Novella Rockett v. State of Illinois

ORDER

JANN, J. This cause is before the Court after oral argument of the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss for Claimant’s failure to comply with the notice requirements of the Court of Claims Act, 705 ILCS 505/1, et seq. at 505/22-1 and 505/22-2. (The Act).

The issue presented is whether Claimant’s filing of a claim based upon the same allegations and against the same hospital with other defendants in the Circuit Court of Cook County within one year of accrual of the negligence alleged is adequate to meet the requirements of the Act for maintaining a suit in this Court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The parties dispute the possible date of accrual of this claim. For purposes of our consideration, we shall accept the death of Claimant’s fetus due [*258] to alleged negligence of Respondent on February 17, 2003, as the latest possible date of accrual of the underlying action. Under the Act, Claimant was required to file her notice of intent/and-or claim on or before February 17, 2003 with the Office of the Attorney General and the Clerk of the Court of Claims, pursuant to 705 ILCS 505/22-1. No notice or filing of a complaint within the limitations or providing the requisites set forth in this section have been filed at any time to date of this Order.

Within one year of accrual of the medical malpractice claim herein alleged against the Respondent, Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, University of Illinois Hospital, Chicago, Claimant filed a cause of action alleging the same acts of negligence against the same or additional defendants in the Circuit Court of Cook County. (Contrary to Claimant’s contention at oral argument, the Circuit Court complaint was not attached to her pleadings or identified by case number.) Claimant alleged that the Respondent employed the same special counsel in both the Circuit Court action and presently in this Court.

This claim was not rebutted by Respondent in pleadings or by averment at oral argument. Respondent’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction by the Circuit Court was granted and Claimant Rockett filed a complaint in the Court of Claims docketed on January 18, 2005.

Claimant now asserts that her filing in Circuit Court within one year was actual and statutory notice under relevant precedent which satisfied the requirements of 505/22-1 of the Act and that her filing of a complaint within the two year limitations period provided at 505/22(h). No assertion of legal disability is made of record and no arguments shall be entertained on this issue in any future reviews of this Order.

ANALYSIS

There appears to be little doubt that Respondent received actual notice of the claim now presented within one year pursuant to the filing of the Circuit Court action which was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction by the Circuit Court after the one year notice period had expired for notice in the Court of Claims. Claimant filed her complaint in the Court of Claims on January 18, 2005 and the complaint at paragraph 10, page 3, pleads as follows:

“10. Pursuant to Section 22 of the court of claims Act, claimant states that a claim was filed on her behalf in the Circuit Court of Cook County within one year of its accrual.”

Regardless of the actual notice which may have occurred to Respondent in this particular instance, Claimant has not addressed the seminal issues of her admitted noncompliance with the Act to present a claim in this [*259] Court, a court of statutorily limited jurisdiction. Claimant has appealed to the equities of the matter. She has made no attempt to address the realities of our jurisdictional limitations and the precedent affirming the creation of this Court for the sole purpose of allowing claimants to proceed only upon meeting the specific requisites prescribed by our creators, the Illinois General Assembly, as set forth in the Act and Rules. Claimant asserts the last sentence of 705 ILCS 505/22-1 is a savings statue as follows:

“A claimant is not required to file the notice required by this Section if he or she files his or her claim within one year of its accrual”.

We must disagree with this interpretation of the Act, given the language of 705 ILCS 505/22:

LIMITATIONS

“Every claim cognizable by the Court and not otherwise sooner barred by law shall be forever barred from prosecution therein unless it is filed with the Clerk of the Court within the time set forth as follows:….” (emphasis added).

The notice provisions of 505/22-1 and 505/22-2 are quite clearly limitations and part of 505/22 on their face by virtue of numerical designation in the Act and designation as “Limitations” in 505/22.

It is further noted that 505/22 (j) advises that the limitations as established are jurisdictional:

“(j) All time limitations established under this Act and the rules promulgated under this Act shall be binding and jurisdictional, except upon extension authorized by law or rule and granted pursuant to a motion timely filed.”

Claimant has further argued that Williams v. Medical Center Commission, 60 Ill. 2d 389, 394, 328 N.E. 2d 1, 3 (1975), is controlling in this decision. We must disagree based upon both the subject matter addressed in Williams, Id., and what we believe to be Claimant’s misinterpretation of the Supreme Court’s remarks therein, which she has relied upon for her argument in this court.

Upon careful consideration and research, we believe Respondent has correctly framed the issue and controlling law as set forth in the Appellate Court’s decision in Reyes v. Court of Claims, 299 Ill. App. 3d 1097, 1104 (1st Dist. 1998). Reyes, Id., explicitly distinguished Williams, Id., and is directly on [*260] point in the issue we are to consider. Absent a specific finding upon notice, separate and apart from the other jurisdictional limitations of the Act, Reyes upheld and thoughtfully discussed the Court’s obligation to deny jurisdiction when the legislative enactments of limitation are not met by a claimant.

Claimant asserts that the Williams decision stands for the proposition that filing within the limitations period in circuit court will satisfy “any statutory requirement of notice and filing.” Williams, 60 Ill. 2d at 396. We most certainly agree that in the context made, this finding is “still good law” as argued by Claimant. We also find no authority or reason to disavow the findings made on validity of the Act and the legislature’s power to retain vestiges of sovereign immunity in enacting laws to codify certain elements of governmental immunity, including the survival of the court of claims, despite great dispute during the 1970 Constitutional Convention.

Despite Claimant’s position, the ability of the legislature to enact limitations denying rights enjoyed in courts of general jurisdiction was affirmed, citing federal law in 1975. The Supreme Court’s decision in Williams was clearly based on exactly that legislative intent when it found Ms. Williams’ claim to be “frivolous” and “without merit” and affirmed the decision of the Circuit Court to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

There is no statement of facts alleging Williams filed a claim in the Court of Claims at any time. Her unique issue of notice concerned perfecting standing to challenge the validity of the limitations on liability, the notice provision by inference, and her deprivation of right to present her case to a jury as allegedly denied by a filing in the Court of Claims. In essence, Ms. Williams wished to proceed in a court of general jurisdiction rather than this Court of Claims for obvious reasons of potential reward. She was shopping for a friendly venue apparently denied by the Act, to put a rather blunt point on the matter.

She tested the validity of the Court of Claims Act and constitutional questions of reservation of tort immunity by the Illinois General Assembly as enacted in the 1970 Illinois Constitution for that purpose. The Court of Claims Act challenged by Ms. Williams was effective January 1, 1972, implementing Section 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution of 1970 .

Mr. Justice Schaefer appears to have taken pains to make his position clear regarding the basic issue of viability of the limitations in the Act and their discrete and significantly unique requirements as granted by legislative edict, and no other grant of authority or jurisdiction at 3:

“Those decisions, however, did not involve the sovereign immunity of the State or the validity of the Court of Claims Act, questions which were thoroughly threshed out in the recent constitutional convention.

[*261] The present language of section 4 of article XIII - “Except as the General Assembly may provide by law, sovereign immunity in this state is abolished” - was adopted only after the defeat of an amendment which would have limited the power of the General Assembly to the provisions of a [*395] special forum, and would have eliminated its authority to restrict the right of trial by jury and to impose time limitations and limitations upon the amount of recovery. (5 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 3948-3952.) In our opinion the contention of the plaintiff is without merit. A constitutional grant of immunity to a sovereign government has never, so far as we are aware, been held to be an arbitrary classification which violates equal protection.”

The remainder of the decision continues to address the validity of the Act and the limitations imposed therein. The pertinent findings are that the Act, as adopted in 1970 is constitutional and binding within the power of the legislature.

Ms. Williams’ claim was dismissed, as Claimant failed to note.

The Reyes, Id., court went further in explaining that when a quasijudicial body is created by the legislature and made separate from the judicial branch by enactment and “possesses no inherent or common law power (it) can only assume jurisdiction in the manner prescribed by the Court of Claims Act, which empowers it.” Reyes, Id., citing Klopfer v. Court of Claims, 286 Ill. App. 3d 499, 505 (1997). This discussion of jurisdiction is the essential crux of the matter before us. The limited jurisdiction provided this Court by legislative enactment has been consistently interpreted as valid and binding on appeals to courts of general jurisdiction, so long as the Court of Claims provides due process to those seeking redress. The authority cited by Claimant, Ms. Rockett, supports this conclusion. More relevant to our consideration herein is the consequent conclusion that the specific requirements of the limitations set forth in 505/22-1 are jurisdictional as we have long held in prior Court of Claims precedent. The language of 505/22 (j) is unequivocal that filing notice under the Act and rules is jurisdictional. (See McCord v. State, 44 Ill. Ct. Cl. 166 (1992), holding the notice provision is a condition precedent to jurisdiction.)

The Reyes, Id. decision specifically addressed the issue now considered. Mr. Reyes filed in Circuit Court but failed to file notice or a claim within the limitations prescribed in the proper and only jurisdiction permitted by statute, the Court of Claims as determined by reviewing courts.

Mr. Reyes argued the “savings statute” prevented dismissal of his claims as he had filed in Circuit Court in timely manner. Justice Quinn discussed the several amendments of the “savings statute” since the decision in Williams (citing Roth) preserving the rights of litigants under section 13-217 of [*262] the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/13-217. Justice Quinn’s 1998 Opinion noted the opinions in courts of general jurisdiction in the period of twenty three years elapsed since Williams was decided and the entry of Illinois Supreme Court Opinions addressing the jurisdictional limitations in the Court of Claims which were affirmed in that period. Justice Quinn further noted that though significant amendments had been made to the savings statute during the elapsed period, no enactment had ever specified amendment to apply to the specific jurisdictional limitations of the Court of Claims Act. Hence, the failure to enact legislation applicable by direct reference to this Court is significant by its exclusion to indicate lack of intent by the legislature when other rules of procedure and practice are broadly changed on any subject or issue of common note.

As in Williams, the limitations of this Court were held to be jurisdictional and binding and Mr. Reyes’ appeal of denial of due process was dismissed. He was later denied a grant of writ of certiorari by the Illinois Supreme Court in the same action. Claimant has made no argument on this issue and we have given her ample opportunity to do so.

CONCLUSIONS

Based upon the authority and arguments presented by the parties, and the Court’s research, we conclude that Claimant has failed to prove that she has complied with the jurisdictional requirements of providing either Notice or filing a claim in this Court within one year of accrual of her claim, as provided in the Act and Rules of the Court of Claims. This failure deprives the Court of Claims of jurisdiction to consider the claims alleged, despite claims of actual notice under common law. The failure/duty to preserve specific rights under the Act is/are, a Claimant’s burden and she bears the consequences thereof. Failure to seek counsel and file appropriate claims in a timely manner is within the sole discretion of the Claimant.

The Court of Claims is rather unique in both requiring exhaustion of remedies against any and all parties before final determination of claims and allowing claims to proceed in other venues under ILCS 505/25 of the Act and Sec. 790.60 (a), (b) and (c). General continuances are granted to allow a claimant to preserve her rights in this court while exhausting any and all other remedies. Hence, it is clearly anticipated that a claimant may file claims in more favorable venues upon discovery of a viable cause(s) of action, before or after filing herein.

It is imperative to stress that this Court’s jurisdiction is limited and established only by act of the Illinois Legislature. Ignorance of the applicable law is seldom a prudent defense in any action, and simply not relevant to the [*263] facts in this claim. The question is not the common law principle, as clearly set forth above. This Court is assuredly, the exception to many rules and must, by law, enforce those exceptional rules applicable to the Court of Claims as noted in Reyes. Notice in fact, by common law standards, happened to occur, despite Claimant’s filing in an improper venue in this claim. There is no exception in the Act or Rules to address this circumstance. Claimant has presented no authority to support the logically resulting chaos resulting where her “personal rule of notice” applied in 102 county seats in the Court of Claims. The Illinois Legislature appears to have reached the same conclusion on repeated amendments to the Act and rules of this Court since 1972.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

1. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss is granted on the merits after oral argument.

2. Claimant’s Motion in Opposition, in re: Complaint # 05 CC 2249 and any and all acts or omissions alleged against Respondent, adopted by the same complaint in any action are denied and dismissed, with prejudice.

3. This claim is dismissed with prejudice.