Kelli Knight v. State of Illinois

ORDER

Birnbaum, J.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Claimant’s Summary Judgment Motion and Respondent’s Cross Summary Judgment Motion. Nature of the Claim

Claimant earned a B.S. Degree in Marketing and a Master’s in Business Administration from Illinois State University during the period of August 2004 to December of 2007.

Starting in August 2006, Claimant worked as a full time graduate assistant for the University’s Career Center.

In August 2007, Illinois State University

Associate Dean and MBA Director, Dr. Sukjung John Chang (“Dr. Chang”), announced an opening for the University’s MBA Program Coordinator.

When filling a position with an academic department at the University, the Human Resources Department posts the job, containing specific request concerning minimum requirements for the job, on the website.

The position of MBA Program Coordinator clearly stated it required a master’s degree, preferably a MBA.

The position of the University’s Program Coordinator involved one-year contracts with a salary of $40,500, including certain benefits.

Claimant applied for the position and subsequently interviewed with MBA Program staff members on or around September 10th and 14th, 2007.

On September 18, 2007, Dr. Chang verbally offered Claimant the MBA Program Coordinator position and wrote the salary of the position on his business card, which he gave to Claimant.

Dr. Chang then sent Claimant an email on or about September 18, 2007 detailing the specifics of the job and asking for a response by Claimant.

Claimant

allegedly accepted the position by signing a subsequent letter on September 25, 2007 sent by Dr. Chang, offering her the position as Program Coordinator in the MBA Program of College of Business at Illinois State University effective October 16, 2007.

On September

26, 2007 Dr. S.J. Change published information in an Illinois State University press release that Claimant was appointed the new Program Coordinator for the MBA Program.

On or around this time, Claimant contacted the Director of the Career Center, Mike Schermer, and resigned her position of graduate assistant because she had accepted the [*211] position of the University’s MBA Program Coordinator.

On September 28, 2007, the University communicated to Claimant they would not be hiring her for the position as she failed to meet the requirement of having a master’s degree at the time of application.

Dr. Cheng testified he knew Claimant had not completed her master’s degree and would not until December of 2007.

He admitted his mistake of offering Claimant the job and wrote a letter of apology.

Claimant was unable to regain full time employment until April of 2008 when she accepted a position as Career Services Coordinator for the University of Missouri, St. Louis.

Applications from applicants whose on-line response do not meet the minimum requirements for the job are eliminated by the computer and are not forwarded to the department for consideration.

A master’s degree, preferably an MBA, was a requirement for the MBA Program Coordinator position.

In her online application, Claimant stated she had already earned her MBA.

All other applicants for this position had already received their required MBAs at the time of application.

Respondent asserts that had Claimant correctly stated that she had not yet earned her MBA, her application would have been eliminated by the Human Resources online system and would not have been forwarded to Dr. Chang for consideration.

Claimant filed her lawsuit on or about February 17, 2009 alleging Respondent entered into a one-year contract of employment with Claimant on September 24, 2007.

She

seeks relief of $50,000 in monetary damages to compensate for lost wages and benefits and reasonable litigation costs.

Additionally, Claimant requests the award of retroactive reinstatement in respect to participation in all employee benefit plans and all other benefits available had she been employed as the University’s MBA Program Coordinator.

Claimant relies under a theory of promissory estoppel and apparent authority, where the employer makes a clear promise and the employee relies upon that promises to their detriment.

Claimant cites Patkus v. Sangamon-Cass Consortium,769 F. 2d 1251, 1264 (1985), which states that even if an employer’s stated policies fail to prove to have a contractual status, an Illinois employee may still recover under the theory of promissory estoppel.

Claimant also includes a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Claimant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.

In its Cross Summary Judgment Motion, Respondent claims that no employment contract existed and Dr. Chang did not have authority to offer claimant the job.

Respondent

asserts it was up to the Dean of the College of Business, Dr. Chang’s supervisor, to choose the candidate for the position.

Further, Respondent claims Dr. Chang lacked authority to waive the MBA requirement for the position.

Although he was aware Claimant had not yet earned her MBA, Dr. Chang believed she could be considered for the position because Human Resources forwarded her application after meeting the online requirements.

When

Human Resources initiated the paperwork for an employment contract with Claimant, they learned she lacked the necessary MBA, or general master’s degree, requirement and advised Dr. Chang that the offer would have be rescinded.

Further, Respondent asserts the Court of Claims lacks jurisdiction over promissory estoppel claims.

Lastly, Respondent claims any emotional distress Claimant asserts was the result of her own actions.

Respondent requested this Court deny Claimant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and grant Respondent’s own Motion for Summary Judgment against Claimant.

Analysis

[*212] Under 705 ILCS 505/8(b) the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction on all claims against Respondent “found upon any contract entered into with the State of Illinois”. In order to prove a breach of contract, the Claimant has the burden of proving to be a preponderance of the evidence that a contract existed.

Black v. State, 49 Ill. Ct. Cl. 143 (1996).

Respondent contends that summary judgment is proper, as no employment contract ever existed, as the September 2007 letter signed by Claimant was not an employment contract but a letter generated by the University’s Human Resources Department.

Additionally, Respondent asserts that the contract did not exist because Dr. Chang did not have authority to offer a job to Claimant and thus, cannot bind the state.

However, Claimant argues Dr. Chang had apparent authority to offer her the position.

When dealing with the subject of apparent authority, this Court has noted that the ability of a person with apparent authority to bind the State to a contract is generally eschewed when dealing with State entities.

Agles v. State, 37 Ill.Ct.Cl. 134 (1984).

The Agles Court

wrote, “The state cannot be bound by agents with apparent authority rather than actual authority in most situations because such a policy could be disastrous to the State’s budget”.

But there are circumstances where the Court of Claims has held that apparent authority can bind the State.

In Kent v. State, 32 Ill. Ct. Cl. 471 (1978), the Court held that Claimant was entitled to damages when he reasonably relied upon the representations of the supervisory personnel that he was hired for the job of Administrative Assistant and worked in that capacity for five months, turning down two other jobs on the representations of personnel that he was hired.

The Court entered an award on the ground that the State had induced claimant to perform services for it, and had accepted those services, with knowledge that he had not been legally hired.

Summary Judgment is only appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is otherwise entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law.

The movant has the burden of showing that, as a matter of law, it is entitled to summary judgment in its favor.

Further, the evidence under consideration in ruling on a motion for summary judgment is to be strictly construed against the moving party and liberally construed in favor of its opponent.

Wright . St. John’s Hospital, 299 Ill. App. 3d 680, 682-83 (1992).

If there exists no genuine issue of material fact, the Court must grant judgment as a matter of law, Brick v. City of Quincy, 241 Ill. App.3d 119 (1993).

This Court finds that material issues of fact exist as to whether an employment contract was established between Claimant and the State.

Particularly, this Court notes that Dr. Chang and other MBA Program staff members had knowledge Claimant lacked the required MBA degree during the interview process.

Secondly, there exists a disputed material fact of whether Claimant reasonably relied on the assumption that Dr. Chang had authority to offer her the job despite Respondents assertion that the Dean of College of Business was the only one with authority to make the selection and forward to Human Resources.

Dr. Chang testified he had the authority, based on past practice to extend the offer to Plaintiff. (Chang Dep. 9:18-22).

Additionally, Dr. Chang testified that he understood that when Claimant signed the letter offering her the position, that she had accepted the position of MBA Program Coordinator. (Chang Dep. 9:11-17).

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Claimant’s summary Judgment Motion is denied and Respondent’s Cross Summary Judgment Motion is denied as disputed factual issues remain [*213] regarding whether the parties agreed to a valid employment contract.

This case is remanded to the assigned Commissioner for further proceedings.

ORDER

J. Birnbaum

THIS MATTER is before the Court on a Recommendation from Commissioner Ysursa following a hearing held on February 7, 2012.

Nature of the Claim

Claimant earned a B.S. Degree in Marketing and a Master’s in Business Administration from Illinois State University (“University”) during the period of August 2004 to December 2007.

Starting in August 2006, while obtaining her MBA, Claimant worked as a full time graduate assistant for the University’s Career Center.

In August 2007, University Associate Dean and MBA Director, Dr. Sukjung John Chang (“Dr. Chang”), announced an opening for the University’s MBA Program Coordinator.

When filling a position with an academic department at the University, the Human Resources Department posts the job online, containing specific requests concerning minimum requirements for the job.

The position of MBA Program Coordinator stated it required a master’s degree, preferably a MBA, to be considered for the position.

The position of the University’s Program Coordinator involved one-year contracts with a salary of $40,500, including certain benefits.

At trial, Claimant described the interview process for the MBA Program Coordinator position.

Specifically, she stated that she participated in two interviews.

The first interview took place on September 14, 2007, with two University professors, Dr. McKee and Dr. Moon.

Claimant testified that she informed the two interviewing professors at that time that she was currently a MBA student and expected to graduate in December 2007.

The second interview was with the MBA Office staff, including Dr. Chang, B.J. Neumister and Serita Cox.

Claimant testified that there was a discussion at the time of this second interview, wherein she state she was a current MBA student and expected to graduate in December 2007.

Claimant testified she next spoke to Dr. Chang at the Career Fair, where Dr. Chang orally offered her the Program Coordinator position and gave him a business card with his number on the back to discuss more about the position in the future.

Claimant testified that at that time she was excited about the job offering but wanted time to think about it.

She stated that later that evening or the net day she received an email from Dr. Chang offering her the job.

Claimant testified that on September 25, 2007, she received and signed an employment agreement from Dr. Chang.

At this time, she met with Dr. Chang to provide her social security card, driver’s license and to fill out the necessary employment forms.

Claimant testified that at the time she believed that she was simply completing the new employee paperwork.

Next, Claimant identified Exhibit 10 as a letter dated September 28, 2007 from Dr. Chang rescinding her employment because Claimant failed to meet the job requirement of having a master’s degree at the time of application and initial employment.

Prior to receipt of the letter, Claimant also stated she received a voice message from Serita Cox informing her that the job offer was rescinded.

Claimant testified that she then emailed Dean Charles McGuire about the rescission of the job offer and offered to wait to start the position until after her graduation from MBA School.

She identified Claimant’s Exhibit 11 as a letter from Dr. Chang apologizing for the circumstances and that the recession of the [*214] offer was final.

She testified she contracted the University EEO Office about the situation but took no further action.

Claimant received her MBA from the University in December 2007 and later obtained employment at University of Missouri St. Louis Career Center in April 2008.

Claimant testified that the rescinded offer the Program Coordinator position at the University was frustrating and embarrassing.

She stated that she believed Dr. Chang had authority to offer the position and that she believed it was understood when filing out the application for the Program Coordinator position that she expected to complete her MBA degree in December 2007.

On cross examination, Claimant acknowledged that she did not have her MBA when she applied for the position.

Claimant also agreed that “have” means to be “in possession” in the present tense and that in her experience she understood the importance of accuracy in the application process.

Further, Claimant testified that she knew that the master’s degree was a requirement for the position and that she indicated “yes” on the online application inquiry regarding whether she held a master’s degree.

Additionally, on cross examination, Claimant stated that her previous employer at Career Services offered her a return position after the job rescission but Claimant declined.

On re-direct Claimant stated that her resume was submitted with her application and it stated that the completion date of her MBA to be in December of 2007.

The next witness was Dr. Chang, an Associate Dean for the MBA and undergraduate programs in the University College of Business for the past 22 years.

Dr. Chang testified he interviewed Claimant and did offer her the program Coordinator position.

He stated at the time of her interview, he believed Claimant met the minimum job qualifications because her application was forwarded to him by the Human Resources Department.

However, Dr. Chang testified he knew Claimant had not completed her master’s degree and would not until December of 2007.

Dr. Chang identified exhibit 9 as an email that was sent to College of Business staff and students announcing Claimant’s hiring.

He admitted his mistake of offering Claimant the job and said he wrote a letter of apology.

Dr. Chang stated that the recession was due solely to Claimant not having a master’s degree at the time of application, which was a requirement for the Program Coordinator position.

Respondent’s first witness was Derek Story, the current Associate Director of the University Human Resources Department.

Story testified that the first step in developing the application process for the filing of a University position is to develop a job description and establish the job’s minimum qualifications.

He stated that these minimum qualifications are then translated into disqualifying application questions that require “yes” or “no” answers.

Applications from applicants whose on-line response do not meet the minimum requirements for jobs are eliminated by the computer and are not forwarded to the Human Resources Department for consideration.

Story testified that the “master’s degree” qualification was the only disqualifying question contained in the online application for the MBA Program Coordinator position.

In her online application, Claimant stated she had already earned her MBA.

All other applicants for this position had already received their required master’s degree at the time of application.

Story stated that the Human Resources Department only discovered Claimant’s disqualification when the hiring information on the employment form indicated the lack of a master’s degree.

Story

testified that had Claimant correctly stated that she had not yet earned her MBA, her application would have been eliminated by the Human Resources online system and would not have been forwarded to Dr. Chang and the search committee for consideration.

[*215] Respondent’s next witness was Dr. Charles McGuire, who in 2007 was Assistant Provost and Interim Dean of College of Business at ISU.

Dr. McGuire testified that he remained Interim Dean until 2009.

He further testified that he is familiar with the hiring process for jobs in the College of Business.

He testified that the search committee did not have authority to offer Claimant employment.

He stated that the actual employment offer must come from Human Resources.

Typically, the search committee recommends an application to the Dean, the Dean makes a recommendation to Human Resources, and after Human Resources clears the paperwork the employment offer is made to the applicant.

In

his experience, Dr. McGuire was not aware of anyone being able to offer employment prior to final vetting by Human Resources.

Analysis

Claimant’s first claim for relief is based upon promissory estoppel.

The doctrine of promissory estoppel is a common law doctrine and has been incorporated into the Restatement (Second) of Contracts as section 90.

That section provides, in relevant part:

Promise Reasonably Inducing Action or Forbearance:

A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or

forbearance on the part of the promise or a third person and which does induce

such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by

enforcement of the promise.

The remedy granted for breach may be limited as

justice requires.”

Restatement (Second) of Contracts §901(1), at 242 (1981). Courts have held that to establish a claim under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, a plaintiff must prove that 1) defendant made an unambiguous promise to plaintiff, 2) plaintiff relied on such promise, 3) plaintiff’s reliance was expected and foreseeable by defendants and 4) plaintiff justifiably relied on the promise to its detriment.

Quake

Construction, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 141 Ill. 2d 281, 565 N.E. 2d 990 (1990).

Promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine offering relief where no legal remedy may be available.

The Court of Claims has consistently held that it lacks jurisdiction over claims sounding in equity.

Ace Coffee Bar, Inc. v. the University of Illinois, 51 Ill. Ct. Cl. 395 (1990); Garimella v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 50 Ill. Ct. Cl. 350 (1996).

This Court is not a court of general jurisdiction where it is empowered to consider the equities of a dispute.

Instead, the Court of Claims is a creature of statute and its jurisdiction is controlled by §505/8 of the Court of Claims Act.

705 ILCS 505/8.

Additionally, the Court of Claims lacks the authority to issue injunctive relief that either forbids or compels actions by any State officer or agencies.

A-Reliable Auto Parts and Wreckers v. State of Illinois, 54 Ill. Ct. Cl. 455 (2001).

While unsettled, a promissory estoppel claim may be beyond our jurisdiction.

Even assuming arguendo, that this Court did have jurisdiction to entertain Claimant’s promissory estoppel claim, Claimant’s Count IV fails to satisfy the doctrine’s elements.

In order to state a cause of action for promissory estoppel the Claimant must establish: 1) a promise, 2) which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promise, 3) which induces such action or forbearance, and 4) which must be enforced in order to avoid injustice.

Lawrence v. Board of Education of School District 189, 152 Ill. App. 3d 187, 201, 503 N.E. 2d 1201, 1210 (1987).

In this case, Claimant asserts that Dr. Chang, as the Associate Dean and the MBA Program Director, armed with the apparent authority of the University, offered Claimant [*216] the Program Coordinator position.

When dealing with the subject of apparent authority, this Court has noted that the ability of a person with apparent authority to bind the State to a contract is generally eschewed when dealing with State entities.

Agles v. State, 37 Ill. Ct. Cl. 134 91984); Ernat v. State of Illinois, 36 Ill. Ct. Cl. 822 (1984); Bellini v. State of Illinois, 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 701 (1982).

The Agles Court wrote, “The State cannot be bound by agents with apparent authority rather than actual authority in most situations because such a policy could be disastrous to the State’s budget”.

But there are circumstances where the Court of Claims has held that apparent authority can bind the State.

In Kent v. State, 32 Ill. Ct. Cl. 471 (1978), the Court held that Claimant was entitled to damages when reasonably relied upon the representations of the supervisory personnel that he was hired for the job of Administrative Assistant and worked in that capacity for five months, turning down two other jobs on the representations of personnel that he was hired.

The Court entered an award there in favor of Claimant on the ground that the State had induced Claimant to perform services for it, and had accepted those services, with knowledge that he had not been legally hired.

In this case, Claimant asserts she justifiably relied on the offer of employment to her detriment when she quit her graduate assistant position with the University Career Center.

Claimant argues that it would be unjust to deny her the compensation that she would have received had the Program Coordinator position offer not have been rescinded.

This Court finds it worth noting that Dr. Chang and other MBA Program staff members had knowledge Claimant lacked the required MBA degree during the interview process.

At the same time, this Court finds it disturbing that Claimant provided inaccurate information on the online application as to the status of her master’s degree.

However, regardless of whether apparent authority existed in this case, Claimant fails to meet the final element of a promissory estoppel claim.

Claimant argues that the offer of the Graduate Program position must be enforced to avoid the injustice of Claimant quitting her graduate assistant position, after being offered employment by Dr. Chang.

However, Claimant’s own testimony indicates that Claimant was offered to return to her graduate assistant position but refused.

Lastly, Claimant’s second claim is for intentional infliction of emotional distress because Respondent published she had the Program Coordinator position before rescinding the employment offer.

Because of this announcement, Claimant claims she suffered public embarrassment.

The elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: 1) extreme and outrageous conduct of defendant; 2) defendant knew, or should have known, that the conduct would inflict severe emotional distress; and 3) defendant’s conduct did cause extreme emotional distress. Chitwood v. State of Illinois, 58 Ill. Ct. Cl. 205 (2005), citing Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, 207 Ill.2d 263, 268-69, 798 N.E.2d 75, 79-80 (2003).

Illinois Courts have consistently held that “...although fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, worry, etc. may fall within the ambit of the term ‘emotional distress,’ these mental conditions alone are not actionable.

The law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.

The intensity and the duration of the stress are factors to be considered in determining its severity.” See Public Finance Corp. v. Davis, 66 Ill. 2d 85, 90, 360 N.E. 2d 765,767 (1976); Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), § 46, Comment d at 73.

Additionally, to qualify as outrageous for purposes of a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the nature of the defendant’s conduct must be so extreme as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and be regarded as intolerable in a civilized community. Kolegas v. Heftel Broadcasting [*217] Corp., 154 Ill.2d 1, 607 N.E.2d 201 (1992), citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, Comment d, at 73 (1965).

In this case, this requisite high level of distress has not been proven.

Lastly, the actionable conduct must be entered into with intent to cause emotional distress. Id.

This Court sympathizes with the embarrassment Claimant experienced with the publication and rescission of the offer for the MBA Program Coordinator position.

However, this Court does not find that the high level of distress contemplated by Illinois courts has been proven in Claimant’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Additionally, this Court does not find that Dr. Chang acted with the intent to cause any emotional distress to Claimant.

As such, Claimant has not met her burden of proof in alleging a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Claimant’s claim is DENIED.