THEODORE H. BELL, II, #B52015, Claimant, v. STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent.
Case summary
Claimant, an inmate, alleged he was injured when a gate at Hill Correctional Center closed on him. The court found his testimony not credible and that his own lack of care was the proximate cause of his injuries, denying the claim.
Cases cited: Von Moore v. State of Illinois, 50 Ill.Ct.Cl. ...; Gavin v. State of Illinois, 39 Ill.Ct.Cl. 146 (1986); Jacobs v. State of Illinois, 49 Ill.Ct.Cl. 16 (1997)
AI-generated summary from the opinion text — may contain errors. The opinion text and PDF above are the official record.
Headnotes
- MICHAEL BANKHEAD, Assistant Attorney General, Respondent.
- Negligence- Elements- Claimant must prove the State owed him a duty, and that duty was breached by a negligent act or omission, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of his injuries.
- Negligence- Res ipsa loquiturThis Court has concluded that res ipsa loquitur is to be applied only when Respondent fails to show State's exercise of proper care under the facts alleged of record. In addition, Claimant must be free from contributory negligence.
- Negligence- Liability- Inmates- The State is not an insurer as to the safety of an inmate in its custody.
- Negligence- Inmate- Proximate cause- Where an inmate's lack of care is to be the proximate cause of the accident, there can be no recovery.
- Negligence- Comparative negligence- Proximate Cause- This Court has held that the adoption of the doctrine of comparative negligence in the State of Illinois did not extinguish the requirement of proximate cause. The failure to establish proximate cause of an injury precludes liability, negating the need to compare fault.
OPINION
BIRNBAUM, J.
Theodore H. Bell, II, an inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections, brings this claim for negligence against the Department of Corrections for an injury he claims he sustained while he was incarcerated at the Hill Correctional Center ("Hill"). The claim is before the Court following an evidentiary hearing. The evidence presented at that hearing is as follows.
Claimant worked as a clerk at the Hill Correctional Industries.
His typical work hours were 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. On April 14, 2003, after finishing his work day, Claimant along with other inmates were escorted from the Hill Correctional Industries to his housing unit at Hill by Correctional Officer Dale P. Dingman.
They
approached Gate 5 at Hill. According to Correctional Officer Dingman, under normal circumstances, the gate would open to about 15 feet wide.
The gate controls are located in a tower that controls all of the gates at Hill. At that time, according to both Claimant and Correctional Officer Dingman, another inmate, Mr.
[*179] Ferguson, went through the gate without incident as it began to open to about 3 feet wide. According to Correctional Officer Dingman, who was walking about 12 feet behind Claimant, the gate then began to close. Claimant, who was following inmate Ferguson, then tried to go through the gate when the gate began closing.
Correctional
Officer Dingman observed that Claimant tried to "slip through" the gate.
Correctional
Officer Dingman believed that if he were passing through the gate, the amount of time available to pass through the gate was doubtful.
Claimant testified on direct examination that as he passed through the gate, it began to close injuring him.
Claimant testified that he had to angle his right shoulder forward as he stepped through the gate.
Claimant was then caught and pinned by the gate for about 15 to 25 seconds.
Inmates tried to pull the gate off of Claimant. Correctional Officer Hayes, the officer in charge of the gate controls located in the tower, opened the gate as soon as he heard over the intercom that someone was caught in the gate.
On cross-examination, Claimant testified that the gate was opening as he approached it.
Claimant argues that there had been "problems" with Gate 5.
However, the "problem" was never described.
Significantly, no evidence of any issues with Gate 5 was introduced at the hearing. To the contrary, inmate Ferguson testified that he had been an inmate at Hill for 5 years and was unaware of any malfunction of the gate. Correctional Officer Hayes, at the time of the incident, had worked at Hill for a year and nine months and was unaware of any inmate being trapped by the gate.
He testified that the gate worked properly both before and after the incident.
After Claimant was freed from the gate he was taken to the health care unit. The medical report contains a finding of redness, bruising, and edema on Claimant's chest. On May 20, 2003, Claimant was seen by a medical doctor.
Claimant reported pain in the chest and back. The physical examination revealed no sign of serious injury.
Mr. Bell was prescribed Naprosyn, a pain medication, as needed
Claimant's pain had largely subsided by June 23, 2003.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
In order for Claimant to recover, he must prove the State owed him a duty, and that duty was breached by a negligent act or omission, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of his injuries. Von Moore v. State of Illinois, 50 Ill.Ct.Cl. 194 (1998). The Court will also consider the comparative negligence of Claimant in adopting an award. Jacobs v. State of Illinois, 49 Ill.Ct.Cl. 16 (1997).
Claimant asserts the liability of Respondent under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur since the gate was under the exclusive control of Respondent and that Claimant would not have been pinned by the gate had Respondent taken proper care in its operation. This Court has concluded that the doctrine is to be applied only when Respondent fails to show State's exercise of proper care under the facts alleged of record.
Enyart v. State of Illinois, 57 Ill.Ct.Cl. 202 (2004).
In addition, Claimant must be free from contributory negligence. Wiegers v. State of Illinois, 40 Ill.Ct.Cl. 88 (1988), citing People v. Morris, 60 Ill. App. 3d 1003 (1st Dist. 1978).
[*180] Here, the gate was in good working order according to an inmate witness and a correctional officer. There was no evidence of any prior malfunction with the gate introduced at the hearing.
The State is not an insurer as to the safety of an inmate in its custody.
Petrusak v. State of Illinois, 39 Ill.Ct.CL. 113 (1987).
Here, the gate was opened at least three feet before it started to close.
Correctional Officer Dingman observed Claimant trying to "slip through" the gate as it was closing.
He observed that the gate was open about a foot when Claimant tried to pass through.
On the other hand, Claimant's testimony that he simply tried to pass through the gate and the gate then started to close in on him too quickly for him to move out of the way is at best confusing. At first, on cross-examination, Claimant testifies that the gate was opening when he approached it.
Later in the cross-examination, he claims that the gate changed direction and pinned him before he could move out of the way.
Claimant's
version of the events is simply not credible in light of his conflicting testimony.
It is more plausible that Claimant saw the gate closing and tried to slip through
before the gate closed.
Unfortunately, he was mistaken in how much time he had and got
caught before he could pass through the gate.
It is this miscalculation by Claimant that
demonstrates a lack of care by Claimant that led to his injuries. Where an inmate's lack of
care is to be the proximate cause of the accident, there can be no recovery. Gavin v. State of
Illinois, 39 Ill.Ct.Cl. 146 (1986). Claimant, and not the Respondent, was the proximate cause
of Claimant's injuries. Thus, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable in the case at
bar.
As to any comparative fault, this Court has held that the adoption of the doctrine of comparative negligence in the State of Illinois did not extinguish the requirement of proximate cause.
Jacobs v. State of Illinois, 49 Ill.Ct.Cl. 16 (1997). The failure to establish proximate cause of an injury precludes liability, negating the need to compare fault. Id. Because Claimant failed to establish the proximate cause of his injuries by Respondent, the doctrine of comparative negligence does not apply in this case.
In conclusion, Claimant has failed to prove his claim by a preponderance of the evidence and, therefore, the claim is denied.