In re Edwin Munoz

The matter before the Court is the petition of attorney Regan Ebert for attorneys fees pursuant to §12 of the Crime Victims Compensation Act.

It follows a hearing before Commissioner Serpico whose recommendation is before us.

The Illinois Crime Victims Act was first enacted in 1973.

This Court

adjudicates over 5,000 cases per year involving that statute.

Despite the long history and volume of cases there are very few reported cases by this Court on the issue of attorney's fees.

Attorney Ebert has submitted to the Court an itemized bill in the amount of $5,373.11.

The invoice claims twenty-one hours of service at $250 per hour for a total of $5,250.

It also seeks reimbursement of expenses in the amount of $123.11.

Assistant Attorney General and Bureau Chief Ms. Cory Ann Gulkewicz has submitted a memorandum in opposition to the claim for fees.

In it she also provides [*271] a detailed analysis of the body of law governing this topic.

We thank both parties for the thoroughness and thoughtfulness of their respective presentations.

This Court rarely sees fee petitions in these cases.

The vast majority of these cases are decided prior to a hearing or if there is a hearing the claimants are usually pro se or have pro bono counsel.

Section 12 of the Crime Victims Compensation Act governs attorney's fees.

It

provides no fee may be charged to the applicant in any proceeding under this Act except as provided by this Act.

If the applicant is represented by counsel or some other duly authorized agent in making application under this Act or in any further proceedings provided for in this Act, that counsel or agent may receive no payment for his services in preparing or presenting the application before the Court of Claims.

He may, however, charge fees to the applicant for representing him in a hearing provided for in this Act, but only in such matter as the Court of Claims deems to be reasonable 740 ILCS 45/12.

It is clear from the statute and cases interpreting same that an attorney can charge a claimant only if a hearing is held.

The Court is given the responsibility of determining what is reasonable for the firm to have charged for the matter, In Re:

Application of Kathy Soto, 35 Ill.Ct.Cl. 509 (1982).

Our case law governing the award of attorney's fees in Crime Victims Compensation Act cases is similar to other statutes governing fee awards in that it establishes three basic criteria for compensation.

1. The time spent by the attorney at the hearing and preparing for

the hearing.

[*272] 2. The complexity of the issue or issues litigated.

3. The results obtained.

In Re: Application of Ellen Lewis and Mary Ann

Scott, 31 Ill.Ct.Cl. 642 (1976).

The Court will not award fees for time spent on activities that were not directly related to the issue or issues litigated at the hearing.

The fees awarded in these cases may be deducted from the award or paid directly by the Claimant.

In re Urban, 46 Ill.Ct.Cl. 591, 594 (1992).

Because of this, the Court must look with particularity at the amount awarded to Claimant to calculate fees.

To do otherwise would result in some decisions where attorneys' fees consume most if not all of an award.

While we appreciate and recognize that private practicing lawyers have significant overhead, the majority of law firms handling these cases view the activity to be "pro bono" or "low bono" in nature.

As such, we do not believe that a law firm should be allowed to charge significant fees in these matters.

For example, in the case before us, counsel is asking for fees totaling $5,373.11.

Given the nature of these proceedings, we believe that amount is unsupportable.

Mr. Munoz recovered $2,512.35 in this case.

It would frustrate the purpose of the Act to allow counsel to obtain a recovery from his client that exceeds the award the client received.

The Court of Claims generally limits contingent fees to 20% of the amount of the recovery (705 ILCS 505/26-1).

We believe that principal has equal application here.

Accordingly, we find counsel may charge Claimant a fee not to exceed 20% of the amount recovered.

[*273] Accordingly, fees are awarded in the amount of $502.47.

Those fees are to be deducted from the Claimant's award.