Jonathan Childress v. State of Illinois

This is a claim brought by Jonathan Childress, a resident of Stateville Correctional Center, for personal injuries when his cell door was closed on his right hand.

On September 23, 1982, Claimant was transported from his cell in E house to a cell in F house. He was then taken to see an investigator and ultimately returned to his new cell in F house around 1O:OO p.m. Claimant was handcuffed with his hands behind his back while escorted to the investigator. The normal procedure for removing the handcuffs from a handcuffed prisoner is for the prisoner to enter his cell, which is then closed, and the prisoner is directed to stand with his back to the cell door. The officer reaches in through a chuck hole (or [*270] feeding hole) in the door and removes one handcuff. The prisoner then sticks his other hand out through the chuck hole and the officer removes the remaining handcuff.

In this case, after Claimant entered his cell, the cell door remained partially open (two or three inches) instead of being fully closed. The guard reached in through the chuck hole and removed the handcuff from Claimant’s right hand. When Claimant bent over to stick his left hand out through the feeding hole, he raised his right arm and rested his right hand against the door frame of the still open door. Claimant did not know that the doors were operated electrically. In E house, where Claimant had come from, the doors opened and closed manually. Claimant had never been in F house before and did not know the doors were closed electrically. While Claimant had his free right hand resting on the door frame between the partially opened door and the frame, the guard in the central tower closed the door on Claimant’s hand.

Since the cell was about a half story higher than the tower, the Claimant could see the guard in the tower and the guard in the tower could see Claimant at all times.

Although Claimant thought the guard removing the handcuffs had closed the door, when he asked the guard to open the door, the guard turned around and waved to the guard in the tower to open the door.

The incident caused Claimant to be in pain and he asked for medical attention. Although the guard said he would send somebody up, nobody came to attend to Claimant. By morning the hand was swollen three to four times its normal size. (R. 21.) Claimant was then taken to the institution hospital where the doctor [*271] examining Claimant told him there was no fracture. Claimant insisted that there had been a fracture and after the doctor took additional X rays it developed that there was an oblique fracture involving the first metacarpal and a transverse fracture involving a distal phalanx of the right middle finger. The doctor could not put a cast on it because of the swelling. He prescribed hot packs and a week later he put a cast on the hand.

The following colloquy took place between Claimant and the commissioner:

“Q: Now, then your complaint is then that you

received no treatment the night of the injury? Is

that what your complaint is?

A: Yes.

Q: You are not complaining about the treatment

you received after you finally got to see the

medical personnel?

A: . No.

Q: Now, I acknowledge that you were in pain and

that your hand had swollen, but in what way

would your medical condition be any better if

you had gone to the doctor that night?

A: They could have given some type of treatment,

something for the pain.

Q: Something for the pain?

A: Yes.

Q. How soon after the incident did you notice that

your hand was swelling? ’

A: I woke up the next morning, it was swollen.

[*272] Q: Okay. You went to sleep though before you

saw, before you noticed it?

A: It was swelling a little.

Q: Now, describe the pain. How did your hand

feel when you woke up in the morning?

A: It was stiff. I couldn’t move it. I could barely

move the tips of my fingers.

Q: Because of the swelling?

A: Right.

Q: But you weren’t feeling any pain from the

incident?

A: Yes, I was feeling pain.

Q: How did it feel?

A: Sharp.

Q: Let me see if I am summarizing this correctly.

Your complaint about the medical treatment is

that you are saying that you should have been

able to see medical personnel immediately

following the incident rather than having to

wait until the following morning?

A: Yes.

Q: But once you got the medical treatment, you

are not saying that you were dissatisfied with

what the doctor did.

A: NO.”

Claimant also complains of some partial permanent disability resulting from the incident. His testimony on this point is reproduced in full:

“Q: . . . How is your hand now?

[*273] I

I

I

I

A: It is all right. I still have a knot in it but it is

I

okay.

Q: So you don’t feel that you have any permanent

injuries from this incident?

A: I can’t say for sure. Like I say a11 of the swelling

is stuff still hasn’t left out of it. I haven’t seen the

last x-rays that they had took after they took the

cast off to see whether the bone mended back

together or what. They said it would be some

time before it would be all the way healed.

Q: Were there any bones broken?

A: It was cracked in two different spots.

Q: Which bone was that?

A: Here and there.

Q: It is in the hand?

A: Yes.

Q: Not in the fingers?

A: No. It is in the hand.

Q: Do you have any trouble using your fingers?

A: No, I don’t.

Q: You can close your fingers just as well with you

right hand as you can with your left hand?

A: I can’t close it as tight as my left.

Q: Let me see your hand. Does it show any

evidence of the injury?

. A: Like I say. It still has a knot right in here. You

could feel it right there on the bone.’’ (R. 6-7.)

[*274] Additionally, Claimant testified:

“Q: But you don’t really have any permanent injury from the door closing on the hand?

A: Yes, I do.

Q: The knot that is what you are talking about?

A: Yes.

Q: All right. Now, let me see your hand again?

A: Right there.

Q: But does that affect you in any way?

A: Like I said I can’t tighten my hand all the way up. I know it is not the way that it is supposed to be.

Q: How old are you?

A: I am 31.

Q: How long have you been here?

A: 3 years.

Q: Before you came here, what kind of work did you do?

A: I was a cosmetologist.

Q: You mean you worked in a beauty salon or something like that?

A: Yes.

Q: When will you be released from here?

A: In ’88.

Q: Will you go back and do that same type of work?

A: I don’t know. [*275]

Q: Well, will this in any way affect your ability to earn a living?

A: I don't know. I can't really say at the time.

Q: You have never done manual work?

A: Yes, I have.

Q: What kind?

A: Quite a few. Gardening, landscape.

Q: Are you on any work details now?., A: Yes, I am.

Q: What?

A: I am a clerk.

Q: Do you find any inconvenience in your work as a clerk caused by your hand?

A: It is not any inconvenience in my clerk work but it inconvenienced me being on the weightlifting team and things like that.

Q: How does it affect you on the ‘weightlifting team?

A: Like I say I can't ball my hand up all the way tight.

Q: Since the time the door closed on it?

A: Yes, I was on the weightlifting team before the injury happened and I was assigned back to the weightlifting team about two months ago trying to exercise to see if the strength will come back in the hand. So far it hasn't.

Q: How long did you suffer pain?

A: What do you mean? [*276]

Q: For how long was your hand in pain from

having the door close on it?

A: Until it got well.

Q: Howlong? I

A: I would say what, four months.” (R. 18-20.)

Respondent called Dr. Gartrell King, medical director at Stateville Correctional Center, as a witness. Dr. King was not the treating doctor, but testified from Claimant’s medical records.

At the request of the commissioner, Dr. King examined Claimant’s right hand (R. 32-35). He found slight tenderness over the right second metacarpal, found that the hand appeared to be “grossly unremarkable,” could not say with a reasonable degree of medical certainty, based on the information that he had, that the knot on the back of Claimant’s hand was caused by the fracture, and found that the patient appeared “to have substantial ability to grip with his right hand.’’

It is clear that Claimant proved a prima facie case of negligence on the part of Respondent. The instrument causing the injury was totally under control of Respondent, and Respondent called no witnesses to explain how the incident occurred.

As held by this Court in Westchester Fire Znsurance Co. v . State, 27 Ill. Ct. C1. 327: , “When a thing which has caused an injury is shown to be under the management of the party charged with negligence and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things will not happen if those who have such management use proper care, the accident itself affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the parties charged, that it arose from want of due care.”

Claimant was not guilty of contributory negligence because of his unfamiliarity with F house and specifi[*277]cally, its electronic doors. Moreover, the guard removing Claimant’s handcuff did not warn him not to rest his hand on the door frame or in any other manner advise him of safe procedures.

Although in the departmental report Warden DeRobertis offered the conjecture that Claimant injured his hand in a fight prior to being taken to segregation, Respondent called no witnesses to support this conjecture. In fact, Respondent introduced Claimant’s medical records which include Claimant’s resident injury report which recites that Claimant caught his right hand in a cell door.

Claimant failed to prove substantial permanent injuries, but he obviously experienced pain and suffering. The failure of Respondent to furnish Claimant with emergency medical treatment increased Claimant’s pain and suffering.

It is hereby ordered that Claimant Jonathan Childress be and hereby is awarded the sum of one thousand dollars ($1,000).

(No. 84-CC-OB63-Claimant awarded $35,831.00.)

CITY OF QUINCY, Claimant, 0.THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Respondent.

Order filed August 13,1984.

DONALD D. ADAMS, for Claimant.

NEIL F. HARTIGAN, Attorney General (WILLIAM WEBBER, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.

[*278] LAPSED APPRoPRiAmoNs-award of funds cannot exceed appropriations. The Court of Claims is not permitted to make awards of funds in excess of those funds the legislature has appropriated.

SAME-fire protection for veterans home-insufficient appropdutionsservices authorized by law-award granted. Even though the funds to pay a city for the fire protection provided for a State veterans home had either lapsed or the appropriation was insufficient, an award was granted to the city, since there is an exception to the rule prohibiting awards in excess of appropriated funds for cases in which the services provided are expressly authorized by law, and the fire protection services were a statutorily mandated part of the operation of the veterans homes.

ROE, C.J.

The City of Quincy brought this claim seeking the sum of $35,831.00 in payment for fire protection provided the Respondent’s Illinois Veterans Home located in Quincy, Illinois. The Claimant alleged that it demanded payment from the Respondent but its demand was refused on the grounds that the appropriation with which it could have been paid had lapsed or, in the alternative, on the grounds that there were insufficient funds appropriated for the payments.

It appears from the departmental report compiled by the Respondent’s Department of Veterans’ Affairs, which report is prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein pursuant to Rule 14 of the Rules of the Court of Claims, that amidst massive cost reduction measures taken by the Respondent with respect to the operation of the Veterans Home, it was decided that the City of Quincy’s fire protection bill would not be paid. The Department of Veterans’ Affairs described the situation as follows:

“During December, 1982, the staff of the Illinois Veterans Home, at Quincy, prepared an updated projection of expenditures through FY83.This projection indicated that, if the then current operational level was to be maintained, it was probable that overspending of the appropriated amount by approximately $soO,oOO would occur.

The Department implemented various cost curtailment measures wherever possible, to assure spending within the limits of the approved [*279] appropriation. Significant reductions were made in staffing levels with layoffs and the freezing of vacant positions. Participation of employees in the voluntary furlough program was encouraged. All future equipment acquisition was frozen, various service contracts were cancelled, commodity inventories were reduced and new purchases were deferred.

About this time, it also became apparent that the Illinois Veterans Home Fund was experiencing a serious cash-flow problem, as generated income was not keeping pace with expenditures. The Illinois Veterans Home Fund is funded from revenue generated at the Home through partial reimbursement of costs by the Veterans Administration and Medicare. A maintenance charge is also collected from the members of the Home, which is based on their monthly income. The Illinois Veterans Home Fund has in recent years supported approximately 60%of the operating costs of the Home.

This tight money situation was further adversely affected in March, 1983, when the Governor’s freeze on new admissions was put into effect. This freeze on new admissions, while intended to reduce operating costs, also placed a freeze on new income. As members died or moved out of the Home, income also was reduced.

A situation developed in which everyone involved was engaged in efforts intended to reduce expenditures and maximize the generation of income, while maintaining a level of operation which would provide adequate care and service for the approximately 600 members of the Home. In spite of efforts to reduce the cost of contractual services it was found that, in particular, the high cost of providing hospital and medical care for the members of the Home was continuing to increase at a drastic rate as the fiscal year was drawing to a close. Adding to the difficulty was the fact that the extent of Medicare participation in payment is never known with certainty until after a lag of several weeks.

Although adequate income was generated and cash was allocated to permit payment of all anticipated expenditures, and total expenditures were curtailed to within the limits of the total appropriation, the Department found that the appropriation by line item was greatly dislocated from where the costs were being incurred.

The remaining amount of transferability under the 2% transfer statute was necessarily utilized to permit payment of the final FY83 payrolls at the Home.

The Department sought the aid of the General Assembly in obtaining an amendment to our FY83 Appropriation to make the necessary transfer. Unfortunately, it was too late in the legislative session, and the Department was unsuccessful in this effort.

As a result, while the Department was lapsing approximately $162,000.00 in the Commodities line item, it was unable to transfer those funds to satisfy the additional needs in the Contractual Services line item.”

Ordinarily in circumstances such as this, this Court must deny this claim, as this Court is not permitted [*280]

under the Constitution of the State of Illinois, 1970,

article 8, section 2, or section 30 of the State Finance Act

(Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 127, par. 166), to award funds in

excess of those the legislature has appropriated.

However, the complaint and the departmental report, which pursuant to Rule 14 of the Rules of the Court of Claims is prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein, both state that the Claimant is requesting payment for fire protection rendered to the Illinois Veterans Home in Quincy, Illinois. Clearly, this is a service which is indispensable for those institutionalized at the home, and it is a service which cannot be purchased from any other source. There is an exception for payment of services in excess of the appropriated amount where those services are expressly authorized by law. The State submits that the operation and maintenance of the Illinois Veterans Home is mandated by section 2.01 of “An Act creating the Illinois Department of Veterans’ Affairs” (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 126%,par. 67.01), and that fire protection services are part of the operation of that home, and that these services are expressly authorized by law. This interpretation is consistent with the holding in Fergus v. Brady, 227 Ill. 272.

It is hereby ordered, that the Claimant be awarded $35,831.OO.