Maurice Moore v. State of Illinois

This is a claim brought by Maurice Moore for personal injuries sustained by him while a resident of the Centralia Correctional Center. On April 27, 1985, Claimant was playing cards in the day room of the institution. While sitting in a plastic swivel chair bolted to a table unit, the chair gave way and threw him to the floor. He injured his back, and in trying not to hit his head on the floor, caused his left index finger to be sprained. Examination of the chair revealed that one or more of the screws needed to hold the chair to the unit were missing.

Applying this Court’s holding in Ware v . State, 25 Ill. Ct. C1. 181, Claimant made an unrebutted prima facie case of negligence on the part of the Respondent.

In Ware, the Claimant was injured when the chair in which she was sitting in a State office collapsed. “This Court is of the opinion that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable to a public authority in Illinois. (See Roberts u. City of Sterling, 22 111. App. 2d 337; Kenney u. State, 22 111. Ct. C1. 247; and Finch u. State, 22 111. Ct. C1. 376.) The testimony clearly shows that the chair in question was under the control and management of the Unemployment Compensation Division of the Department of Labor of the State of Illinois, and that the occurrence was such as in the ordinary course of events would not have happened if due care had been exercised by Respondent. Claimant has established a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the Respondent, thereby shifting the burden of proof to Respondent. Respondent produced no evidence on the question of negligence and has failed to rebut the presumption raised by Claimant’s testimony. There is testimony in the record by Claimant that after the fall she noticed there was an old place in the chair where the chair had cracked, and that there was a crack on the back part of the chair where the seat goes into the leg. Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur it becomes the obligation of Respondent to show by affirmative proof that Respondent was not guilty of negligence in the incident in question, namely, the collapsing of the chair on which the Claimant sat. Respondent has failed to do so, and the Court finds that Respondent was guilty of negligence in the maintenance of the chair, and that said negligence caused the injury to Claimant.” Ware u. State, 25 Ill. Ct.

C1. 181,185.

[*182] Claimant’s medical history pertaining to the accident is contained in the departmental report attached to the transcript of this case. We are of the opinion that the Claimant suffered temporary pain and discomfort. It appears that he was unable to work in the correctional center kitchen for two weeks, and lost $6.00 in pay.

Therefore, we award the Claimant five hundred dollars ($500.00) for pain and suffering.

( N O . 86-CC-0230-Claim denied.)

VERA IRENE MCGRAW,Claimant, u. THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Respondent.

Opinion filed August 6,1986.

LAWRENCE BRUCKNER, for Claimant.

NEIL F. HARTIGAN, Attorney General (JOHN BUCKLEY, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.

NECLIGENCE-State is not insurer of safety of invitees. The State has a duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of invitees using State buildings and property, but the State is not an insurer of the safety of invitees.

SAME-slip-and-fall-ice-breach of duty by State not proved- claim denied. The Court of Claims denied a claim for injuries sustained when the Claimant slipped and fell on ice at a State facility where she had gone to work as a volunteer for a Red Cross bloodmobile program, since she failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the State breached its duty of reasonable care to provide for the safety of persons using the facility for the blood donation program.

POCH, J. This claim arises out of an incident which occurred on December 13, 1983, at the State of Illinois Department of Transportation headquarters in Dixon, Illinois.

[*1] j On that date the Red Cross set up its bloodmobile in the assembly room of the Department headquarters for the benefit of the Transportation employees and others who desired to donate blood.

On the morning of December 13,1983, at about 10 a.m., Claimant drove into the employees’ parking lot at the north end of the Department of Transportation complex and parked her car. Claimant came as a volunteer to help prepare lunch for those who had , donated blood. It had rained the night before and the temperature was in the low thirties.

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I Claimant entered the building at the north door and I walked down the corridor to the assembly room where i she found the bloodmobile. She intended to return to her car to bring in the groceries for the donors’ lunch.

As Claimant started for her car, a man who also was a volunteer for the Red Cross offered to go with her to carry the groceries. Claimant testified she started to retrace her steps and started to walk in the same i direction as she came when the other volunteer said, “You’re going the long way. I’ll show you a short cut.”

She further testified that from then on “I was in his hands, and went with him as he seemed to know where he was going.”

Unfortunately, he did not know where he was going and they walked in the exact opposite direction from the direction they should have taken and exited the building at its far southwest corner.

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The Department of Transportation had posted signs I both inside and outside the building identifying the I parking lot to be used by the volunteers and donors, and I the portions of the building being set aside for Red Cross purposes. In walking in the direction which they did [*184] Claimant and her friend ignored a sign in the corridor pointing in the opposite direction. They exited the building onto a concrete parking lot.

They were passing in front of a garage door when Claimant slipped on some ice and fell breaking her left arm.

Claimant testified that the surface was clear and that the ice was thin and very smooth. The sheet of ice was about three feet across.

As a result of the fall, Claimant was unable to accept a job as a cook.

James P. Wasilewski, a witness for Respondent, testified that he is the business services manager for the installation and is responsible for the maintenance of the office, including snow and ice removal around the facility. He testified that he made detailed preparations both inside and outside the building to insure the safety of persons using the parking lot and the part of the building reserved for volunteers and blood donors. He did not anticipate that anyone involved in the blood program would find their way into the southwest comer of the building. After the accident, Wasilewski did inspect the area where Claimant had fallen and found only dampness on the pavement.

The State is not an insurer of the safety of invitees, but must only exercise reasonable care for the safety of invitees.

The burden is upon the Claimant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the State breached its duty of reasonable care. This Claimant has failed to do.

[*185] We find that the Claimant has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent was negligent, and therefore this claim is denied.