In re Sharon F. Beene

This matter is before the Court on the petition of Sharon Beene for an extension of time within which to file documents to claim compensation under the Crime [*432] Victims Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.),hereinafter referred to as the Act.

On October 1, 1982, we ruled that we were constrained by operation of law to deny the petition on the grounds that so much time had lapsed since the date of the.-alleged crime that we no longer had authority to grant the petition. The petitioner asked for a hearing and the case was assigned to a commissioner of the Court: At the suggestion of the commissioner, the parties elected.to file memoranda in lieu of holding the hearing.

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The facts as stated in the Petitioner’s memoranda are I as follows.

The Petitioner, Sharon F. Beene, was the victim of a crime on December 6,1979. She was sitting in a car with a friend in Garfield Park in Chicago when three men unknown to them went up to the car and one of them shot the Petitioner in the chest. The bullet went through her left lung and lodged in her spine. The men were never apprehended, and it is presumed the motive for the crime was robbery. No notice of intent or application were filed at that time by Petitioner, because she did not suffer monetary loss compensable under the Crime Victims Compensation Act. Her medical bills and sick leave were covered by her employer and insurance, and she was able to return to work about four months after the crime. She worked steadily until February of 1982, at which time the bullet which had been lodged in her body since 1979, migrated to a nerve causing severe back and muscle pain. As of that time she was unable to work, and thus suffered monetary damages necessary to seek compensation under the Act. On May 3, 1982, Claimant contacted attorney Devereux Bowly, Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago, to represent her in this matter.

He consulted Mr. Ron Castan, of the Chicago Crime [*433]

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Victims Compensation Act office, of the Attorney Gen- I eral of Illinois. Mr. Castan informed him that the current practice in regard to situations such as this was for the Claimant to submit a petition for extension of time, but not a notice of -intent nor claim: Mr. Castan said that if the petition for extension of time was granted by the

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Court, the notice of intent and claim could then be filed.

On May 4,1982, the petition and supporting documents were sent to Mr. Castan.

The statute in effect at the time of the crime was not the current statutory provision, which became effective I on September 22, 1979. When the crime occurred, on I September 6, 1979, the applicable statute was Ill. Rev.

Stat. 1973, ch. 70, par. 73(g). It provided: “Right to compensation-Conditions-Limitations-Notice. Q 3. A person is entitled to compensation under this Act if: 0 0 0 (g) his application for compensation under this Act is filed with the Court of Claims within 2 years of the date of the injury to the victim or within such further extension of time as the Court of Claims for good cause shown, allows, provided that notice of intent to file a claim is filed in the Office of the Attorney General within 6 months of the date of the injury, or within such further extension as the Court of Claims, for good cause shown, allows.” (Emphasis added.)

The above-cited provision, unlike the current one, does not set any limit on how long an extension of time can be granted in regard to the application or notice of intent, provided the Claimant shows good cause for the extension. It is the petitioner’s contention that the Court erred in the October 1, 1982, order in quoting and applying the current version of the section of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 70, par. 76.l), which, as previously stated, did II not go into effect until September 22, 1979, after the alleged crime in the instant case. Petitioner argues that statutes of limitation are given prospective effect, not retroactive operation, citing a case decided in 1875. It is unnecessary for us to recount the history of case law on [*434] this subject which developed since that time. This is a situation where a limitation on the bringing of an action was decreased. The type of action was legislatively created (as opposed to existing under common law). We find the cases of Orlick v . McCarthy (1954), 4 Ill. 2d 342, 122 N.E.2d.513, and Stanley v . Denning (1970), 264 N.E.2d 521, controlling and that the current version of the statute should be applied retroactively. I The Petitioner also filed a reply brief which ad- I dressed several arguments. However, we find that our decision above makes it unnecessary for us to address them. The fact that the Attorney General failed to file with the Court any brief or memorandum at all would make it very difficult to address those arguments made in the Petitioner’s reply brief had we found it necessary or helpful to do so.

Petition denied.

(Claim denied.)

In re PETITION OF MATTIERAMSEY Order filed May 9, 1984.

LEGAL ASSISTANT FOUNDATION OF C HICAGO (D EVEREUX BOWLEY, of counsel), for Claimant.

N EIL F. H ARTIGAN, Attorney General (F AITH S. SALSBURG, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Responden t.

CRIME VICTIMS COMPENSATION Am-notice of intent-limitations period.

Within six months of occurrence of crime Claimant must file notice of intent to file claim with Attorney General, and within one year of occurrence of crime upon which claim is based, Claimant must file application, under oath, with Court of Claims; and upon good cause shown, Court of Claims may extend time for filing notice of intent and application for period not exceeding one year.

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i SAME-petition for extension of time to file claim denied. The Claimant’s petition for extension of time to file documents to claim compensation under Crime Victims Compensation Act was untimely under the applicable statute pertaining to limitations on such extensions, and therefore the petition was denied, notwithstanding Claimant’s contention that her original application was timely, as the record showed that the application was filed with the Attorney General, and not, as required by statute, with the Court of Claims. 1 ROE, C.J. This matter is before the Court on the petition of Mattie Ramsey for an extension of time to file documents to claim compensation under the Crime Victims Com- I

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pensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.), hereinafter referred to as the Act. ~ On August 27, 1982, we ruled that we were constrained by operation of law to deny the petition on the grounds that too much time had lapsed since the date of the alleged crime. The crime was alleged to have ocI curred on May 9, 1980. Section 6.1 of the Act (Ill. Rev.

Stat. 1983, ch. 70, par. 76.1), provides in pertinent part ~ that a person is entitled to compensation under the Act if: “(a) within 6 months of the occurrence of the crime he files a notice of ~ intent to file a claim with the Attorney General and within one year of the occurrence of the crime upon which the claim is based, he files an application, under oath with the Court of Claims . . . . Upon good cause shown, the Court of Claims may extend the time for filing the notice of intent to file a claim and application for a period not exceeding one year.”

Accordingly, we would only have authority to extend the filing time for a period not to exceed November 9,1981, for the notice of intent and May 9, 1982, for the application. The notice of intent was submitted to the Attorney General on July 12, 1982, and the petition for the extension of time was filed on July 21, 1982, both dates being beyond our periods of discretion.

The Petitioner requested a hearing to review that decision which is a right provided under section 13.1(3) of the Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 70, par. 83.1(3).)The case was assigned to a commissioner of the Court. At his [*436] suggestion the parties elected to file memoranda in lieu of holding a hearing.

The Petitioner’s first contention is that she filed her application within 21 months of the date of the crime and thus the Court was mistaken when it stated in the fourth paragraph of the aforementioned order that the application was not tendered. Petitioner attached to her petition as an exhibit a letter from the deputy chief of the Attorney General’s crime victims division to the Petitioner which states that the application was received in their Springfield office on February 4, 1982.

Petitioner also argues that this entire case has been fraught with confusion and error not only in regard to its handling by the Court but also the Attorney General’s office. The letter referred to above was sent on June 15, 1982. The letter purported to return the application to the Petitioner because it was unsigned. It also stated, “As you sent, this application two years after the incident occurred, you must show good cause for the Court of Claims, which handles these matters, to extend this filing deadline”. In her memorandum Petitioner stated: “Claimant submitted her application on February 4, 1982, less than 21 months after the crime. The Attorney General’s Office then took more than 5 months to compose a 7 sentence letter to respond to Claimant. To add insult to injury, the letter states that claimant sent her . . . ‘application two years after the incident occurred. . .’when in fact only 21 months had gone by, and the remainder of the two year passage of time occurred during the 5 months she waited for his reply.”

It is the Petitioner’s contention that under these facts the State should be estopped from complaining about delays in this case because it contributed to and encouraged the very delays it complains of.

The Petitioner filed a reply brief which purports to address certain “myopic” and “distorted” views of the facts and case law contained in the State’s brief which [*437] Petitioner noted was filed almost two months late. We find it impossible to comment on those arguments because the State apparently neglected to file its brief with the Court (the docket shows no indication of it) and without knowing what was said in the State’s brief we cannot make sense out of Petitioner’s reply.

After having considered the record we find no error in our order of August 27, 1982. Section 6.l(a) of the Act (quoted above) clearly states that applications for benefits are to be filed under oath with the Court of Claims.

The statute contains no mention of filing applications with the Attorney General. Neither the docket nor the Court’s file contains an application made by the Petitioner here. No mention of one being filed with the Court appears in Petitioner’s memorandum or reply brief. It is our conclusion that none was tendered as stated in the previous order. The petition for an extension of time bears the filing stamp of the clerk’s office dated July 21, 1982. That date is well beyond the period within which we are authorized to grant an extension of time. Petitioner admitted that her notice of intent was filed beyond the discretionary period.

Petition denied.