In re Elizabgth J. Randall

Claimant brought this claim as the designated beneficiary seeking compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act (111.Rev.Stat. 1981, ch. 48 par. 2.81 et seq.), hereinafter referred to as the Act. Pursuant to an order of this Court her claim was assigned to a commissioner for hearing and a hearing was held July 29, 1982, at the Court of Claims courtroom in Springfield, Illinois.

It appears from the evidence presented that Herbert W. Randall was married to the Applicant. She was his designated beneficiary under the Act. He was employed as an investigator for the Vermilion County Sheriff‘s Department, and also worked part-time for the village of Catlin as a patrolman. The evidence further showed that a condition of his employment as investigator for Vermilion County was that he was subject to 24-hour call, and that in the event that an incident or an investigation required his presence, this would take precedence over his duties as a patrolman for the village of Catlin.

It was further shown by the exhibits, affidavits, and [*918]

testimony that on August 11, 1981, the decedent left his

duties with the sheriff‘s department at 4:OO p.m. and went to his home in Georgetown, Illinois, for dinner. At

that time he changed into a uniform of the Catlin Police Department, ate dinner and left in the family autoniobile at approximately 4:45 p.m. for the village of Catlin. The Applicant testified that she assumed he would stop for gasoline in the family car because she had used the car that day. There was testimony that the decedent was taking the most direct route to the village of Catlin. Further, there was testimony that had he arrived at the home of the chief of police of the village of Catlin, he would have changed vehicles and proceeded upon routine patrol in a marked squad car for the village of Catlin. The tour of duty was to commence at 5:OO p.m. and conclude at 9:00 p.m.

The investigative reports indicate that when the decedent approached the village of Westfield, an automobile operated by a Steven R. Neal appeared at the intersection of Route 150 and Virginia Street at a high rate of speed and was being operated in a reckless manner. In an attempt to overtake another vehicle, Neal was said to have sideswiped and forced said vehicle off the roadway at which point the Neal vehicle proceeded into the northbound lane and hit the decedent’s vehicle head on. This evidence was not objected to, not corroborated, and not refuted. The death certificate recites that the decedent was killed immediately from a basal skull fracture as a result of the accident.

Counsel for Applicant and Respondent both seem to agree, and we concur, that the only issue in this case is whether or not the decedent was “killed in the line of duty” as provided by sections 2(e) and 3 of the Act. (111.Rev.Stat. 1981, ch. 48, pars. 282(e), 283.) Both counsel waived the filing of briefs and asked the Court to decide [*919] the case on the record. Neither party could cite a previous Court of Claims decision directly on point.

In general, this Court’s decisions on the issue have closely paralleled workmen’s compensation rules. The rule which has evolved in the field of workmen’s compensation and generally applied by this Court is to determine whether the employee, when injured, was at a place where by reason of his employment, he was required to be, or whether he was subject, by reason of his employment, to a hazard to which the general public is not exposed or to which he, by reason of his employment, is exposed peculiarly to a greater degree than the public. We believe this test is within the spirit and intent of the Act and closely summarizes our analysis of all of the prior claims. Even in cases where the decedent died of a heart attack we have tried to discern a direct causal link between the heart attack and some official activity. The statute states in part: “ ‘killed in the line of duty’ means losing one’s life as a result of injury received in the active performance of duties as a law enforcement officer.” (Emphasis added). (111.Rev.Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 282(e)). Webster’s Dictionary defines the word “active” as “characterized by action rather than contemplation” and “produced of or involving action or movement”. Therefore we have looked into what exactly the person was doing at the time of his death.

Under workmen’s compensation case law it has been held that simply because a law enforcement officer is on call 24 hours a day, any injuries sustained-must still be in some way dependent on the claimant’s status as a police officer. Siens v . Industrial Commission (1981), 84 I11.2d 361,481 N.E.2d 749.

Turning to the facts in the case at bar in light of the discussion above, we have a police officer in uniform, in his personal vehicle driving to his place of employment, [*920] with certain conjecture that he may have stopped for gasoline for his personal vehicle. His personal vehicle was not equipped with any radio equipment nor had he been contacted for any police work or activity. It is our opinion that the decedent would not have commenced in the “active performance of duties as a law enforcement officer” until he would have arrived at the residence of the chief of police of the village of Catlin, changed vehicles from his own car to the marked squad car, and begun to patrol or gone about assigned duties from the chief of police. Although there was much testimony concerning the period of time for which he was in fact paid and the exact time of death, we do not find it persuasive, for benefits under the Act are not limited to paid persons. Even though a person may be paid for working certain hours, if he is not actually on the job in the active performance of his duties, he is not within coverage of the Act.

The unfortunate death of Mr. Randall came as a result, in our opinion, of a hazard to which all of the general public is subjected and cannot be linked or related to his employment as a law enforcement officer other than by commuting to his secondary place of employment.

Wherefore, it is hereby ordered that this claim be, and hereby is, denied.

[*1] I

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( No . 82-CC-1921-Claini denied.)

In re APPLICATION OF EUNICE J. RIVERS. I

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Opinion filed l u n w r y 11,1983.

EUNICE J. RIVERS, pro se, for Claimant.

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NEIL F. HARTIGAN, Attorney General (EDWARD C. HURLEY, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent. I

LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS AND FIREMEN COMPENSATION ACT-heart uttuck-ckim denied. University police officer’s death was not due to injury which arose from violence or other accidental cause related to work as law enforcement officer, as record clearly established that when decedent suffered heart attack shortly after reporting for duty, he was not engaged in any activity posing risks inherent in his job of law enforcement.

ROE, C.J.

The Claimant herein, Eunice J. Rivers, seeks an award based upon the provisions of the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 281 et seq.), by reason of the death of her husband, Allen Albert Rivers, Jr., who died on December 29, 1981, while on duty at the University of Illinois police department.

The decedent was a 51-year-old male employed as a field supervisor on the University of Illinois police department. His duties required him to work both inside at a desk and outside in good weather and bad. During the one-year period immediately preceding the date of his death he suffered from diabetes, hypertension, poor circulation, swelling of the feet and legs, and chronic lung disease. The decedent was overweight, had difficulty controlling his weight and ate when he was nervous or upset from his job. During the three weeks immediately preceding his death, Mr. Rivers showed signs of fatigue, had difficulty sleeping, and would nod off during the day, even while engaged in conversation. Additionally, [*922] Mr. Rivers was suffering from an ulcer on his leg, swelling of his legs and the residual effects of severe frostbite which occurred while he was on duty, but not within the one-year period preceding his death. On December 18, 1981, he was advised by his physician, Victor S. Wojnar, M.D., to enter the hospital, which the decedent refused to do.

Mr. Rivers, in the performance of his duties as an officer, worked 40 hours per week and additionally, he was required to work mandatory overtime. During the 10 days immediately preceding his death he worked a 40- hour week and, in addition to his regular duties on December 19, 1981, worked 3.8 hours of overtime; on December 22, 1981, he worked 3.8 hours of overtime; on December 25, 1981, he worked 3.8 hours of overtime.

On the morning of December 29, 1981, he arose from bed, stated that he was not feeling well and vomited prior to leaving for work. He drove to the police station in near zero temperatures and arrived sometime prior to 7:OO a.m. While on duty he was seen by his fellow officers to be gasping for breath. He collapsed and was taken by ambulance to Burnham City Hospital and at 7:58 a.m. was pronounced dead. The cause of death was massive myocardial infarction due’to or as a consequence of hypertension.

The issue is whether Claimant’s decedent was killed in the line of duty, as defined in section 2(e) of the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48,par. 282(e).

Although coverage of the Act is not limited to healthy persons, the preponderance of the evidence shows that Claimant’s decedent was not killed in the line of duty, as defined under section 2(e) of the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, [*923] ch. 48, par. 282(e)) and the guidelines set forth by the Court of Claims, as his death did not arise from “violence or other accidental cause.” See Wierciak 2). State (1982), No. 00192; McZnerny 2). State (1980), 34 Ill. Ct. C1. 300; Hedge v. State (1982), No. 00195; Baker v. State (1980), 34 11l.Ct.Cl. 311, and McNamara v. State (1982), N O . 81-CC-2814.

The Act provides for payment of compensation only in cases in which an officer is killed in the line of duty as stated in section 2(e) of the Act. To recover under the Act, Claimant must prove that decedent lost his life as a result of injury which arose from violence or other accidental cause. It is not disputed that the decedent was on duty at the time of his death. However, the circumstances under which the decedent died in no way satisfy the requirements of the Act, allowing compensation.

In all of the above cited cases, the Court denied an award because the claimant was unable to prove a violent or accidental cause leading to the heart attack. In the McNamara case, the Court said:

“Clearly there can be no recovery tinder the statute if Captain McNaniara was not first injured. Death alone is not sufficient. It must be preceded by an injury. In all cases involving death by heart attack an effort is made to pin-point an injury which triggered the fatal attack.”

Applying the above to the facts, it is clear that Mr. Rivers, in arriving at work, was not engaged in any activity which posed risks inherent in the job of law enforcement.

The Court must also consider its decision in light of the precedent it creates. By granting recovery the Court would adopt a position which essentially would allow compensation merely where an officer dies while at work. This position is inconsistent with the intent of the legislature.

[*924] It is therefore ordered that the claim of Eunice J. Rivers be, and hereby is, denied.