Timothy Radke v. State of Illinois

ORDER

BIRNBAUM, CJ.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Claimant’s Motion for Class Certification following an oral argument held on January 27, 2014, regarding whether the Court of Claims has jurisdiction over class actions.

NATURE OF THE CLAIM

On October 29, 2009, Claimant filed a putative class action complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. District Judge Milton Shadur dismissed the complaint for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. On November 24, 2009, Claimant re-filed the complaint in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Chancery Division, where the Circuit Court Judge Mary Rochford dismissed the case with prejudice on the grounds that the Illinois Court of Claims had exclusive jurisdiction.

On August 10, 2010, Claimant filed a putative class action complaint in this Court alleging that Respondents used a “Category 1 list” in the University of Illinois admissions process. Claimant asserts the list rewarded political clout, money, and power over prior academic achievement and merit. Claimant seeks damages, on behalf of himself and a putative class of individuals who applied for admission to the University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana between 1999 and August 6, 2009, paid an application fee, and were not offered admission. On November 3, 2011, this Court granted in part and denied in part Respondent's Motion to Dismiss. Specifically, this Court dismissed Claimant's claims against individual Respondents and dismissed Claimant's constitutional claims of due process and equal protection while remanding the breach of contract claim and common law fraud claim. Since that time, the parties have conducted written discovery, exchanged documents, and taken depositions.

On February 14, 2013, this Court scheduled an oral argument for March 12, 2013 on the question of whether the Court of Claims has jurisdiction to hear class action litigation. At the request of the parties, this Court canceled the March 12, 2013 oral argument and held in abeyance both the jurisdictional and the class certification arguments until the parties completed discovery. On October 10, 2013, the parties filed a joint motion asking the Court to schedule an oral argument on the sole question of whether the General Assembly has granted this Court [*83] jurisdiction to adjudicate class action claims against the State. The parties further asked that the Court continue to hold in abeyance the argument on the merits of Claimant's Motion for Class Certification. On January 27, 2014, an oral argument was held on the question of whether the Court of Claims has jurisdiction to hear class action litigation.

ANALYSIS

Respondent argues this Court should dismiss the class action allegations of Claimant's Complaint because the Court of Claims Act does not provide this Court with the authority to adjudicate class action disputes against the State. Specifically, Respondent argues that the General Assembly has not waived sovereign immunity relative to class action claims against the State and has not given this Court authority through the Court of Claims Act to adjudicate class action claims against the State. Additionally, Respondent alleges Claimant is unable to point to any language in the Court of Claims Act affirmatively waiving sovereign immunity relative to class action suits or giving the Court of Claims jurisdiction over class action claims against the State.

Respondent also notes the General Assembly has sound logic to limit the Court’s jurisdiction over class action suits to conserve government time, money, and resources (citing the unique procedures and burdens in class actions suits). Respondent argues that if the Court of Claims concludes it has jurisdiction over class action litigation, the Court will have to decide whether Claimant can satisfy the requirements of 735 ILCS 5/2-801 to certify the class. 735 ILCS 5/2-801 states:

Prerequisites for the maintenance of a class action. An action may be maintained

as a class action in any court of this State and a party may sue or be sued as a

representative party of the class only if the court finds:

(1) The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;

(2) There are questions of fact of law common to the class, which common

questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual members;

(3) The representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the

class; and

(4) The class action is an appropriate method for the fair and efficient adjudication

of the controversy.735 ILCS 5/2-801

Respondent argues that determining certification pursuant to Section 2-801 will greatly tax the resources of the Court. Respondent argues that this type of burden would not be imposed on the Court of Claims absent an express mandate by the General Assembly.

Conversely, Claimant argues that because the Court of Claims enacted 74 Ill. Admin. Code §790.20 which states “pleadings and practice shall follow the Civil Practice Law”, the class action statute is part of the Civil Practice Law. Claimant argues that this Court has therefore adopted the class action statue as part of its procedural rules and has jurisdiction to entertain Claimant's claim as a class action. §790.20 states: “Except as otherwise provided by this Part or [*84] by the Court of Claims Act, pleadings and practices shall follow the Civil Practice Law and the Rules of the Supreme Court of Illinois.” 74 Ill. Admin. Code §790.20.

Claimant cites precedent arguing that class action claims are procedural - concerning how claims are litigated and not what claims are litigated (emphasis added): “A ‘class action’ is a ‘procedural vehicle’ under which claims by multiple persons may be decided in a single action…Thus, the designation of an action as a ‘class action’ merely identifies the procedural device under which the class members’ claims will be litigated.” Uchumi Supermarkets Ltd. v. Diners Club International, Ltd., 309 Ill. App. 3d 902, 905 (1999). As such, Claimant argues that because the Court of Claims enacted the Civil Practice Law, and the Court of Claims Rules make no mention of the class action device, the class action statute has been adopted as part of the Rules of this Court and this Court must apply and follow its own Rules in the claim before us. The Court is not persuaded by this argument. Many sections of the Civil Practice Law are not applicable to the Court of Claims and its jurisdictional authority. Specifically, this Court has consistently held we lack jurisdiction over constitutional claims and injunctive relief as the General Assembly has not enumerated within the Civil Practice Law. Hyche v. State, 52 Ill. Ct. Cl. 375 (1999); Reyes v. State, 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 498 (1979); Sass v. State, 36 Ill. Ct. Cl. 111 (1984).

On January 17, 2014, Respondent filed an additional reply to Claimant's Brief Regarding Class Action Jurisdiction. In its reply, Respondent argues that this Court does not have the authority to define its own jurisdiction through the adoption of rules of practice. It is well decided by this Court that the Court of Claims can only have subject matter jurisdiction over a claim when such jurisdiction is granted to us by statute by the General Assembly. Wulf v. State, 51 Ill. Ct. Cl. 383 (1999); Klopfer v. Court of Claims, 286 Ill. App. 3d 499, 505 (1st Dist. 1997).

Respondent also cites specific sections of the Court of Claims Act to suggest that the General Assembly intended the Court to only hear claims brought by individual claimants. Respondent cites 705 ILCS 505/11(a) which states:

Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this Section and subsection (4)

of Section 24, the claimant shall in all cases set forth fully in his petition the

claim, the action thereon, if any, on behalf of the State, what persons are owners

thereof or interested therein, when and upon what consideration such persons

became so interested; that no assignment or transfer of the claim or any part

thereof or interest therein has been made, except as stated in the petition; that the

claimant is justly entitled to the amount therein claimed from the State of Illinois,

after allowing all just credits; and that claimant believes the facts stated in the

petition to be true. The petition shall be verified, as to statements of facts, by the

affidavit of the claimant, his agent, or attorney.

705 ILCS 505/11(a)

Respondent argues this provision does not permit a claimant to file a single petition on behalf of thousands of individuals. They also cite 705 ILCS 505/12 which permits the Court to direct any claimant to appear and be examined on oath concerning any matter pertaining to a claim. Respondent argues this provision assumes that the claimant is before the Court and can be [*85] compelled to appear and testify under oath, not possible in the class context with thousands of absent class members.

This Court agrees with Respondent. Section 705 ILCS 505/11 specifically states that the claimant shall in all cases set forth fully in his petition the claim…” (emphasis added). Id. The rules of this Court require that all potential claimants must file individual petitions and have such individual petition verified by the claimant, his agent, or attorney. This holding overrules Gendel v. State, 38 Ill. Ct. Cl. 76 (1984) and any other Court of Claims precedent that concludes or implies the Court of Claims has jurisdiction over class actions.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Claimant's putative class action claim is DISMISSED.

DISSENTING

KUBASIAK, J.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s order dismissing Claimant's claim on the grounds that this Court has no jurisdiction over Claimant's class action contract claim. The Court of Claims Act (“Act”) specifically grants jurisdiction over all claims against the State founded upon any contract entered into with the State of Illinois. 705 ILCS 505/8(b). Claimant's complaint as a class action suit does not change the substantive issues over which the Court has jurisdiction. In contrast, the class action, as the Illinois Supreme Court has determined, is merely a procedural device for the purpose of judicial economy. Mashal v. City of Chicago, 2012 IL 112341, ¶42, 981 N.E.2d 951 (2012). In fact, “it is not meant to alter the parties’ burdens of proof, right to a jury trial, or the substantive prerequisites to recover under a given tort.” Id. Moreover, nothing in 705 ILCS 505/8, which explicitly establishes the Court’s jurisdiction, addresses class actions or more importantly, the exclusion of class actions.

Instead, the basis of the majority’s order relies on the language of 705 ILCS 505/11(a) which states that the “claimant shall in all cases set forth fully in his petition the claim…” (emphasis added). However, the importance that the majority places on these individual terms expands the reach of the Act by defining jurisdiction where the Act has not. In particular, the Court today has required each individual claimant to file a petition in his own name in order for this Court to have jurisdiction over the claim. While Respondent admits in oral arguments that the Court can consolidate 10,000 individually filed petitions to hear them as one case, it contradictorily argues that the Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the same case procedurally consolidated through class certification. Thus, the reasoning for this limitation of jurisdiction is unsupported by sound logic or authority.

Respondent claims that because 705 ILCS 505/11(a), which details the requirements for filed claims, states “his petition,” that somehow the legislature intended the Court to only hear claims brought by individuals. However, several sections in the Civil Practice Law (“CPL”) similarly refer to the plaintiff as an individual without eliminating the availability of the right to file as a class. For instance, 735 ILCS 5/2-604 states: “Every count in every complaint and counterclaim shall contain specific prayers for the relief to which the pleader deems himself or [*86] herself entitled…” (emphasis added). Although the CPL describes the plaintiff as an individual, the individual plaintiff is not prohibited from filing a class action suit under 735 ILCS 5/2-801.

Furthermore, because the Act allows the Court to establish rules for its government and for the regulation of practice therein, the rules provided by the CPL are incorporated through the Illinois Administrative Code (“Code”) to the extent that they are not otherwise provided by the Code or Act. 705 ILCS 505/9; 74 Ill. Admin. Code §790.20. Therefore, because the CPL allows class actions and neither the Code nor Act addresses them, the CPL applies and the Court has jurisdiction over class action suits. To hold otherwise is an improper expansion of the Act. Lastly, although the Court has no jurisdiction over constitutional issues, it cannot be ignored that the Court’s denial of Claimant's state-created right to proceed as a class, without authority from the Act, raises serious questions regarding Claimant's right to due process. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 432 (1982) (finding that the appellant’s right to use FEPA’s adjudicatory procedures was a species of property protected by the Due Process Clause).

Accordingly, I would find that the Court of Claims does have jurisdiction over class action suits and grant a hearing to determine whether Claimant's claim meets the requirements for class certification pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-801.

OPINION

BIRNBAUM, CJ.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This matter is before the Court on Claimant's Petition for Rehearing. On June 29, 2015, the Court of Claims dismissed the Claimant's class action claim. Claimant filed a Petition for Rehearing on July 23, 2015. Respondent filed a response to Claimant's Petition for Rehearing on August 12, 2015. Claimant then filed a reply in support of the original Petition for Rehearing on August 24, 2015.

LEGAL STANDARD

For a petition for rehearing, the Court of Claims follows Rule 220. The rule states in relevant part:

A party desiring a rehearing or new trial in any case shall, within 30 days after the

filing of the opinion or order, file with the Clerk 4 copies of the petition for

rehearing. The petition shall state briefly the points supposed to have been

overlooked or misapprehended by the Court, with authorities and

suggestions concisely stated in support of the points. A copy of the petition

shall be served on counsel for the other party and proof of service shall be shown

in the petition. Any petition violating this Section will be stricken. 74 Ill. Adm.

Code 790.220 (emphasis added).

[*87] ISSUES

In Claimant's Petition for Rehearing, Claimant alleges that a rehearing is necessary because (1) this Court misapprehended the Illinois Court of Claims Act, (2) this Court misapprehended established precedent by overruling Gendel v. State, (3) Claimant and the Class are without a remedy, and (4) Claimant and the Class were denied due process.

ANALYSIS

I. This Court Correctly Interpreted the Illinois Court of Claims Act.

Claimant alleges this Court “misapprehended the Illinois Court of Claims Act” because this Court had “no reasonable basis to foreclose jurisdiction in class actions claims.” Claimant's Petition for Rehearing points to the use of the term “all claims” in 705 ILCS 505/8 and Claimant states the term “all claims” “necessarily includes class actions.” Claimant then cites a concurring opinion from Garimella v. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois, which stated that the term “all claims” must be analyzed under the “plain and ordinary meaning: that ‘all’ means all and does not mean some.” Claimant's Petition for Rehearing at Pg. 4-5, quoting 50 Ill. Ct. Cl. 350 (1996).

This Court finds the concurring opinion in Garimella does not apply to this case. First, the concurring judge was speaking of the ability of this Court to rule on “equitable claims” not class action lawsuits. Garimella, 50 Ill. Ct. Cl. 358. It is noteworthy that Judge Epstein whose concurring Opinion in Garimella is cited by Claimant is also the author of an opinion five years later that is adverse to Claimant's position. (See infra.) Further, this Court is not denying Claimant the ability to pursue a claim. It is only denying the use of a class action as a vehicle to do so. Claimant Timothy Radke can bring his claim without the use of a class action.

Claimant also emphasizes Judge Kubasiak’s dissent from the majority’s Order, in which an argument is made that the word “his” in “his petition,” found in 705 ILCS 505/11(a), could be applied to more than one plaintiff, despite the singular nature of the word “his.” Claimant's Petition for Rehearing Pg. 4. But, Claimant's interpretation of the word “his” is inconsistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of the word “his.” Claimant cannot request this Court to interpret a statute using a plain and ordinary meaning for one word, “all,” and then request this Court to interpret another word in that same statute, “his,” beyond the plain and ordinary meaning of that word. In other words, if “all” means “all” and not “some”, then “his” must mean “his” and not “their.”

“[The Court of Claims] is a statutory Court, and has only those remedial powers and only that adjudicatory jurisdiction that is granted to [the Court] by the General Assembly…the only statutory delegation of authority to this Court is set forth in section 8 of the Court of Claims Act (705 ILCS 505/8).” Wulf v. State of Illinois, 51 Ill. Ct. Cl. 383, 388 (1999).

Claimant claims this Court is creating law and going against the legislature’s intent, but this Court is doing the exact opposite. The Court of Claims is strictly a statutory court with “no inherent or common law power,” and the Court “can only assume jurisdiction in conformity with [*88] the statute which empowers it.” Klopfer v. Court of Claims, 286 Ill. App. 3d 499, 505 (5th Dist. 1997).

II. The Court Did Not Misapprehend Gendel v. State.

In Section II of the Petition for Rehearing, Claimant alleges that this Court misapprehended Gendel v. State, 38 Ill. Ct. Cl. 76 (1984). Claimant goes on to describe holdings and implications found in Gendel and other Court of Claims cases that involved class actions. But as Judge Epstein noted in Farrell v. State, 52 Ill. Ct. Cl. 275, 279 (2000), the Court in Gendel assumed, rather than decided, the class jurisdiction question and as such Gendel is of limited precedential guidance. Farrell concluded that class jurisdiction is unsettled in the Court of Claims. Id.

III. Claimant and the Class Were Not Denied a Remedy.

As mentioned above, this Court is not denying Claimant the ability to pursue a claim against Respondent. This Court is ruling only that the legislature did not give this Court the ability to rule on class actions lawsuits. Claimant can still attempt to recover as a single claimant, and, therefore, Claimant is not denied a legal remedy.

Further, Claimant states that “the legislature clearly sought to preserve [class action relief].” Claimant's Petition for Rehearing Pg. 9. However, Claimant fails to state exactly why the legislature failed to express that the Court of Claims had authority over class action lawsuits in 705 ILCS 505/8. The exclusion of class actions from 705 ILCS 505/8 contradicts Claimant's finding that the legislature’s clear intent was to preserve class actions.

IV. Due Process.

This Court lacks jurisdiction to determine the merits of constitutionally based claims. In so far as Claimant alleges that this Court has denied his due process rights, we only say that the arguments from both parties were heard and fully considered by the Court, prior to making its original ruling and this ruling on rehearing.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Claimant's Motion for Rehearing is DENIED.