In re Virgil Dragos

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on June 17, 1980. Virgil Dragos, Claimant, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on January 21, 1981, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based on these [*548] documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on June 17, 1980, the Claimant alleges that an unknown offender entered his apartment and hit him over the head with a bottle during the course of a robbery. Subsequent police investigation revealed that the Claimant had procured a female impersonator, thinking that he was a prostitute. The Claimant then took the individual to his apartment. When the Claimant realized that the offender was a female impersonator, the offender hit him over the head with a bottle and robbed him. The incident occurred in the Claimant’s apartment located at 5900 N. Sheridan Road, Chicago, Illinois. The Claimant was taken to Edgewater Hospital and admitted for treatment. The offender has not been apprehended to date.

2. That the Claimant seeks compensation for loss of earnings.

3. That section 10.1 of the Act indicates factors used to determine entitlement to compensation. Specifically, section lO.l(d) of the Act states that an award shall be reduced according to the extent to which any prior criminal conviction or conduct of the victim may have directly or indirectly contributed to the injury or death of the victim.

4. That it appears from the investigatory report and the police report that the Claimant’s injury was substantially attributable to the unlawful act of soliciting for a prostitute. Soliciting for a prostitute is an illegal act in violation of the Illinois Criminal Code. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 28-1.

5. That without addressing the merits of other issues raised in the investigatory report, the Claimant’s conduct contributed to his injury to such an extent as to warrant that the Claimant be denied entitlement to compensation.

[*549] It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is hereby denied.

( No . 81-C\’-0901-Claini denied.)

In re APPLICATION OF GAYLE KINDER.

Order filed December 31,1981.

G AYLE KINDER, pro se, for Claimant.

T YRONE C. F AHNER, Attorney General (MAUREEN CAIN, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.

Crmm \ r ~ n C~OMPENSATION

~ s Am-non-intentional motor vehicle offensecluirn denied. Crime Victims Compensation Act was not intended to include compensation for non-intentional motor . vehicle offenses, and therefore claim for injuries sustained in hit-and-rim accident was denied.

POCH,J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on November 23, 1980. Gayle Kinder seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the Court and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on November 23, 1980, the Claimant was the victim of a hit-and-run accident as he was walking on the shoulder of Camp Jackson Highway, Cahokia, Illinois.

[*550] The Claimant was taken to Memorial Hospital for treatment of a fractured leg. The driver of the vehicle was not apprehended.

2. That the issue presented to the Court is whether an injury incurred as a result of the reckless operation of a motor vehicle, including leaving the scene of the accident, may be the basis for an award under the Act.

3. That in In re Stevens (1976), 31 Ill. Ct. C1. 610, the Court held: “It is the opinion of this Court that the Illinois General Assembly did not intend to include compensation for non-intentional motor vehicle offenses.”

While a hit-and-run case is a crime, it is not one of the crimes specifically enumerated in the Act as being the basis of a claim under the Act.

It is therefore hereby ordered, that this claim be, and is hereby denied.

( No . 81-CV-0920-Claim denied.)

In re APPLICATION OF ALICE N ANCE .

Order filed October 7,1981.

ALICE NANCE, pro se, for Claimant.

T YRONE C. FAHNER, Attorney General (MAUREEN CAIN, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.

C RIME VICTIMS COMPENSATION Am-smoke inhalation-no evidence of violent crime-claim denied. Claim for death of victim due to smoke inhalation as result of fire at his residence denied as there was no evidence as to cause of fire or evidence proving that death was result of one of violent crimes listed in Crime Victims Compensation Act.

[*551] POCH,J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on December 29, 1979. Alice Nance, sister of the deceased victim, Floyd Brown, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on May 6, 1981, on the form prescribed by the Court, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and oth,er evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on December 29, 1979, the victim died of smoke inhalation as a result of a fire at his residence at 4530 N. Malden, Chicago, Illinois. The victim was pronounced dead on arrival at Weiss Memorial Hospital. The cause of the victim’s death, as listed on the death certificate, was acute carbon monoxide intoxication. The police investigation was unable to determine the cause of the fire.

2. That in order for a Claimant to be eligible for compensation under the Act, there must be evidence of one of the violent crimes specifically set forth under section 2(c) of the Act.

3. That there was no evidence to prove that the victim died as a result of one of the violent crimes specifically set forth under section 2(c) of the Act.

4. That the Claimant has not met a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered, that this claim be, and is hereby denied.