Michael Dortch v. State of Illinois

ORDER

BURNS, J.

This case comes before the Court on cross motions for summary judgment pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-1005.

The Court having read the pleadings and being fully advised in the premises, finds:

The Claimant, MICHAEL DORTCH, filed this pro se claim against the Respondent, STATE OF ILLINOIS, seeking monetary damages as the result of personal injuries allegedly suffered while the Claimant was an inmate under the care of the Illinois Department of Corrections.

Specifically, the Claimant alleges that sometime in early 2004 the staff at the Danville Correctional Center negligently failed to fix a leak in the roof which caused water to collect on the floor.

The

Claimant alleges that as a direct result of Respondent’s negligence, he slipped and fell on the wet floor, causing him to hit his head on the floor.

The Claimant alleges that he suffered headaches, memory loss, back pains and blurred vision, among other injuries, as a result of the fall.

The Claimant seeks $100,000 in damages.

The Respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the sole grounds that the water on the floor was an open and obvious condition for which no duty was owed to the Claimant.

The Respondent asserts that the Claimant knew of the collected water on the floor, and, therefore, the Respondent cannot be held liable.

The Claimant did not respond to the Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment, but rather filed his own Motion for Summary Judgment in which he argued essentially that the Respondent had prior knowledge of the dangerous condition caused by the leaky roof and, therefore, should be held liable.

[*136] STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is properly granted where the pleadings, depositions, admissions on file and affidavits show that there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Freeman v. State, 55 Ill. Ct. Cl. 329, 334 (2003).

While a plaintiff need not prove his case at this stage, he must present sufficient evidentiary facts to support the elements of his claim or present some factual basis which would arguably entitle him to judgment.

Id.; see also Juwick v. Starmark Star Marketing & Admin. Inc., 2323 Ill.App.3d 8, 12 (2nd Dist. 1992).

ANALYSIS

The State owes a duty to inmates of penal institutions to provide reasonable, safe conditions.

Dewitt v. State of Illinoi, 43 Ill. Ct. Cl. 254, 262 (1991).

However, the State is not an insurer of all accidents or injuries that occur on its premises.

Pinnick

v. State, 50 Ill.Ct.Cl. 321, 326 (1997).

To prevail in a negligence action, the Claimant must prove by a preponderance of evidence that the State had a duty to protect the Claimant from harm, that the State negligently breached that duty and that the negligence was the proximate cause of Claimant’s injury.

Additionally, the Claimant must also show that the State had actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition to be held liable.

Ratcliff v. State of Illinois, 48 Ill. Ct. Cl. 137, 140 (1995).

This Court has held that when a condition is open and obvious, and should be recognized by the claimant, the State generally owes no duty to protect the claimant from dangers associated with that condition.

Hickman v. State, 55 Ill.Ct.Cl. 388 (2002), citing Sheilds v. State, 47 Ill.Ct.Cl. 313 (1994).

In Sheilds, the claimant fell on spilled soda on the steps of a basketball arena.

The Court ruled that because the presence of the soda on the floor was open and obvious, it should have been recognized by claimant, and as such, the State did not breach a duty in failing to clean up the soda prior to the claimant’s fall.

Similarly, in the case at bar, the Claimant alleges that water on the floor from leaking roof caused his fall.

The Claimant was aware of the dangerous condition, however, as he had previously complained of the water on the floor in a grievance filed just a few weeks before his alleged fall.

The Claimant does not allege that the Respondent had reason to expect that the Claimant’s attention would be distracted in any way or that the Claimant was forced by job requirements or other circumstances to make a deliberate choice to proceed in the face of the danger presented by the wet floor.

Accordingly, the Court finds in this case that the presence of the water was open and obvious, and, therefore, should have been observed by the Claimant.

In his Motion for Summary Judgment, the Claimant argues that the mere fact that the Respondent knew of the dangerous condition is enough to establish liability.

In support of his argument he cites to the case of Roberts v. State, 36 Ill.Ct.Cl. 74 (1984), in which this Court found the State negligent in failing to repair a broken chair that later collapsed when the claimant sat on it, causing injuries to the claimant.

The Roberts case is clearly distinguishable; however, as the claimant in Roberts did not know the chair was broken before she sat down. Id.

In the instant case, the Claimant knew the roof was leaking and that a dangerous condition existed [*137] in the form of water on the floor.

The Respondent, therefore, cannot be held liable for the Claimant’s own lack of due care.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the Claimant’s motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED, and the Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

The Claimant’s complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice.