In re Irene Soens

Irene Soens, Claimant, filed a timely application for

benefits under the Law Enforcement Officers and Fire[*361]

36 1 i men Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 48, pars. 281-285) as a result of the death of her husband, Orville J. ~ Soens, on January 20, 1982. An investigation was made by the Attorney General pursuant to section 4 of the Act I (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 48, par. 284), and the Attorney General then filed his report stating that he was unable to determine whether the decedent was killed in the line of duty and requesting a hearing on that issue. All other requirements have been satisfied.

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Decedent was a firefighter for the Olive Fire Protec- I

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tion District in Livingston, Illinois, which is a volunteer 1 fire department. At the time of his death he held the rank . ,

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of captain. His duties included maintenance of. the department’s trucks and the evidence indicated he w7as i performing this duty at the time of his death. I

Robert Pollett, a firefighter for the Olive Fire Protec- i tion District, testified that when he visited the fire station ‘1 at 4:55 p.m., on January 20,1982, decedent was working !

in the garage area of the station. There were two trucks in the station, a tanker and a pumper. Decedent was working on the engine of the tanker. The engine was idling, and the doors and windows of the station were . I closed. Pollett remained in the station conversing with I

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decedent for about 10 minutes. He did not notice any 1 accumulation of exhaust fumes, although there was no

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device attached to the truck to vent the fumes to the outside and no exhaust fan. There was no one else in the 1 station.

Decedent’s body was discovered about 6:lO p.m. by I Loren Linn, who resides in Bridgeton, Missouri, and had ’!

stopped at the station to get directions to a residence in Livingston, Illinois. Linn entered the station by the front I

! door and noticed the tanker’s engine running. He smelled I fumes and called out to see if anyone was present. He

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[*362] saw decedent lying on his back under the pumper truck and left the station to summon help.

When the body was found, the hood to the tanker was still open, and the tools decedent had been using were lying around near the engine where Pollett had seen them earlier. I

It was determined the decedent died as a result of I carbon monoxide poisoning.

There was no indication that decedent had been I depressed in any way or had suffered from any health problems. Decedent had in fact planned to meet his son, I Terry Soens, at 4:30 that afternoon at home so that Terry I

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could go with him to the station and help him with the I work on the truck’s engine. Terry had been unable to get home in time to meet his father, and decedent had gone to the station without him. The Act places the burden of proving wilful misconduct on the Attorney General. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 48, par. 282(e).) No such evidence was offered.

The Act defines “killed in the line of duty” as “losing one’s life as a result of injury received in the active performance of duties as a . . . fireman if the death occurs within one year from the date the injury was received and if that injury arose from . . . accidental cause”. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 48, par. 282(e).) It is the opinion of this Court that the preponderance of evidence indicates that Orville Soens’ death was accidental and I within the meaning of the Act. The Court therefore orders that compensation under the Act be paid to Claimant in the amount of $20,000.00.

[*363] I

( No . 83-CC-1779-Claimant awarded $20,000.00.)

In re APPLICATION OF BEVERLY BLUNT.

Opinion filed October 31,1983.

BEVERLY BLUNT, pro se, for Claimant.

NEIL F. HARTIGAN, Attorney General (J AMES A. KOCH, 1 Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.

L AW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS A N D FIREMENCOMPENSATION ACT-~UW enforcement officer defined. Law enforcement officer meam any perwn employed by State or local governmental entity as a policeman, police officer, auxiliary policeman or in some like pmition involving the enforcement of the law and protection of the public interest at the risk of that person’s life. I

SAME-Secretary of State investigator-traffic , emergency- deathclaim allowed. Investigator for Secretary of State was “law enforcement officer” for purposes of Law Enforcement Officers, Civil Defense lt’orkers, Civil Air Patrol Members, Paramedics and Firemen Compensation Act at time he stopped .his car while driving to work to’assist’other motorists \vho had gone off highway, and death benefits were awarded his survi\.ing spouse, as evidence established that decedent was charged yith enforcing . the Illinois Vehicle Code and was bound to respond immediately, at any time,’ to any emergency, on notice his services were needed, and he was struck and killed by an oncoming car while responding to what he perceived as the emergency involving the other motorists.

ROE,, C.J.

This claim arises out of the death of Kenneth L. Blunt, an internal investigator in the Office of the Secretary of State. The decedent’s widow seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48,par. 281, et seq.),hereinafter referred to as the Act. The verified application for benefits shows that Beverly Blunt was the wife and designated beneficiary of the decedent at the time of his death.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General, a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer, and a report by the [*364]

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Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application.

Based upon the record in this matter we find the circumstances surrounding the death to have been as follows. On January 31, 1983, the decedent was driving to work in Springfield, Illinois, from Vandalia, Illinois, on Interstate 55 when he stopped near the Divernon exit to assist motorists whose car had slipped off the roadway onto the grass median area. While standing near the disabled vehicle, the decedent was struck by another car which slid off the roadway onto the median. He died instantly due to brain hemorrhage as a consequence of fractures of the base of the skull.

The Attorney General’s investigation report states that the issue in this claim is whether the decedent was a law enforcement officer as contemplated by the Act. However, the report does not indicate what position the Attorney General takes concerning the issue.

The Act states:

“Section 2(a). ‘Law Enforcement officer’ or ‘officer’ means any person employed by the State or a local governmental entity as a policeman, peace officer, auxiliary policeman or in some like position involving the enforcement of the law andpprotection of the public interest at the risk of that person’s life.” I

The record indicates that the decedent was an investigator for the Secretary of State who had achieved the rank of deputy director of internal affairs. He was sworn pursuant to the Illinois Vehicle Code and charged with enforcing the Vehicle Code in his capacity as an internal investigator at all times. His duties as an investigator included being subject to call to duty 24 hours of the day, every day of the year, and being bound to respond immediately, day or night, in any emergency, whether on or off duty, on notice that his services were needed.

[*365] In this case it appears that the decedent perceived what he thought to be an emergency when he saw the motorists and their car which had slipped onto the grass median. He responded on notice that his services were needed. While performing his duty to respond to an emergency he was exposed to the risk which caused him to lose his life.

By reason of the foregoing, this Court finds that the decedent was a law enforcement officer within the meaning of the Act.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $20,000.00 (twenty thousand dollars and no cents) be, and hereby is, awarded to Beverly Blunt, the surviving spouse and designated beneficiary of Kenneth L. Blunt.

( No . 84-CC-0445-Claimant awarded $20,000.00.)

In re APPLICATION OF B ARBARA KLACZA.

Opinion filed November 9,1983:

BARBARA KLACZA, pro.se, for Claimant.

NEIL F. HARTIGAN, Attorney General (H ANS G. FLADUNG, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.

LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS A N D FIREMEN COMPENSATION Am-“kiZled in line of duty” defined. Killed in line of duty means losing one’s life as result of injury received in active performance of duties as law enforcement officer or fireman if death occurs within one year from date the injury was received and if injury arose from violence or other accidental causes.

SAME- police officer- killed by hit-and-run driver-claim allowed. Death benefits were granted to surviving spouse of police. officer who was struck and killed by hit-and-run driver while walking to his police vehicle, as death arose from “other accidental cause” within meaning of being “killed in the line of duty” for purposes of Law Enforcement Officers, Civil Defense Workers, Civil Air Patrol Members, Paramedics and Firemen Compensation

Act. I

[*366] ROE, C.J.

This claim is before this Court by reason of the death of Wayne Klacza, a police officer for the city of Chicago. Barbara Klacza, the widow and sole designated beneficiary of the decedent, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 281 et seq.),hereinafter referred to as the Act.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General, a written statement

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of the decedent’s supervising officer along with documents submitted with that statement, and a report prepared by the Illinois Attorney General’s office.

The record indicates that on June 28, 1983, the I decedent reported for duty at the Area Center 4 Head- I quarters in Chicago at 5:OO p.m. At approximately 5:55 p.m. he was walking toward his assigned police vehicle I from the south curb at 3148 W. Harrison Street to the II north curb when an eastbound vehicle traveling at a high rate of speed suddenly swerved from the eastbound lane and struck the decedent in the westbound lane. After

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striking the decedent, the vehicle continued eastbound

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and struck parked vehicles further down the street. The , decedent was taken to Mt. Sinai Hospital where he w7as pronounced dead at 6:56 p.m. The medical examiner’s certificate of death lists the immediate cause of death as multiple injuries due to blunt trauma. The driver of the vehicle which struck the decedent was apprehended and charged with reckless homicide, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of marijuana.

The report by the Attorney General’s office states that the Attorney General is unable to determine whether [*367]

,367 the decedent’s death meets the requisite of being killed in the line of duty as defined in the Act.

Section 2(e) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 282(e)), provides, in relevant part, that “ ‘killed in the line of duty’ means losing one’s life as a result of injury received in the active performance of duties as a law enforcement officer . . . if the death occurs within one year from the date the injury was received and if that injury arose from violence or other accidental cause.” (Emphasis added.)

This Court has previously dealt with that part of section 2(e) concerning the phrase “other accidental cause” and its applicability to cases involving traffic accidents which result in the deaths of law enforcement officers while on duty. In Carr u. State (1974), 29 Ill. Ct. C1. 540,and Allen u. State (1947),29 Ill. Ct.C1. 540,we found that “other accidental cause” included the situation where two game wardens on patrol duty were killed when the car in which they were riding collided with a car driven by a civilian which crossed over the center line.

Although the decedent was not riding in a car when the fatal accident occurred, his situation is substantially similar to that of the officers in the cases cited above. We find, therefore, that Officer Klacza’s death arose from an accidental cause covered by section 2(e) of the Act and that his death meets the requisite of being “killed in the line of duty” as defined in the Act.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $20,000.00 be, and hereby is, awarded to Barbara Klacza, as the widow and sole designated beneficiary of Wayne Klacza.

[*368] ( No . 84-CC-0517-Claim denied.)

C. O’BRIEN.

In re APPLICATION OF MERCEDES

Opinion filed November 9,1983.

MERCEDES

C..O’BRIEN,pro se, for Claimant.

NEIL F. HARTI’GAN, Attorney General (R OBERT J. SKLAMBERG, Assistant Attorney General, o,f counsel), for Respondent.

L AW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS AN’D FIREMEN COMPENSATION Acr-‘‘ki‘Zled in line of duty” defined. Killed in line of duty means losing one’s life as result of injury received in active performance of duties as law enforcement officer or fireman if death occurs within one year from date the injury was received and if injury arose from violence or other accidental cayses.

SAME-Department of Law Enforcement officer-fatal heart attackclaim denied. Claim for death benefits filed by surviving spouse of captain in Department of Law Enforcement was denied, as evidence established that decedent suffered fatal heart attack while travelling to conference of police association, and there was nothing in record to indicate that death arose from violence or other akcidental cause within meaning of being “killed in line of dlity” for purposes of Law Enforcement Officers, Civil Defense Workers, Civil Air Patrol Members, Paramedics and Firemen Compensation Act. ROE, C.J.

This claim is before this Court by reason of the death of William Patrick O’Brien, a captain in the State of Illinois Department of Law Enforcement. The decedent’s widow seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act, (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 281 et s e q . ) ,hereinafter referred to as the Act.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General, a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer, and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office.

The record shows that on November 13, 1982, the decedent suffered a fatal heart attack while en route to represent the State of Illinois Department of Law En[*369]forcement at the International Association of Chiefs of Police Conference in Atlanta, Georgia. The attack occurred while the decedent was preparing to leave Murfreesboro, Tennessee, for Atlanta after a night’s lodging. The certificate of death issued by the Department of Public Health of Rutherford County, Tennessee, states that the cause of death was cardiac arrest due to coronary artery disease.

Section 2(e) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 282(e)) provides, in relevant part, that ‘killed in the

“ line of duty’ means losing,one’s life as a result of injury received in the active performance of duties as a law enforcement officer . . . if the death occurs within one year from the date the injury was received and if that injury arose from violence or other accidental cause”.

There is nothing in the record indicating that the decedent’s death arose from violence or other accidental cause. No injury, or other unusual force, has been shown I which might have caused the heart attack. I

We find therefore: (a) that Captain O’Brien was not killed in the line of duty as defined by section 2(e) of the Act; and (b) that the proof submitted in support of this I claim does not satisfy the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore not compensable thereunder.

It is hereby ordered that the claim of Mercedes C. O’Brien, as widow of William Patrick O’Brien, be, and hereby is, denied.[*370]