Carolyn Lewis v. State of Illinois

This cause coming on to be heard on the motion of Respondent to dismiss the claim herein, due notice having been given the parties hereto, and the Court being advised in the premises:

The court finds that Claimant has filed a complaint seeking damages for personal injury she allegedly sustained while visiting her mother, a patient at ChicagoRead Mental Health Center. The complaint further alleges that Claimant was attacked by Major Cobbs, a patient of Chicago-Read Mental Health Center.

We note that section 25 of the Court of Claims Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 37, par. 439.24-5) and section 790.60 of the Court of Claims Rules (74 Ill. Adm. Code 790.60) require any person who files a claim before the Court of Claims shall, before seeking final disposition of his [*118] claim, exhaust all other remedies and sources of recovery.

In Essex v . State (19871, No. 85-CC-1739, the Claimant, a patient at John J. Madden Mental Health Center, brought suit against the State after she had been sexuany assaulted by another Madden patient. The Claimant, however, did not file an action against her assailant, and as a result, Respondent moved to dismiss the claim for failure to exhaust remedies pursuant to section 25 of the Court of Claims Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 37, par. 4 5) and section 790.60 of the Court of Claims Rules (74 Ill. Adm. Code 790.60). We, in Essex, followed the reasoning set forth in Boe v - State (1984), 37 111. Ct. C1. 72, which held that a claimant “must exhaust all possible causes of action before seeking final disposition of a case filed in the Court of Claims.” (Emphasis in original,.)We determined that the language of section. 25 and section 790.60 “clearly makes the exhaustion of remedies mandatory rather than optional,” and that if it were to waive this requirement, ‘“the mquhement would be transformed into an option, to be accepted or ignored according to the whim of all claimants.” Id. at 76; quoting Lyons v . State (1980),.34 Ill. Ct.. C1. 268, 271-72.

Like the Claimant in Essex, Claimant in the, case at bar failed to exhaust all remedies available to her prior to seeking fina1 disposition of her claim in the Court of Claims. Accordingly, the Claimant here was obligated to bring a civil,action against Major Cobbs:

Section 790.90 of the Court of Claims rules (74 Ill. Adm. Code 790.90) provides that failure to comply withy the provisions, of section 790.60 shall be grounds for dismissal.

Therefore, Respondent’s motion to dismiss should be granted because Claimant has failed- to comply with [*119] the exhaustion ,of remedies requirement mandated in section 25 of the Court of Claims Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 37, par. 439.24-5) and section 790.60 of the Rules of the Court of CIaims (74 I€l. Adm. Code 790.60).

It is therefore ordered that the motion of Respondent be, and the same is, hereby granted, and the claim herein is dismissed with prejudice.

(No. S-CC-2.544-Claimants awarded $5,000.00.)

B RAD. CENTOLAand1 VALERIE CENTOLA, Claimants, 0.

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent.

Order filed September 22,1987.

Order filed July 14, 1988.

FULLER, HOPP, BARR, MCCART~Y & QUIGG (KITTY M. MCCARTHY,of counsel), for Claimants.

NEIL F. HARTIGAN, Attorney General (CHRISTINE ZEMAN, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent. *

INTEREST-state not liable for interest absent statute. The State is not liable for interest in the absence of a statute expressly subjecting the State to such liability.

STiPuLATIoNs-chim arising from State’s investigation of child abuse by husband of Claimants’ babysitter-stipulotion-award granted. Based on a joint stipulation between the parties, a claim arising from the Department of Children and Family Services’ investigation of child abuse by the husband of the Claimants’ babysitter was settled and the Claimants were granted an award of $5,000, since the agreement appeared to have been entered into with full knowledge of the facts and law, and it was for a just and reasonable amount.

1NTEREsT-stipulation-payment of award dela yed-request for interest denied. Where the payment of an award based on a joint stipulation was delayed by the legislature’s failure to approve the bill which included the provision for payment, the Claimants’ request for interest from the date of the award until payment was denied, since no statute allowing interest was [*120] applicable to the circumstances pleaded by the Claimants, and interest cannot be awarded in the absence of a statute authorizing such an award.

ORDER

MONTANA, C.J.

This cause comes before the Court on the parties’ joint stipulation for.settlement which states:

This claim arises from a Department of Children and Family Services investigation into child abuse by the husband of the babysitter for Claimants.

The parties have investigated this claim, and have knowledge of the facts and law applicable to the claim, and are desirous of settling this claim in the interest of peace and economy.

Both parties agree that an award of $5,000 is both fair and reasonable.

Claimants agree to accept, and Respondent agrees to pay Claimants Brad and Valerie Centola $5,000 in full and final satisfaction of this claim i d any other claims against Respondent arising from the events which gave rise to this claim.

The parties hereby agree to waive hearing, the taking of evidence, and the submission of briefs.

This Court is not bound by such an agreement but it is also not desirous of creating or prolonging a controversy between parties who wish {o settle and end their dispute. Where, as in the ,instant claim, the agreement appears to have been entered into with full knowledge of the facts and law and is for .a just and reasonable amount, we have no reason to question or deny -the suggested award.

It is hereby ordered that the Claimants be awarded $5,000, in full and final satisfaction of this claim.

[*121] ORDER

MONTANA, C.J.

This cause comes on to be heard on the Court’s own motion;

On September 22,.1987,an order was entered in this claim approving a settlement and awarding the Claimants $5,000. On January 29,,1988, an amended complaint for interest was filed. In .pertinent part that complaint reads as follows:

“1. That on September 22, 1987 an Order was entered by the State of Illinois, Court of Claims which awarded the Claimants Five Thousand Dollars ($5,OOO.00).

2. Claimants were advised by the Court of Claims that this award for Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00)would be included in a Special Awards Bill (Senate Bill 1521) to be approved by the Illinois General Assembly in October of 1987.

3. That during the veto session of the Illinois General Assembly in October of 1987, this award was included in Senate Bill 1521, the Court of Claims Special Awards Bill. However, during this veto session, this award was removed from Senate Bill 1521 and transferred to the Omnibus Bill, Senate Bill 1520, as an amendment to that Bill.

4. That the Illinois General Assembly failed to approve the Omnibus Bill, Senate Bill 1520, which included Claimants’ award for Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00).

i,

5. That Claimants have not received payment of their award.

6. That Claimants are entitled to interest on this award from the date the Order was entered on September 22, 1987 up to and including the date when a voucher from the State of Illinois is submitted to them as payment.

WHEREFORE, Claimants pray for judgment against: the State of Illinois, Court of Claims, for interest on their award which is to be calculated from the date the award was entered by the Court of Claims on September 22, 1987 up to and including the date on which Claimants receive a voucher from the State of Illinois representing payment of said award.”

This Court has consistently followed the rule that the State is not liable for interest in the absence of a statute expressly subjecting it to such liability. No such statute has been pleaded here and we know of none applicable to this set of facts as pleaded. In Doe v .

[*122] State (1986), 40 Ill. Ct, C1. 37, post-judgment interest which would have < a e c r d e an award was awaiting appropriation by the legislature was denied. In BranchNicoloff Co. v . State (19873, 40 Ill. Ct. IC1. 252, we denied interest stating "'* * I* (T)Be legislature7<s postponement, or failure to appropriate, the award does not change our previous p

It is hereby ordered that the-amended complaint be, and hereby is, dismissed for e to state a cause of action.