Carolyn Faye Frye v. State of Illinois

OPINION

SPRAGUE, J

This claim is before the court upon a Commissioner’s recommendation following an evidentiary hearing. Claimant, the mother of deceased, Timothy Ashanti Frye, brings this claim pursuant to the Line of Duty Compensation Act, 820 ILCS 315/1 et seq. This claim was previously before the Court and it was ordered that a hearing be held to determine whether or not Timothy Ashanti Frye, who at the time of his death was an Aviation Avionics Technician Third Class with the United States Navy, was “killed in the line of duty” as contemplated in the Act.

On January 5, 2002, while on liberty status, Seaman Frye, 22 years old, died in a single vehicle accident while riding with some of his shipmates near a military base in Japan. Japanese law enforcement personnel investigated the [*333] accident. Law enforcement investigation results and medical reports were translated from Japanese to English and were included in the Naval Criminal Investigative Service Report of January 9, 2002.

According to the Naval report, Seaman Frye was a rear seat passenger in a vehicle, which was traveling to the U.S. Naval Air Facility, Atsugi, Japan. The vehicle crashed into a roadside tree, approximately one mile from the U.S. Naval Air Facility, Atsugi, Japan. Immediately after the accident Seaman Frye was transported to a nearby hospital. His heart and lung function had ceased en route to the hospital. Medical personnel at the hospital unsuccessfully attempted to resuscitate Seaman Frye with electric shock therapy, intubations, artificial respiration and medication. According to the Autopsy report Seaman Frye’s death was caused by “damage to the cervical region of the spinal cord and fracture-dislocation of the cervical vertebrae.” The mother of Seaman Frye, Carolyn Faye Frye, is Timothy Frye’s only beneficiary.

The Line of Duty Compensation Act (820 ILCS 35/1, et. seq.) requires Claimant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the death was not caused by willful misconduct or intoxication; (2) the Armed Services member was “killed in the line of duty.” The Act provides, in relevant part, that:

“[I]n the case of an Armed Forces member “killed in the

line of duty” means losing one’s life while on active

duty in connection with the September 11, 2001 terrorist

attacks on the United States, Operation Enduring

Freedom, or Operation Iraqi Freedom.”

Additionally, the Act states “if the Armed Forces member was killed in the line of duty before October 18, 2004, the claim must be made within one year of October 18, 2004.” In this case, the Claimant has done so, as shown in the Claimant’s Court of Claims Application for Benefits, dated October 22, 2004.

The issue before this court is whether Seaman Timothy Frye’s tragic death in a car accident in Japan constitutes being killed in the line of duty within the meaning of the Act. The fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the legislature’s intent. In re Marriage of Rodgers, 213 Ill.2d 129, 136 (2004). The best indicator of this intent is the plain language of the statute. Metzger v. DaRosa, 209 Ill.2d 30, 35 (2004). The meaning of a statutory provision is derived from an examination of the language of the statute and its purpose. The statute must be evaluated as a whole, and each provision should be construed in connection with every other section or part. The statute shall also be construed in light of the general purpose of the statute. Henry Ross Construction v. State (1988), 43 Ill.Ct.Cl.20,28.

In November 2004, the Illinois General Assembly amended the Line of Duty Compensation Act to include members of the Armed Forces. Since there are no decisions from a reviewing court construing the amendment to the statute, the legislative intent must first be examined. Id. An examination of the legislative history regarding the amendment to the statute to include members of the armed forces serves to illustrate the legislative intent.

[*334] “[T]he way we have drafted this bill is very specific.

We deal with Operation Enduring Freedom, which is

Afghanistan or Operation Iraqi Freedom, which has

been Iraq, or just for September 11, 2001. We’ve

been very specific on which actions are

compensable.” IL H.R. Tran. 2004 Reg. Sess. No.

213.

It is a basic cannon of statutory construction that relative or qualifying phrases are to be applied to words immediately preceding the phrase. Henry Ross Construction, 43 Ill. Ct. Cl. at 29. Thus, for an award to be granted it must be shown that decedent was on active duty with a branch of the Armed Forces, and it must also be shown that the death arose either in connection with the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Operation Enduring Freedom, or Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Military records reflect that Seamen Frye was attached to Sea Control Squadron Two-One (VS-21) and on liberty status at the time of his death on January 5, 2002. There is nothing in the records to indicate that the accident was caused by intoxication or willful misconduct on the part of Seaman Frye.

We must next determine whether claimant has met her burden of establishing that Seamen Frye’s naval assignment at the time of his death qualified as active duty in connection with the “September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the United States, Operation Enduring Freedom, or Operation Iraqi Freedom” as defined in the Line of Duty Compensation Act, 820 ILCS, 315/1 et. Seq. The Compensation Act clearly was not intended to cover the death of every Illinois servicemen on active military duty throughout the world. To qualify for compensation under the Act, the death of any active servicemen must be in connection with the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks or service in connection with Operation Iraqi or Enduring Freedom. If the Legislative intent were to the contrary, then the Legislature would have simply provided compensation to any servicemen killed in the line of duty during a specified period of time. There are for example servicemen who are killed in connection with military service in Korea or Bosnia who are clearly not covered by the current Line of Duty Compensation Act.

When statutory language is clear, it must be given effect without resort to other tools of interpretation. Land v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 202 Ill.2d 414, 421-422 (2002). We are bound to follow the plain meaning of statutory words and phrases as the primary indicator of legislative intent. The burden of persuasion is on the party urging a construction other than the plain meaning of the statutory language. Decatur Earth Mover Credit Union v. State (1999), 52 Ill. Ct. Cl. 414, 420. The record reflects that Seamen Frye served with distinction in his military service, which included service on the USS Kitty Hawk in support of Operation Enduring Freedom beginning in September 2001 and ending in December 2001. However there is no evidence in the record that Seaman Frye’s death, while on liberty status, in a car accident on January 2, 2002 in Japan was in connection with the September 11, 2001 [*335] terrorist attacks, or in connection with service in Operation Enduring Freedom, or Operation Iraqi Freedom, as is required for an award under the Act.

Therefore, it is with deep regret that this Court must deny this claim.

Based on the foregoing, we find that this claim must be denied since it has not been shown that Seaman Fry was “killed in the line of duty” as is required by the Act.