James Thomas v. State of Illinois

This cause coming on to be heard on the motion of Respondent to dismiss, due notice having been given, and the Court being fully advised in the premises; A complaint has been filed by James Thomas seeking retroactive compensation in the amount of $26.64 which represents the difference between the double time rate to which Mr. Thomas alleges entitlement and the straight time rate at which he was actually paid for working on a holiday. Claimant based his claim on Art. VI, Section 6.4, Item c of the Local 726 Teamsters Agreement.

In the motion to dismiss, Respondent points out that Personnel Rules 3-200 and 3-220 provide that an employee shall be paid at a straight time rate for all holidays worked.

Thus the issue before us is what provision will prevail when there is a conflict between a collective bargaining contract and the Rules of the Department of Personnel. We find that the Rules, pursuant to Ill. Rev.

Stat. 1977, ch. 127, Sec. 63b 108, have the force and effect of law, and are binding as if made directly by the Legislature. City of Chicago o. Bullis 77 N.E. 575,221 Ill. 379; Braswell 0.State, No. 78-CC-2073, Ill. Ct. Cl., filed [*194] June 25,1980. Any contract provision which is in conflict with existing law cannot prevail and is invalid.

We find that the contract provision by which Claimant is seeking compensation is in direct conflict with Rules of the Department of Personnel. Therefore the claim for double time pay is hereby denied and, because Claimant has already been compensated at straight time pay for the time worked, as provided for in the Rules, this claim is hereby dismissed with prejudice.

( No . 79-CC-0660-Claim dismissed.)

ERNEST M. ADKINS, J R . , and MERRY Jo ADKINS, Claimants, u.

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent.

Order filed July 21,1980.

ERNEST M. ADKINS, JR., and MERRY Jo ADKINS, pro se, for Claimants.

NEGLIGENCE-guardian given custody of minor under provisions of Juvenile Court Act is not subject to liability for damages caused by minor.

Claim for replacement of belongings damaged and destroyed by fire caused by minor ward of the State was denied, as the minor was placed in the State’s custody under provisions of the Juvenile Court Act and the State was not subject to the liability imposed by the Parental Responsibility Law.

POCH,J. This cause is before the Court on Respondent’s motion for summary judgment.

Claimant seeks to recover the sum of $16,472.94 from the State of Illinois Department of Children and Family Services for the replacement of personal belongings damaged and destroyed in a fire in the home of the Claimant’s mother while the Claimant’s personal articles [*195] were being stored in said home. The loss occurred when the home burned as a result of a fire started by a minor ward of the Department of Children and Family Services who was a foster child in the home of Claimant’s mother.

The ward had been placed in Claimant’s home after she was placed in the custody of the Department of Children and Family Services by the Order of the Juvenile Division of the Circuit Court of Clay County as set forth in the I departmental report. In support of its motion for summary judgment the Respondent has cited the case of Mildred L. Vallery, 74-CC-378 and attached a copy of the VaZlery case to its Motion. The Vallery case is exactly I on point wherein they state as follows: “At common law, the parent or legal guardian of a minor is not liable for the tortious acts of the minor. However, Illinois has adopted a Parental Responsibility Law, Ch. 70, 111. Rev. Stat., Paragraphs 51-57, which does impose liability upon a parent or legal guardian for actual damages for the wilful or malicious acts of a minor.

Section 2 of the Parental Responsibility Law, Ch. 70, Ill. Rev. Stat., Section 52, defines ‘legal guardian’ to be: ‘A person appointed guardian or given custody of a minor by a circuit court of the State, but does not include a person appointed guardian, or given custody, of a minor under the Juvenile Court Act; approved August 5, 1965, as now or hereafter amended.’ Since the Department of Children and Family Services was given custody of the minor by a circuit court under the provisions of the Juvenile Court Act, the Department is not subject to the liability imposed by the Parental Responsibility Law and the Department is likewise not liable at common law.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Respondent’s motion for summary judgment be, and hereby is granted.” - ..- This Court recognizes the VaZZery opinion as controlling and it hereby ordered that this case be and the same is hereby dismissed.