Stanley Wofford v. State of Illinois

ORDER

BURNS, J. This cause comes before the Court on various motions by the parties, including the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss and the Claimant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court having read the pleadings and being fully advised in the premises finds:

FACTS

On November 5, 2010, the Claimant filed the instant Complaint against the Respondent alleging that the Illinois Department of Corrections ("IDOC") failed to [*173] properly apply the Mandatory Supervised Release ("MSR") term to his prison sentence. The Complaint alleges that as a result of the Respondent's alleged "misapplication" of the MSR law, the Claimant had to serve two years of MSR that he was not legally obligated to serve. He seeks $100,000 in damages.

The Complaint states that the Claimant was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. (Complaint, ¶1.) Claimant served ten years in prison, which he alleges was the completion of the sentence imposed by the trial judge. (Complaint, ¶4.) Claimant alleges that the remaining ten years were "eliminated" as a result of earned day-for-day good conduct credit and that, therefore, Claimant's entire judicial sentence was served in prison. (Id.)

After his release, Claimant was placed on MSR. (Complaint, ¶12.) Claimant states that he found himself confined by multiple restrictions that limited his freedom, and at one point was even placed back in prison as a result of violations of the terms of his MSR. (Complaint, ¶12.)

Claimant filed a habeas corpus petition with the Illinois Supreme Court; the petition was denied. (Complaint, ¶13.) Claimant has also filed a class action lawsuit in federal court. (Complaint, ¶5.)

Claimant argues that the Respondent "had a duty to apply the MSR term to Claimant’s judicial judgment in a way that [illegible] can harmonize with the day-for-day provisions pursuant to 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(2.1), the maximum sentence allowed by 730 1LCS 5/5-8- 1(1.5), and the trial judge's judgment." (Complaint, ¶18.)

The Claimant's case was assigned to a Court of Claims Commissioner. On March 2, 2011, the Commissioner entered an order as follows: 1. Discovery in this case is governed by Court of Claims Regulations, 74 Ill. Admin.

Code 790.55; 2. Respondent shall comply (if not already complied) with Rule 55 on or before May 20,2011; 3. No other discovery is permitted without leave of Court; and, 4. Respondent is granted through June 30, 2011, to file motions dispositive of some or all of the issues, and for filing affirmative defenses.

On May 4, 2011, the Claimant filed a Motion to Compel Discovery, which states that the Respondent did not comply with the March 2, 2011 order that directed Respondent to comply with Rule 55. The Respondent did not respond to Claimant's Motion to Compel Discovery. However, we note that the Claimant's Motion to Compel Discovery, filed May 4, 2011, was premature as Respondent was not ordered to produce discovery until May 20, 2011.

On August 14, 2011, the Claimant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. On September 8, 2011, the Respondent filed a Motion for Extension of Time to respond to the Claimant's summary judgment motion. On September 22, 2011, the Commissioner found as follows:

[*174] 1. On August 14, 2011, Claimant filed his Motion for Summary Judgment. 2. Respondent requires additional time within which to obtain the information necessary to provide the court with a concise response to Claimant's Motion. 3. This motion is made in good faith and not for the purposes of delay. 4. Claimant will not be unfairly prejudiced by the granting of this motion, but prejudice will ensure if not granted.

The Commissioner thus granted the Respondent's Motion for Extension of Time to respond to Claimant's Motion, and the Respondent was allowed an additional 45 days from the date of the Order in which to file its response. On October 27, 2011, the Respondent filed its "Combined Response to Claimant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Respondent's Motion to Dismiss." On November 21, 2011, the Claimant filed his Response to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss.

On January 26, 2012, the Claimant filed a Motion for Oral Argument on Summary Judgment.

ANALYSIS

Section 2-615 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure allows a party to bring a motion to dismiss based on the pleadings. 735 ILCS 5/2-615. A motion to dismiss under Section 2-615 challenges the legal sufficiency of the complaint by alleging defects on its face. Iseberg v. Gross, 366 Ill. App. 3d 857 (1st Dist. 2006). In ruling on a motion, it must be determined whether the allegations of the complaint, when viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. Ottawa Savings Bank v. JDI Loans, Inc., 374 Ill.App.3d 394, 401 (2d Dist. 2007). A section 2-615 motion admits as true all wellpleaded facts, but not conclusions of law or factual conclusions that are unsupported by allegations of specific facts." Ottawa, supra, 374 Ill.App.3d at 401.

Here, we find the Claimant's Complaint fails to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted and, therefore, must be dismissed.

The Claimant's Complaint states that his MSR term was misapplied because it was done after his judicially-imposed sentence. The Complaint states that "Respondent has no legal authority to confine Claimant for any time beyond that of the sentence imposed by the trial court..." (Complaint, ¶10). The Complaint also states that being placed on MSR was how the Claimant was "confined." (Complaint, 1112, 16) In essence, then, the Complaint argues that the MSR was misapplied because it was added on to the end of the Claimant's sentence instead of running concurrently with his sentence.

In Owens v. Snyder, 349 Ill.App.3d 35, 44-45 (2004), the Illinois Appellate Court explicitly rejected the argument that an inmate's MSR should run concurrently with an inmate's prison term. In that case, the petitioner filed a complaint for mandamus to [*175] prevent IDOC from imposing an MSR term on him after his sentences had been discharged. Finding the claim "frivolous" and "without merit," the court upheld the trial court's dismissal of the claim while noting that "[t]erms of mandatory supervised release are imposed by statute 'in addition ' to imprisonment." (emphasis added). Id. at 45.

In the present case, the Claimant argues that his prison sentence was discharged after 10 years and that the MSR should run concurrently with that prison term. Thus, as in Owens, the Claimant's claim has no merit. The Claimant here fails to plead any facts that would suggest that he has a clear right to have his MSR included in his determinate sentence as opposed to added at the end.

Because the Claimant cannot show that the Respondent had a duty to include the Claimant's MSR into his determinate sentence, the Claimant has failed to state a cause of action for negligence and, therefore, his claim for negligence must be dismissed.

As for any constitutional claims that the Claimant may be alleging, it is well-settled that this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear claims based on violations of the U.S. Constitution. Hyche v. State, 52 Ill. Ct. Cl. 375 (1999). Nor does this Court have jurisdiction to decide whether a statute violates the Illinois Constitution. Sass v. State, 36 Ill. Ct. Cl. Ill (1984).

We find the Claimant's Complaint, therefore, fails to state a cause of action for which relief can be granted and must be dismissed.

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and the Claimant's Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. All other pending motions are hereby declared moot.