Osf Healthcare System v. State of Illinois

ORDER

MCGLYNN, J.

This cause coming on for hearing on Claimant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

The Claimant seeks compensation for medical services rendered to Richard Cacciola. Cacciola sustained head injuries while violently resisting arrest by an Illinois State Policeman, Matthew McFall.

The record indicates that an Illini ambulance conveyed Cacciola from the roadside scene of the occurrence to Illini Hospital. Dr. Gebler and emergency staff at Illini rendered treatment. Dr. Gebler testified they stabilized Cacciola’s emergency medical condition, but Dr. Gebler decided to transfer Cacciola to Claimant’s facility where a neurosurgeon would be available. Claimant seeks payment for emergency services it rendered to Cacciola.

Claimant’s Complaint alleges two theories: tort and contract. Claimant alleges it is entitled to payment because the injuries “were caused by an officer’s negligence or excessive use of force in the course of arrest.” Claimant also alleges that the State is responsible for the services on the basis of a breach of a “medical emergency implied contract theory.”

Cacciola filed a claim against Trooper McFall, (alleging excessive force), the Sheriff of Henry County, and others in U.S. District Court, Central District of Illinois, entitled Richard J. Cacciola vs. Matthew D. McFall, et al., 4:08-cv-04072. A jury returned a verdict in favor of McFall on April 18, 2012. The District Court entered judgment on the jury verdict. That judgment is final.

Claimant’s allegation that it is entitled to compensation for the excessive force and negligence of McFall suggests a tort theory against the State on the basis of respondeat superior. The judgment adjudicating and exonerating the State’s employee constitutes res judicata as to OSF’s tort claim based on respondeat superior. Bartley v. Illinois Department of Military Affairs, 60 Ill.Ct.Cl. 223 (2008).

Claimant argues, however, that the judgment does not act as a bar to its claim based on the theory of implied contract to perform emergency services. Claimant points out that the State [*126] is required to provide necessary medical treatment to a person in its custody, citing 725 ILCS 5/103-2(c).

Claimant argues that the State requested emergency medical treatment of Illini EMS, and it should not matter that Dr. Gebler ordered the transfer of Cacciola to St. Francis. Claimant relies on certain Exhibits attached to Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment as the factual basis for Claimant’s Motion.

The Respondent argues that it is entitled to summary judgment, because OSF did not present sufficient evidentiary facts to support the elements of its claim that a valid and enforceable contract existed. Respondent asserts that its agents neither requested nor derived benefit from the services provided by St. Francis to Cacciola.

Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, admissions, affidavits and other relative matters on file show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c); Freeman v. State, 55 Ill.Ct.Cl. 329, 334 (2003).

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of proof. Nedzvekas v. Fung, 374 Ill.App.3d 618, 624, 872 N.E.2d 431 (2007). The movant may meet its burden of proof either by affirmatively showing that some element of the case must be resolved in its favor or by establishing that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. Nedzvekas, 374 Ill.App.3d at 624, 872 N.E.2d 431 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). To prevent the entry of summary judgment, the nonmoving party must present a bona fide factual issue and not merely general conclusions of law. Caponi v. Larry’s 66, 236 Ill.App.3d 660, 670, 601 N.E. 2d 1347 (1992). Therefore, while the party opposing the motion is not required to prove its case at the summary judgment stage, it must provide some factual basis to support the elements of its cause of action. Illinois State Bar Ass’n Mutual Insurance Co. v. Mondo, 392 Ill.App.3d 1032, 1036, 911 N.E.2d 1144 (2009); Ralston v. Casanova, 129 Ill.App.3d, 1050, 1059, 473 N.E.2d 444 (1984).

On a motion for summary judgment, the court cannot consider any evidence that would be inadmissible at trial. Brown, Udell & Pomerantz, Ltd. v. Ryan, 369 Ill. App.3d 821, 824, 861 N.E. 2d 258 (2006). Thus, the party opposing summary judgment must produce some competent, admissible evidence which, if proved, would warrant entry of judgment in its favor. Brown, Udell & Pomerantz, 369 Ill.App.3d at 824, 861 N.E.2d 258.

Summary judgment is appropriate if the nonmoving party cannot establish an element of its claim. Willett v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 366 Ill.App.3d 360, 368, 851 N.E.2d 626 (2006). Written formalities such as definite terms and authorized signature are required on any contract of/or with the State. Rubidoux v. State, 51 Ill.Ct.Cl. 275 (1998). It is well settled with the Court that oral or implied contracts are enforced only when provided in an emergency. Sbigoli v. State, 53 Ill.Ct.Cl. 215 (2000).

The Claimant has failed to produce competent admissible evidence that an authorized representative of the State requested Claimant to provide Cacciola emergency medical treatment.

[*127] Claimant cites to hearsay statements in Exhibits 4, 7 - 17 attached to Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment as establishing the factual basis for the request, the contractual meeting of the minds.

Exhibit 4, the EMS Report, states: “PT who was in custody of P.D. Henry County P.D. stated that PT ran from him …” “Illinois State Police stated that they were not riding with us in the ambulance, but they were going to follow us to Illini.” “Once PT was in the ambulance Illinois State Police released the PT from the handcuffs.”

Exhibit 8 is a portion of the “Patient Record” of Richard Cacciola identifying Cacciola as the “Guarantor,” “Occupation: prisoner,” “Primary Insurer: Self.”

Exhibits 9, 10, and 11 are pages from the Patient Record which state on Exhibit 11: “discharged into the custody of the State Police.” The only matters pertinent to the Motion next appear on Exhibit 14, part of the Patient Record stating: “Nursing PT being discharged to the release of the State Police. Four officers present to escort PT out of building.”

Exhibit 15 is a copy of “Physicians Orders” which states: “OK to DC to IL State Police custody.”

Exhibit 17 is a “Discharge Medication Order Report” indicating that the Patient is to follow up with a trauma doctor in 1 to 2 weeks “unless head staples can be removed by facility staff.”

The hearsay statements in all of these Exhibits, apparently offered to prove the State Police maintained some custody over Cacciola, are equivocal and incompetent evidence. Evidence such as hearsay which is inadmissible at trial is not admissible in support of or in opposition to a summary judgment motion. People ex rel Madigan v. Kole, 968 N.E.2d 1108 (2nd Dist. 2012).

Furthermore, according to Cacciola, Henry County authorities had custody of him at discharge. The record includes Cacciola’s Amended Complaint which asserts in Paragraph 63 that the Sheriff of Henry County had Cacciola “taken off a medically induced coma in and forcibly removed from the I.C.U. of the St. Francis Medical Center by Officer under his control and pursuant to his authority as Sheriff of Henry County.” The Amended Complaint further provides the Sheriff placed Cacciola in the Henry County Jail from July 12, 2007, to July 20, 2007.

Summary Judgment in favor of Respondent is appropriate, because the Claimant has not provided competent evidence that an authorized agent of the State requested OSF to perform emergency services upon Cacciola. Further Claimant has not provided competent evidence that an authorized State agent represented to Claimant’s agent that the State would pay for services provided by OSF to Cacciola.

Accordingly, Claimant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED; Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.