Sherman L. Strootman v. State of Illinois

This cause having come for consideration on the joint motion of the Claimant, Sherman L. Strootman, and the Respondent, State of Illinois, and the Court being duly advised in the premises:

Finds, that Claimant’s property, a 1981 Ford van, was damaged when Claimant was entering Vandalia Correctional Center, Vandalia, Illinois, on November 6, 1981, at approximately 10:30 a.m. At that time, Claimant was proceeding through the Correctional Center gate when Sgt. Dennis McCombs accidentally pushed the close button to the gate control and the gate control shut damaging the van on the right passenger door. Claimant has had this damage repaired and the cost of that repair is $118.74. The Respondent agrees that this is a reasonable sum for that repair.

This information was received from the Claimant’s complaint and a departmental report issued by the Illinois Department of Corrections, State department or agency, a copy of which was attached to the joint stipulation and which is considered prima facie evidence pursuant to Rule 14 of the Rules of the Court of Claims. The Respondent, State of Illinois, conceded liability for the [*865] damage to Claimant’s property to the extent agreed upon in the joint stipulation.

Both parties have indicated ,that no other evidence, oral or written, will be presenteh to the Court and both parties waive briefs. Both parties agree to the granting of an award to the Claimant for $118.74 and both parties agree that this award will constitute full and final satisfaction of the claim herein or any other claim arising out of the same occurrence.

While this Court is not necessarily bound by a stipulation such as this, it has no desire to interpose a controversy where none appears to exist. Stipulation submitted by the parties appears to have been entered into freely and fairly, and its contents appear to be reasonable. The Court, therefore, finds no reason not to accept this stipulation and to follow its recommendation for an award in the amount of $118.74.

It is hereby ordered that this Claimant be awarded $118.74 in complete and final satisfaction of this claim.

( No . 82-CC-1857-cIdim di\mised.)

T HEODORE J. C ATTONI, J R . , Claimant, v . THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Respondent.

Order filed June 15,1983.

LAMBERT, LEVINSON, WANNINCER

& C ANNA, for Claimant.

N EIL F. HARTIGAN, Attorney General (SANDRA L. ANDINA, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.

[*866] NOTICE-purpose of notice requirement. The notice requirement of the Court of Claims Act is intended to afford State an early opportnnity to investigate claims and thus protect taxpayers of State.

SAhiE-irntimeZy notice-duim dismissed. State’s motion to dismiss claim allowed where Claimant’s first mailed notice to Clerk of Court of Claims and Attorney General was never received by either office and a second notice was sent and received more than six months after the personal injnry, as Claimant who does not take precaution of sending notice by certified or registercd mail takes risk that notice will not be received in required offices in timely fashion.

HOLDERMAN, J.

This matter comes before the Court upon a joint stipulation filed by the parties hereto.

The question involved here is whether or not the mailing of a notice to the clerk of the Court of Claims and to the Attorney General on August 10, 1981, which was not received by them, and the mailing of a second notice on January 7, 1982, more than six months after the alleged personal injury, and which was received by the addressees, was sufficient to comply with notice requirements of the notice statute of the Court of Claims Act.

Section 22-1 of the Court of Claims Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 37, par. 439.22-l), which is the section involved here, states that the required notice must be filed in the office of the Attorney General and in the office of the clerk of the Court of Claims.

The joint stipulation is as follows:

“Now come Claimant and Respondent by and throngh their respective attorneys and, for the purposes of expediting decision of Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, stipulate as follows regarding the attached Notice of Claim for Personal Injuries:

1. That said Notice was mailed by Claimant, as stated in the affidavit

Of Susan M. Semens, on August 10,1982, to both addressees.

2. That said notice was not received by either the Clerk of the Court

of Claims or the Office of the Attorney General until after it was mailed

a second time on January 7, 1982.”

[*867] The purpose of the requirement notice is to afford the State an early opportunity to investigate a claim. If the notice is not actually received, then the legislative purpose is thwarted or evaded. Mail sent by ordinary mail, rather than certified or registered mail with return receipt requested, which does not arrive at its destination, is actually never in the addressee’s office.

It is the opinion of the commissioner who received the stipulation and it is the opinion of the Court that one who mails a notice to the Attorney General and to the clerk and who does not take the precaution of sending it registered or certified mail takes the risk that the notice will never be in the required office. It is the opinion of this Court that the notice requirement of the statute was for the distinct purpose of giving the State of Illinois a chance to investigate any and all claims and thus protect the taxpayers of the State.

It is the further opinion of the Court that the stipulation in question does not satisfy the requirements of the statute and that the motion of Respondent to dismiss be granted.

This cause is dismissed.