1280 (2nd Dist. 2004).

[*136] These general principals apply here. There are no material issues of fact in dispute for this Court to resolve. As such, Claimant is not in need of any factual discovery in order to rule on the purely legal questions raised in Respondent's motion.

Having found that the Motion for Summary Judgment is now properly before the Court, we note the following:

Claimant is a member of the Illinois bar and was licensed to practice law in the State of Illinois on October 22, 1975.

On July 17, 2013, the Administrator of the ARDC filed complaint number 2013PR00073, alleging Claimant engaged in a conflict of interest based on his drafting of restatements of trust agreements for a client that named a beneficiary/non-profit organization wherein Claimant held an interest as a beneficiary.

A hearing was held before the ARDC’s Hearing Board on February 27 and 28, 2014.

On September 9, 2014, the Hearing Board issued its Report and Recommendation finding that the Administrator did not prove the charges by clear and convincing evidence and recommended that the charges against Claimant be dismissed.

Claimant brought a motion seeking sanctions against an ARDC attorney on October 9, 2014. The Hearing Board denied that motion on October 14, 2014. Claimant appealed that ruling to the Illinois Supreme Court on November 19, 2014. That motion was denied on December 10, 2014. Claimant also appealed the ARDC decision denying sanctions to the Appellate Court, Second District on January 26, 2015. The Appellate Court also denied that appeal.

Claimant, having been denied his pursuit of sanctions by the Hearing Board of the ARDC, the Supreme Court and by the Appellate Court, is now before this Court seeking recovery of attorney’s fees against the ARDC for its bringing an allegedly unreasonable and untrue disciplinary complaint.

ANALYSIS

The Illinois Constitution provides that the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government are separate and that no branch shall “exercise powers properly belonging to another.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, § 1. The separation of powers doctrine exists to ensure that each of the three branches of government retains its own sphere of authority, free from undue encroachment by the other branches. See, e.g., City of Waukegan v. Pollution Control Board, 57 Ill. 2d 170, 175 (1974); People ex rel. Hansen v. Phelan, 158 Ill. 2d 445, 451 (1994).

The Illinois Supreme Court has held: “This Court has the inherent power to define and regulate the practice of law in this state.” Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Sperry, 214 Ill. 2d 371, 382 (2005). “The power to regulate and define the practice of law is a prerogative of the Supreme Court under the Illinois Constitution.” King v. First Capital Financial Services Corp., 215 Ill. 2d 1, 12-13 (2005).

[*137] Illinois, like 13 other states, treats attorney discipline as an exclusively judicial function (in the other states the process is regulated by a unified or local bar association). See In re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 54 N.E.2d 646 (1899). In Day, the Illinois Supreme Court overturned a state statute setting criteria for the admission of attorneys to practice. The Court found judicial power to be reserved to the courts by the state constitution’s separation of powers clause. The Court found that control over both the admission and disbarment functions are considered judicial. The Court reasoned that judicial authority over both functions arises logically from the attorney’s role as an officer of the court and from the judicial responsibility to maintain and supervise the courts.

In 1876, the Illinois Supreme Court issued its first rule on attorney discipline requiring disciplinary proceedings to be initiated by the Attorney General or a state’s attorney. In 1909, the Boards of Managers/Governors of the Chicago and Illinois State Bar Association assumed responsibility of disciplinary proceedings. In 1938, the Supreme Court began appointing Commissioners from the boards of the CBA and ISBA to receive and adjudicate claims of misconduct.

By 1971, the Chicago and Illinois State Bar Associations petitioned the Court for relief from their responsibilities citing the expensive and time-consuming nature of the duties. The result was the adoption of Illinois Supreme Court Rules 750-756 in 1973. The Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission was created pursuant to Rule 751. In adopting these rules, the Illinois Supreme Court created a system of discipline of attorneys exclusively under the jurisdiction of the Court.

The question before this Court is whether the ARDC is an “agency” as defined by the Administrative Procedure Act. We agree with Respondent's argument that the Illinois Appellate Court had held that the ARDC is not a “state agency” as defined by the Illinois State Auditing Act. Chicago Bar Ass’n v. Cronson, 183 Ill. App. 3d 710, 720 (1989). Because of this same reasoning, we similarly find that the ARDC is not an “agency” as defined by the Administrative Procedure Act.

In Cronson, the Appellate Court noted that the ARDC was “created by Illinois Supreme Court rules adopted pursuant to the Supreme Court’s inherent, exclusive constitutional authority” and the ARDC’s “duties, structure, and authority to collect and administer funds…derive exclusively from rules of the Illinois Supreme Court.” Id. at 720. The Cronson Court found that the plain language of the definition of state agency in the Illinois Auditing Act does not include the [ARDC] because the definition of state agency contains those agencies created by statute or executive order. Neither the [ARDC] nor the Board of Law Examiners is created by the Constitution, nor is either created by or pursuant to statute or created by executive order. Id.

The Administrative Procedure Act provides an almost identical definition of

“agency:”

“Agency” means each officer, board, commission, and agency created by the

Constitution, whether in the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of State

government, but other than the circuit court; each officer, department, board, [*138]

commission, agency, institution, authority, university, and body politic and

corporate of the State; each administrative unit or corporate outgrowth of the State

government that is created by or pursuant to statute, other than units of local

government and their officers, school districts, and boards of election

commissioners; and each administrative unit or corporate outgrowth of the above

and as may be created by executive order of the Governor. “Agency,” however,

does not include the following:

(1) The House of Representatives and Senate and their respective standing and

service committees, including without limitation the Board of the Office of the

Architect of the Capitol and the Architect of the Capitol established under the

Legislative Commission Reorganization Act of 1984.

(2) The Governor.

(3) The justices and judges of the Supreme and Appellate Courts.

(4) The Legislative Ethics Commission.

5 ILCS 100/1-20

Given the nearly identical definition contained in the Administrative Procedure Act, the same analysis adopted by the Cronson Court applies. The Illinois Supreme Court created the ARDC and delegated to it the Court’s inherent and exclusive authority to discipline members of the Illinois bar. Ill. S. Ct. R. 751. The Administrative Procedure Act’s definition of “agency,” confines its definition to the same limitation of the Illinois State Auditing Act: 1) agencies created by the Constitution; 2) agencies created by statute; and 3) agencies created by executive order. Using the same approach as that in Cronson, supra, the ARDC is neither created by the Constitution, nor is it created by or pursuant to statute, nor is it created by executive order.

Also noteworthy is the Administrative Procedure Act’s exclusion of “justices and judges of the Supreme and Appellate Courts” from the definition of “agency.” 5 ILCS 100/1-20. The Illinois Supreme Court has held that it has original and inherent jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law and this authority has been delegated to the ARDC. In Re Harris, 93 Ill. 2d 285, 291 (1982); also see Ill. S. Ct. R. 751. The Court noted that the ARDC and its various officers “serve only as agents of this Court in administering the disciplinary functions that have been delegated to them” In Re Mitan 75 Ill. 2d 118, 123-24 (1979). If the justices of the Illinois Supreme Court are excluded from the definition of “agency,” and if the Court’s inherent power to discipline attorneys is delegated to the ARDC and the ARDC acts as the Court’s agent, it logically follows that the ARDC also falls within this exclusion. For all these reasons, we find that the ARDC is not an “agency” as defined by the Administrative Procedure Act.

Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and this matter is Dismissed.

ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Claimant's Motion to Reconsider.

[*139] NATURE OF THE MOTION

Claimant, having been denied his pursuit of sanctions by the Hearing Board of the ARDC, the Supreme Court and by the Appellate Court, came before this Court seeking recovery of attorney’s fees against the ARDC for its bringing an allegedly unreasonable and untrue disciplinary complaint.

This Court denied Claimant his fees and dismissed his claim on June 17, 2019 for the reason that the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (“ARDC”) is not an “agency” as defined by the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). Claimant is now before this Court seeking reconsideration of that Order on the basis that the Order is based on the following incorrect propositions: that the ARDC is not an “agency” under the Illinois State Auditing Act and therefore not under the APA; the APA confines its definition of “agency” to those created by the Constitution, statute, and executive order; and justices of the Illinois Supreme Court are excluded from the definition of “agency.”

ANALYSIS

There is one question before this Court that is dispositive of Claimant's claim and legal theory, and that is whether the ARDC is an “agency” as defined by the APA. We have already established in our Order dated June 17, 2019 (“Order”) that it is not.

In his Petition currently before us, Claimant argues that we have ignored the plain meaning of the APA and have therefore exceeded our judicial authority in concluding that the APA’s definition of “agency” only includes those “created by the Constitution.” But since that is precisely what the statute states, to conclude otherwise would be to create ambiguity in the statute where none exists.

It is well established law that when interpreting the meaning of the provisions of a statute, we are bound to ascertain and give effect to the true intent of the legislature. See People ex rel. Director of Corrections v. Booth, 215 Ill. 2d 416, 423, 294 Ill. Dec. 157, 830 N.E.2d 569 (2005). The best evidence of legislative intent is the language in the statute itself. See Illinois State Treasurer v. Illinois Worker’s Compensation Commission, 30 N.E.3d 288, 295 (2015). That language must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. If the statutory language is clear, Courts must not read into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not express. Solich v. George & Anna Portes Cancer Prevention Center of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 76, 83, 196 Ill. Dec. 655, 630 N.E.2d 820 (1994).

5 ILCS 100/1-20 is very clear by the language. The APA states:

“‘Agency’ means each officer, board, commission and agency created by the

Constitution, whether in the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of State

government, but other than the circuit court; each officer, department, board,

commission, agency, institution, authority, university, and body politic and

corporate of the State;…” [*140]

The Claimant argues that the last clause “unambiguously and necessarily as a matter of English language includes the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission.” (Claimant's Pet. 3). We might agree, if the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission were a commission of the State. But the fact that it is a commission in title does not make it a commission of the State; rather, as we established in our Order dismissing Claimant's claim for attorney’s fees, the ARDC was created pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 751 and is a function of that Court.

We find here, as we did in our Order, Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Sperry, 214 Ill. 2d 371, 382 (2005); and King v. First Capital Financial Services Corp., 215 Ill. 2d 1, 12-13 (2005) to be controlling. Those cases reason that, in Illinois, control over both attorney admission, discipline and disbarment is a judicial function that arises logically from the attorney’s role as an officer of the court and from the judicial responsibility to maintain and supervise the courts.

For this Court to hold that the ARDC is included in the APA’s definition of “agency” because it is a “commission” would ignore the facts of the ARDC’s creation and case law.

We need not address Claimant's other arguments that as a result of our impermissible judicial interpretation, his federal and state constitutional rights have been violated.

For all of these reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Claimant's Motion to Reconsider is DENIED.

[*141] No. 17-CC-1771 - Claim Dismissed)

LARREESE BENNETT, Claimant v. STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent

Opinion entered September 25, 2019

Gregory T. Mitchell, for Claimant

Erin Walsh, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent

OPINION

GAGLIARDO, J.

THIS MATTER coming to be heard on Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, and the Court being fully advised in the premises.

THE COURT FINDS:

BACKGROUND

Claimant was hired by DHS on November 13, 2000, as a Mental Health Technician II. After nearly nine years in this position, Claimant was placed on administrative leave from his full-time position as Mental Health Technician II while an investigation was conducted after a patient reported that Mr. Bennett had engaged a patient in a “punching match.” The Office of the Inspector General for DHS reported the allegation of suspected abuse to Illinois State Police, which accepted the case for full investigation and resolution. Ultimately, Claimant was charged with “Care Facility Resident Abuse” and “Official Misconduct/Forbidden Act” in violation of the Illinois Criminal Code.

After this indictment was returned, DHS allegedly “recommended, encouraged, and pressured” Claimant to resign from his position with DHS in order to avoid criminal prosecution and possible jail time. Claimant refused to resign. According to Claimant, DHS “improperly threatened to place [him] on administrative leave without pay and prohibit Claimant from continuing his employment and receiving his regular pay, health insurance and other benefits.”

On October 4, 2010, Claimant was suspended without pay pending judicial verdict and was suspended for approximately eleven months. Claimant, a member of AFSCME-31, subsequently filed a grievance in late October.

Ultimately, a finding of not guilty was entered as to both charges against Mr. Bennett; the criminal case against him was dismissed. After the resolution of the criminal charges, DHS continued Mr. Bennett’s suspension without pay until September 22, 2011. Claimant alleges that after he demanded to be returned to work, DHS directed the OIG for DHS to re-characterize the ISP investigation as a “DHS-OIG administrative investigation” in order to support his improper termination. Claimant maintains this is all in retaliation for his refusal to resign and his demand to be reinstated.

[*142] Claimant's suspension without pay continued from August 31, 2011, through September 4, 2013. In the meantime, Claimant asserts that his grievance was pending appeal and advancement to an arbitration hearing. Claimant's employment was finally terminated on September 16, 2013. He alleges that he had no administrative hearing. Id. On January 9, 2017, Claimant filed a Complaint against State of Illinois, Department of Human Services.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A § 2-615 motion tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. 735 ILCS 5/2-615; Cowper v. Nyberg, 2015 IL 117811, ¶ 12. A § 2-615 motion to dismiss “alleges only defects on the face of the complaint” and asks “whether the allegations of the complaint, when taken as true and viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted.” Turner v. Memorial Medical Center, 233 Ill. 2d 494, 499 (2009).

A § 2-619 motion, on the other hand, functions to “dispose of issues of law and easily proved issues of fact at the outset of litigation.” Van Meter v. Darien Park Dist., 207 Ill. 2d 359, 367 (2003). When considering a motion to dismiss brought under § 2-619, the court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true as well as reasonable inferences that may arise from those facts. Patrick Engraving, Inc. v. City of Naperville, 2012 IL 113148, ¶ 32. All pleadings and supporting documents must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party when a court rules on the motion. Van Meter, 207 Ill. 2d at 367.

A motion with respect to the pleadings brought pursuant to § 2-615 may be filed in conjunction with a motion for involuntary dismissal or other relief under § 2-619. 735 ILCS 5/2- 619.1. A combined motion under § 2-619.1 shall be brought in specific parts, with each part limited to either §§ 2-615 or 2-619. 735 ILCS 5/2-619.1.

OPINION

1. This Court lacks jurisdiction over causes of action arising out of the U.S. Constitution and

the Constitution of the State of Illinois.

The Court of Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction. For the Court of Claims “to have subject matter jurisdiction over a claim, such jurisdiction must be granted… by statute.” Bingaman v. Ill. Dep’t of Human Services, 61 Ill. Ct. Cl. 238, 241 (2009). As a statutory court, the Court has “only those remedial powers and only that adjudicatory jurisdiction that is granted to [it] by the General Assembly.” Wulf v. Illinois, 51 Ill. Ct. Cl. 383, 388 (1999).

The Court’s sole statutory authority is derived from § 8 of the Court of Claims Act. See 705 ILCS 505/8. Accordingly, any jurisdictional analysis of a claim brought in the Court of Claims depends upon whether that claim “fall[s] within the scope of any jurisdictional grants” in § 8. Wulf, 51 Ill. Ct. Cl. at 388. The Court’s jurisdictional grant does not encompass claims based upon either federal or State constitutional issues. See Michaelis v. Ill. Dep’t of Mental Health & Developmental Disabilities, 61 Ill. Ct. Cl. 270, 272 (2008) (“[F]ederal and state constitutional issues are outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims.”) see also Caine v. Illinois, 47 Ill. Ct. Cl. 393, 395 (1995).

[*143] Accordingly, Counts I and II of Claimant's Verified Complaint are dismissed with prejudice.

2. This Court lacks jurisdiction over Claimant's breach of contract claim.

This Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (IPLRA) establishes a “comprehensive system of collective bargaining for those public employees and employers who fall within its scope” in the State of Illinois. City of Freeport v. Ill. State Labor Relations Bd., 135 Ill. 2d 499, 505 (1990). The IPLRA provided for the creation of the Illinois Labor Relations Board, which is compromised of the State Panel and the Local Panel. 5 ILCS 315/5(a). By statute, the State Panel of the Illinois Labor Relations Board (Board) has been given “jurisdiction over collective bargaining matters between employee organizations and the State of Illinois.” Id., (a-5).

Pursuant to this statutory scheme, courts have held that the Board has exclusive jurisdiction of breach of contract claims where interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement that falls within the province of the IPLRA. Cessna v. City of Danville, 296 Ill. App. 3d 156, 160, 166-68 (4th Dist. 1998). So holding promotes the legislature’s “intent to provide a uniform body of law in the field of labor-management relations to be administered by those who have the required expertise in this area.” Id. at 168. The stated purpose of the IPLRA is to “regulate labor relations between public employers and employees, including the designation of employee representatives, negotiation of wages, hours and other conditions of employment, and resolution of disputes arising under collective bargaining agreements.” 5 ILCS 315/2. To allow concurrent jurisdiction in multiple forums would hinder the achievement of this legislative goal and potentially lead to forum shopping and inconsistent judgments. Cessna, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 168.

At its foundation, Claimant's breach of contract claim requires interpretation of applicable grievance provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, placing the claim squarely within the jurisdiction of the Board.

While it is true that the Court of Claims normally is to have exclusive jurisdiction over “[a]ll claims against the State founded upon any contract entered into with the State of Illinois,” the Court has previously determined that is not the case with contracts governed by ILPRA. See 705 ILCS 505/8(b); Garde v. Bd. of Governors of Southern Ill. Univ., 53 Ill. Ct. Cl. 245 (2001).

According to § 16 of the IPLRA, “[a]fter the exhaustion of any arbitration mandated by this Act or any procedures mandated by a collective bargaining agreement, suits for violation of agreements… between a public employer and a labor organization representing public employees may be brought by the parties to such agreement in the circuit court in the county in which the public employer transacts business or has its principal office.” 5 ILCS 315/16. Section 25 of the IPLRA contains an unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity. Significantly, the State shall not be made a defendant or party in any court except as provided in only four other acts - one of which is the IPLRA. 745 ILCS 5/1.

[*144] The Court’s underlying historical purpose is to “hear and determine” claims against the State that are barred in the constitutional courts by sovereign immunity. Id. This purpose is no longer applicable in light of the legislature’s decision to abrogate sovereign immunity. Id.

By including a provision waiving sovereign immunity, the legislature indicated its intent that claims governed by the IPLRA were no longer committed to the Court of Claims’ exclusive jurisdiction. Furthermore, the purpose of the IPLRA is best served by the application of consistent and uniform law, which would be imperiled by any finding that the Court had concurrent jurisdiction over matters involving the interpretation of the provisions within a collective bargaining agreement.

Finally, the Claimant failed to properly exhaust his remedies before proceeding in the Court of Claims by failing to file suit against his union for breach of the fair duty of representation. And the union cannot be sued in the Court of Claims, as it has no jurisdiction over any entity other than the State.

For these reasons, Count III of Claimant's Verified Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

3. Claimant has failed to state a claim under the Wage Payment and Collection Act.

The Wage Payment and Collection Act specifically exempts employees of the State or Federal governments from its scope. See 820 ILCS 115/1 (“This Act applies to all employers and employees in this State, including employees of units of local government and school districts, but excepting employees of the State or Federal governments.”)

Since the Act does not apply to employees of State government, Claimant has failed to state a claim against Respondent and Count IV of Claimant's Verified Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

The motion of Respondent, STATE OF ILLINOIS, is GRANTED. Claimant's claim is DISMISSED with prejudice.