Laddy Littrell v. State of Illinois

ORDER

STORINO, J.

This cause comes before the Court on Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Section 2-619(a)(9) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, 705 [*226] ILCS 505/25, and 74 Ill. Adm. Code 790.60, the Court having reviewed the court file, and the Court being fully advised:

The court finds as follows:

The State of Illinois (“Respondent”) has filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that the existence of affirmative matters defeats Laddy Littrell’s (“Claimant”) allegations. This Court notes that Respondents have erroneously designated its motion as a Motion to Dismiss when in practicality it is a Motion for Summary Judgment brought pursuant to Section 2-1005 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure. Although a Section 2-619(a)(9) motion may not be used as a substitute for a summary judgment motion, this Court notes that they are very similar; a fact motion under Section 2-619 essentially amounts to a summary judgment procedure. Malanowski v. Jabamoni, 293 Ill. App. 3d 720, 724, 688 N.E. 2d 732, 737 (1st Dist. 1997).

The courts have previously held that meticulous practice dictates that motions should be properly designated. However, misdesignation is not always fatal to the right of the movant to prevail. The court is to look at the substance of the motion to determine which section of the Code of Civil Procedure governs. Denial by reason of misdesignation is only required where the nonmovant has been prejudiced by the error. Id. This Court finds that Claimant has not been prejudiced by any apparent misdesignation of Respondents’ motion, and Respondent “may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his or her favor as to all or any part of the relief sought against him or her.” 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(b). As such, Respondents’ motion will be considered.

Claimant filed a three count Complaint against the State of Illinois, Tamms Correctional Center, and the Illinois Department of Corrections arising out of his employment at Tamms Correctional Center. Claimant alleges that each of the Respondents have discharged the Claimant in retaliation for filing a claim under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Although Claimant lists three separate Respondents they will all be considered as one Respondent: the State of Illinois.

Claimant commenced his action on April 30, 2002, for relief against Respondent for discharging him in retaliation for filing a worker’s compensation claim. The facts of the case are clear from the record and undisputed:

On February 17, 1998, Claimant was employed by the Illinois Department of Corrections as a correctional officer at Tamms Correctional Center. On August 12, 2000, Claimant allegedly suffered an injury within the scope of his employment when he slipped and fell on a recently mopped, wet [*227] floor. On August 17, 2000, Claimant filed a worker’s compensation claim with the Illinois Department of Corrections’ Workers’ Compensation Unit. On October 31, 2000, an internal investigation of the August 12, 2000, incident concluded that Claimant likely committed State Benefits Fraud in regards to the incident. The Illinois Department of Corrections referred Claimant for further review to an employee review hearing officer. On November 13, 2000, the Illinois Department of Corrections denied Claimant’s worker’s compensation claim in response to the Illinois Department of Corrections’ investigative report that concluded Claimant was likely guilty of State Benefits Fraud. On November 20, 2000, an Employee Review Hearing was held and Claimant was found in violation of the State Benefits Fraud statute, various Illinois Department of Corrections’ departmental rules, and employee rules of conduct. The hearing officer recommended Claimant be suspended pending discharge/discharge from employment.

On January 3, 2001, the Illinois Department of Central Management Services (CMS) approved the recommended discharge, and Claimant was officially discharged for cause on January 12, 2001. On January 5, 2001, Claimant, represented by the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) union, filed a contract grievance alleging he had been discharged without cause in violation of its collective bargaining agreement. On February 14, 2001, an Employee Grievance Hearing was held and Claimant’s grievance was denied citing that no support for his original claim existed. Thereafter, a Resolution Prior to Arbitration was entered into by the Illinois Department of Corrections, AFSCME, and Claimant ending Claimant’s grievance and wherein Claimant agreed to voluntarily resign in exchange for any mention of discharge being expunged from his record. Most importantly, for purposes of Claimant’s claim before the Court, the parties to the resolution also agreed that:

The Union and the grievant, Laddy Littrell, agree and refrain from

initiating or pursuing any existing grievance, administrative or other

judicial proceeding arising out of his employment or discharge action

of (sic) the circumstances that led to the filing of charges of discharge.

In a similar wrongful termination suit, this Court has held that a union has authority to effect a settlement for, and to bind, a claimant to its terms unless the union breached its duty of fair representation to a claimant, which must first be established in a forum of proper jurisdiction. See Jones v. State of Illinois, 55 Ill. Ct. Cl. 414 (2002). Therein, the claimant, an Illinois Department of Corrections employee and AFSCME member, brought a wrongful termination suit, alleging she was discharged without cause in violation of the union’s collective bargaining agreement. During the underlying employer-employee grievance process, the union settled the grievance on behalf of the claimant by [*228] entering into a Resolution Prior to Arbitration, whereby the claimant waived any remaining procedural rights against the Illinois Department of Corrections, including the right to sue. Pursuant to the Settlement, the Court held that the claimant was barred from pursuing her claim in the Court of Claims and dismissed it with prejudice.

The facts of the claim before the Court mirror those in Jones. Both claimants were employees of the Illinois Department of Corrections and AFSCME members, both claimants were discharged, both claimants filed grievances alleging they were discharged without cause, both claimants entered into Resolutions Prior to Arbitration settling their grievances and waiving any future remedies, and both claimants failed to prove that the union breached its duty of fair representation in a forum of competent jurisdiction.

As such, the terms of the Resolution Prior to Arbitration are controlling, binding, and enforceable. Claimant has waived his right to sue Respondent for claims arising out of the circumstances of his discharge.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. Respondent’s Motion is granted.

2. Judgment is entered in favor of Respondent.