BARBARA ANDERSON, Claimant, v . THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent.
Case summary
Claimant sought damages for the wrongful death of her decedent in a vehicular accident, alleging that a state trooper negligently failed to detain a driver who was possibly under the influence. The court dismissed the claim, holding that the public duty rule barred the action and that no special relationship or duty to specific third persons existed.
Cases cited: Mallder v. Rasmussen (1986), 145 Ill. App. 3d 809, 495 N.E.2d 1356; Fessler v. R.E.J. Inc. (1987), 161 Ill. App. 3d 290, 314 N.E.2d 515
AI-generated summary from the opinion text — may contain errors. The opinion text and PDF above are the official record.
Headnotes
- NEGLIGENCE-essence of “public duty” rule. Under the rule of law commonly known as the “public duty” rule, a police officer’s duty to enforce the law is a duty owed to the public generally, and not to specific persons, and therefore police officers are not liable to individuals injured when an officer fails to do his or her duty, but there is an exception to the rule where an officer enters into a special relationship with a person who is subsequently injured.
- SAME-intoxicated driver issued warning ticket-allowed to continue driuing-fatal accident followed-“public duty” rule applicable-officer not liable. Where a State trooper stopped the Claimant’s decedent shortly before he was involved in a fatal automobile accident and issued him a warning citation, the officer was not liable to the Claimant for her loss of financial support and consortium because he failed to determine that the decedent was possibly under the influence of alcohol and was negligent in allowing the decedent to continue to drive, since no special relationship was alleged to have existed between the officer and the decedent, and the “public duty” rule applied.
- SAME-application of section 319 of Restatement o f Torts 2d to create special duty on part of arresting officers to specific third persons rejected. Although section 319 of the Restatement of Torts 2d provides that a person who takes charge of a third person known to be likely to cause bodily harm to others has a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent him from doing such harm, the uniform precedents of the State of Illinois precluded the adoption of that rule to create a special duty on the part of an arresting officer to a deceased motorist’s surviving spouse where the officer allegedly allowed the motorist to continue driving following a traffic stop even though he was intoxicated, with the result that the motorist was involved in a fatal accident.
- O FFICERS AN D PUBLIC EMPLOYEES-arresting officer allowed intoxicated motorist to continue driving-claim of wilful and wanton conduct not supported by facts pleaded. Where a surviving spouse of a deceased motorist alleged that a State trooper engaged in wilful and wanton conduct when he failed to determine that the motorist was intoxicated when he was stopped for driving erratically and allowed him to continue driving after being issued a warning citation, the facts pleaded were insufficient to distinguish the officer’s conduct from prior cases in which claims had been rejected. i:
This cause coming on to be heard on the motion of Respondent to dismiss the claim herein; due notice having been given the parties hereto, and the Co&( I,\ being fully advised in the premises, the court finds: t
That the claim before us arose from a vehicular accident which occurred on May 21, 1983, on Route 47 near Huntley, Illinois. Claimant’s decedent was involved in a head-on collision with Robert Yurs. Shortly before the accident, Mr. Yurs had been stopped for erratic driving and was ticketed by State trooper Richard Stewart of District 15.
The gist of the Claimant’s complaint is that when Trooper Stewart stopped Mr. Yurs and issued him a warning citation, he was careless or negligent in failing to determine that Mr. Yurs was possibly under the influence of alcohol, and was careless or negligent in allowing Mr. Yurs to drive. It further alleges that as a direct and proximate cause of these acts or omissions, Claimant suffered loss of financial support and loss of consortium. Additionally, by amended complaint, it is alleged that Trooper Stewart’s conduct was willful and wanton.
Traditionally, claims such as this fall under a rule of [*128] law sometimes known as the “public duty” rule. This rule states that a police officer’s duty to enforce the law is a duty owed to the public generally and not to individual persons; therefore, police officers and their employers are not liable to individuals injured even if an officer failed to do his or her duty. (Mallder w. Rasmussen (1986), 145 Ill. App. 3d 809, 495 N.E.2d 1356.) An exception to this rule exists where the police enter into a special relationship with a person who is subsequently injured (Mallder, supra), but no such relationship existed in this case.
The Claimant argues that section 319 of the Restatement of Torts 2d, should be adopted by this Court in this case to create a duty on the part of Trooper Stewart to protect third persons once he had stopped Mr. Yurs. “319. Duty of Those in Charge of Persons Having Dangerous Propensities.
One who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should
know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled is
under a duty to exercise reasonable care to conk01 the third person to
prevent him from doing such harm.”
In Fessler w.R . E . J .Znc. (1987), 161 Ill. App. 3d 290, 314 N.E.2d 515, with facts similar to the present case, the court rejected the application of section 32AA of the Restatement of Torts. Section 324A essentially states that those who render services have a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect third parties. In Fessler, supra, the court found that the decedent’s representatives had no cause of action against the police officer who had been dispatched to respond to reports of drunken driving. The officer talked to the alleged drunken drivers, but did not make an arrest. Soon thereafter one of the drunken drivers struck an auto and killed its occupant. The court refused to create a duty to specific third persons and rejected application of section 1 [*129] 324A of the Restatement of Torts. The court stated that, “the law and policy of this State call for the continued validity of the ‘public duty’ rule * * *” Fessler, 161 Ill. App. 3d 290,302.
In cases similar to the present case, the precedents are uniform in this State, holding that no duty exists to specific third persons. Additionally, an argument attempting to establish a duty to specific persons from the Restatement of Torts, albeit a different section, has been rejected within the past year on the grounds of public policy. Therefore, this Court, under the precedent of the reasoning and rule of law as expressed in the Fessler case, cannot adopt section 319 of the Restatement of Torts 2d, to create a duty to the Claimant’s decedent.
The Claimant pleads that the conduct of Trooper Stewart was willful and wanton; however, the Claimant pleads no facts to distinguish Trooper Stewart’s conduct from that of the officers in Fessler or Mallder, supra. It would appear that the allegation is more directed to the Respondent’s argument of public official immunity which this Court has not addressed.
Therefore, this Court finds that the Claimant has failed to state a cause of action, and this complaint is dismissed.
The Claimant, in its memorandum, requests leave to file a second amended complaint. The Claimant may make whatever motions it deems necessary in the proper form.