Christopher Dussold v. The Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University Governing Southern Illinois University Edwardsville

ORDER

STORINO, J.

This cause comes before the Court on Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to 2-615 and 2-619 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, and the Court being fully advised:

[*284] The court finds as follows:

The Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University (“Respondent”) has filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that Christopher Dussold (“Claimant”) has either failed to meet pleading requirements or that the existence of affirmative matters defeat Claimant’s allegations.

Claimant filed an eight count Complaint against the State of Illinois arising out of his employment at Southern Illinois University Edwardsville. Claimant’s Complaint contains the following counts: (1) Interference with a Business Relationship, (2) Interference with Contract, (3) Defamation, (4) Negligent Defamation, (5) Willful and Wanton Conduct/Recklessness, (6) Negligent Misrepresentation, (7) Fraudulent Misrepresentation, and (8) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

Claimant commenced his action on March 15, 2006, for relief against Respondent for alleged incidents that occurred while Claimant was employed as a professor at Southern Illinois University Edwardsville (“SIUE”).

First, Counts I and II originate from a Contract that Claimant entered into with Respondent upon his employment. Claimant alleges that certain acts of Respondents’ officers, agents, employees and/or assigns interfered with his business relationship and his contract with Respondent. Such actions ultimately led to his termination.

At all times material to Claimant’s allegations, SIUE maintained a faculty grievance procedure that was available to Claimant to utilize in order to challenge the propriety of his termination. It is well established that a Claimant must exhaust all available remedies prior to invoking the jurisdiction of this Court. Specifically, 705 ILCS 505/25 provides as follows:

“Any person who files a claim before the court, shall, before seeking

final determination of his or her claim exhaust all other remedies and

sources of recovery whether administrative or judicial…” Exhaustion of remedies is a fundamental requirement which must be satisfied in order for any claim to be brought before this Court. Devaney v. State of Illinois, 48 Ill. Ct. Cl. 461 (1996). Under the Faculty Grievance Procedure, Claimant clearly was entitled to file a grievance in order to address his contention that SIUE acted in violation of its own policies when it terminated his employment. Claimant failed to file such a grievance. A claimant who fails to pursue an internal grievance is precluded from subsequently filing a claim with the Court of Claims. Badal v. State of Illinois, 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 254 (1981). As such, Count I and Count II of Claimant’s complaint are dismissed with prejudice.

[*285] Second, Counts III and IV deal with alleged defamatory statements made by agents of Respondent which were either false or made with reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the statements. The Complaint only contains allegations of statements made on or before March 15, 2004.

Ordinarily, the statute of limitations to file an action before the Court of Claims is two years, 705 ILCS 505/22(h). This general rule of limitations gives way to any other appropriate statute of limitations. As it relates to defamation claims, 735 ILCS 5/13-201, specifically provides for a one year statute of limitations regarding any libel or slander actions. In Sarpolis v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 52 Ill. Ct. Cl. 390 (2000), the Court of Claims recognized that any defamation claims are governed by the shorter one year statute of limitations.

As the statements are alleged to have been made on or before March 15, 2004, and Claimant failed to file his Complaint until March 15, 2006, Counts III and IV are dismissed with prejudice for failure to comply with the one year statute of limitations.

Third, Count V of the Complaint alleges willful and wanton conduct/recklessness in regards to the same conduct alleged in Counts I and II. As such, Count V is dismissed with prejudice based upon the same reasoning as Counts I and II.

Fourth, Counts VI and VII are founded in Negligent Misrepresentation and Fraudulent Misrepresentation. Each has a heightened pleading standard. Under this standard, Claimant must, in essence, provide the exact statements allegedly made that he contends were a misrepresentation, and provide the “what, where, when, who, how” context in which the statements were allegedly made. As part of this heightened pleading standard, the exact words that constitute the alleged misrepresentation must be provided. Miner v. Fashion Enterprises, Inc., 794 N.E. 2d 902, 916 (1st Dist. 2003). In the instant case, Claimant failed to meet the heightened pleading requirement. As such, Counts VI and VII are dismissed without prejudice.

Lastly, Count VIII contains allegations of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress based upon defamatory statements by Respondents officers, agents, employees and/or assigns. In order to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of Emotional Distress, a claimant must allege some facts which, if true, would support a conclusion that the emotional distress actually suffered as a proximate result of the defendant’s conduct was severe. Welsh v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 713 N.E. 2nd 679, 684-685 (1st Dist. 1999). Claimant has failed to make such allegations. As such, Count VIII is dismissed without prejudice.

[*286] IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. Counts I, II, III, IV, and V are dismissed with prejudice.

2. Counts VI, VII, and VIII are dismissed without prejudice.

3. Claimant is granted 30 days to file an Amended Complaint for

Counts VI, VII, and VIII.