Sherri Ewing v. State of Illinois

OPINION

JANN, J. The Claimant, Sherri Ewing, brings this claim in Tort stemming from a slip and fall down a stairway on March 5th, 2001 at a building owned by the University of Illinois. Claimant alleges that the fall was due to negligent maintenance of the stairway, due to the existence of an unknown and foreign sticky substance and other debris on the stairway carpeting. Claimant suffered injuries from the fall requiring medical treatment and incurred medical expenses. She now seeks to recover damages for those injuries.

On the date of the incident, Ms. Ewing was employed by Wolcott, Wood, & Taylor and assisting with the transition of the University of Illinois at Chicago’s billing department to Wolcott, Wood & Taylor. Her work site was a University of Illinois owned building located at 835 S. Wolcott in Chicago, Illinois. Her work office was located in a loft area above the eighth floor of the building. The building has an elevator that runs from floors one to eight, and a carpeted staircase that serves the 8th floor loft. The staircase has approximately ten to eleven stairs. Claimant’s exhibits 1, 2, 3, and group 4, are photographs of the staircase in question.

Ms. Ewing had worked in the 8th floor loft for approximately three months prior to her fall. She testified that she used the stairs approximately four times a day. Claimant described the stairway at issue as dimly lit with worn carpeting which was covered with spots consisting of a sticky substance.

Ms. Ewing testified that on March 5th, 2001, she fell down the stairs as she was leaving work for the day. She was carrying her purse and was wearing low-heeled boots. Claimant testified that she walked down approximately three steps when her left foot became stuck on the stair and did not lift properly. This caused her to fall headfirst down the stairs. She testified that she tried to grab the handrail to stop her fall, but she could not be sure if she actually made contact with the handrail. She was unable to stop her fall. Claimant testified that she always tried to use a handrail while using the stairway but during her deposition, she testified that could not remember whether or not the stairway [*304] had a handrail. After she fell, Ms. Ewing called out to her manager, Kathy Sequin, who was still in her office at the top of the stairs. Ms Sequin came to see what happened. Ms. Sequin called the paramedics and Ms. Ewing was taken to the UIC Emergency room.

At the University of Illinois at Chicago Hospital Emergency Room, doctors noted multiple blunt trauma, bilateral should contusions, bilateral wrist sprain, and left ankle sprain. Ms. Ewing received x-rays to her pelvis, ankles, shoulders, wrists, cervical spine, and chest. Ms. Ewing was given crutches and pain medication and released later that evening. Ms. Ewing followed up with the orthopedic clinic at the University of Chicago Hospital four days later where it was noted in x-rays that Ms. Ewing had sustained a slight fracture of the left medial clavicle. Ms. Ewing was also placed in a short-leg cast and was given another set of crutches. Ms. Ewing also received two months of physical therapy on her shoulder at the Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago and another six weeks of physical therapy at Athletico Sports Medicine and Physical Therapy.

She testified that she still suffers from headaches, severe neck and shoulder pain which limit the use of her left arm, and also soreness and weakness of her left ankle as a result of her fall. Ms. Ewing testified that she was in good physical condition prior to the accident. The parties stipulated to evidence that Claimant incurred $12,192.53 in medical bills.

Claimant testified that she had complained to her manager, Kathy Sequin, about the condition of the stairway carpet on several occasions prior to her fall. Ms. Sequin testified that she worked for Wolcott, Wood, & Taylor at the time of the accident. She was the director of the billing program and in charge of the 8th floor loft office. She stated that on the night of Ms. Ewing’s accident she heard Ms. Ewing calling for her. She found Ms. Ewing on the ground at the bottom of the stairs to assist Ms. Ewing and immediately called security and an ambulance. Ms. Sequin was shown photos of the staircase and testified that the photographs accurately represented the condition of the staircase at the time of the accident. Ms. Sequin could not recall whether Ms.

Ewing or anyone else ever complained to her about the condition of the stairway. She also could not recall whether there had been any previous falls on the staircase.

Curtis Williams testified for the Respondent. Mr. Williams had been the janitor at 835 S. Wolcott since 1990. Mr. Williams testified that he used the stairway on a regular basis because his cleaning duties included cleaning the 8th floor loft. He testified that the carpet had not been replaced since he started working at the building in 1990, but that he cleaned and vacuumed the stairway as needed. Mr. Williams was questioned about the lighting conditions of the stairway. He testified that fluorescent lights located at the top of the stairway were always on. He also testified that there was track lighting along the wall in the center of the stairway that could be turned on with a switch. Mr. Williams testified that he did not notice any sticky areas on the carpet at the time of Ms.

Ewing’s accident, and that he had never received any complaints about the condition of the stairway.

[*305] Analysis

The State has a duty to use ordinary care to keep its property reasonably safe for the benefit of those who come upon its property as invitees.

Peters v. State (1984), 36 Ill.Ct.Cl. 255. The State is not an insurer of the safety of persons visiting its grounds, but rather such visitors are owed a duty of reasonable care in maintaining the premises. Berger v. State (1988), 40 Ill.Ct.Cl. 120.

For the Claimant to establish a breach of the heretofore-stated duties, the Claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) a dangerous condition existed, (2) the State had actual or constructive notice of the condition, and (3) that the State’s negligence was approximate cause of the Claimant’s injury. Hall v. State (1991), 45 Ill.Ct.Cl. 276,280. For a claim to be approved the Claimant has the burden of proof to show that the State breached its duty of reasonable care.

In the instant case, Claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the carpeting on the stairway created a dangerous condition.

Illinois courts have previously considered when a stairway should be considered a dangerous condition. The fact that stairs, by their very nature, create a risk that persons using them might be injured by a fall does not make them unreasonably dangerous. Glass v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 238 Ill.App.3d 355 (Ill.App.Ct. 1992). Stairs, by themselves, are not an unreasonably dangerous condition; they must have some defect that caused the plaintiff’s injury. Bellerive v. Hilton Hotels Corporation, 245 Ill.App.3d 933, 936 (1993).

The Illinois Appellate Court determined that negligently or improperly installed carpeting could create a dangerous condition of a magnitude sufficient to impose liability, but cautioned that liability cannot be predicated upon surmise or conjecture as to the cause of injury. Latimer v. Latimer, 384 N.E.2d 107 (Ill.App.Ct. 1978).

In the instant case, Claimant has not established that the carpeted staircase at issue was sufficiently dangerous to impose liability on the State.

Claimant proved that the carpeting on the staircase was old and stained, but the evidence does not establish the existence of or the nature of the sticky spots on the carpet that allegedly caused Claimant’s fall. There was no evidence that anyone else had ever had a problem on the stairway, and the evidence established that Claimant, as well as the rest of the office staff, and the janitor used this stairway on a regular basis without incident. Therefore, based on the evidence, the Claimant has not met her burden to prove that the stairway was a dangerous condition.

Even if the Claimant were able to establish that a dangerous condition existed, Claimant still must prove that the State had notice of the condition.

Notice can be actual or constructive. Byrd v. State (1997) 50 Ill.Ct.Cl. 280. A defendant must have knowledge that the condition existed to be liable. Worsley v. Farmington Pizza Company, Inc. 750 N.E.2d 1242 (Ill.App.Ct. 2001).

[*306] Ms. Ewing testified that before the accident she complained about the stairway carpeting to her supervisor, Kathy Sequin. Ms. Sequin testified that she did not recall any complaints made by Ms. Ewing. Moreover, since Ms.

Sequin was not a State employee there is no evidence that complaints or notice was ever communicated to the State. Mr. Williams, the building janitor was a State employee and he testified that he had never received any complaints about the condition of the carpeting on the stairway. Therefore, based on the evidence, this Court does not find that the State had actual notice of a dangerous stairway condition.

To establish constructive notice of a condition, the condition must have existed for such a period of time, and been substantial enough, so as to infer that the State knew of the defect and should correct it. Byrd, 50 Ill.Ct.Cl. at 284. In Byrd v. State, which is factually similar to the instant case, this Court considered whether the State had constructive notice of a dangerous condition where debris had collected on a stairway in the public aid building, In Byrd, a public aid applicant fell down steps when leaving the office, allegedly slipping on some debris that was on the stairs. The evidence established that the applicant had gone up the same set of stairs 20 minutes prior to her accident. This Court held that if the claimant failed to see the allegedly dangerous condition in such close proximity to the incident the State could not be held to have constructive knowledge. Id. At 285.

Similarly, in the instant case, Claimant testified that she used the stairs approximately four times a day for three months to get to her office. The evidence also established that the janitor regularly serviced the stairway. Based on this evidence we do not find that Claimant has proven that the alleged sticky spots on the carpet were substantial enough that the State should be deemed to have constructive notice of the condition.

Finally, no liability can exist unless the Claimant can establish that the State’s negligence was a proximate cause of her injury. Proximate cause can only be established when there is a reasonable certainty that defendant’s acts caused the injury. Kimbrough v. Jewel Companies, Inc., 416 N.E.2d 328, 331 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981). In Kimbrough, the plaintiff slipped and fell on a ramp upon leaving defendant’s store. Plaintiff admitted that she did not know what caused her fall and there were no other witnesses or evidence presented to answer this question. Id. At 328. the court reasoned that it is not enough for the plaintiff to show that she fell on the defendant’s property. Rather, the plaintiff must “go further and prove that some condition caused the fall and that this condition was caused by the defendant.” Id. At 332. The Kimbrough court held that a directed verdict for the defendant was proper because the plaintiff failed to establish a casual connection between her fall and defendant’s negligence.

Similarly, the Claimant in the instant case testified that she did not know what caused her fall, and she could not prove either the nature of, or the existence of the alleged sticky spots on the stairway carpeting. Therefore, Claimant has not proved that the State’s negligence was the proximate cause of her fall.

[*307] Typically, comparative negligence is to be applied in such cases.

However, because we find that the Claimant has not met her burden to prove the elements of the claim we need not consider whether there was any comparative negligence. The court does not question that Ms. Ewing was injured as a result of her fall. Regrettably, she has not presented evidence sufficient to show that the State of Illinois is liable for those injuries.

Wherefore, it is hereby ordered that this claim is denied.