In re APPLICATION OF DOROTHY LACEY.
Case summary
Claimant sought compensation under the Crime Victims Compensation Act for the murder of her daughter, Cheryl Lacey. The court denied the claim because the crime occurred in Indiana, not Illinois, so the victim did not meet the statutory definition of a victim under the Act.
Statutes cited: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.; section 2(d) of the Act
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Headnotes
- WILLIAM J. SCOTT, Attorney General (A LAN R. BOUDREAU, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
- CRIME VICTIMS COMPENSATION ACT-crime must have occurred within the State of Illinois in order to be compensable.
This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on June 12, 1978. Dorothy Lacey, mother of the deceased victim, Cheryl Lacey, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.
This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the [*440] Court, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds: 1. That on June 17,1980, the body of the victim was found near Michigan City, Indiana. The victim had been beaten with a blunt object. The victim had been last seen leaving a Midlothian, Illinois, tavern. Police investigation revealed that the victim had left the tavern with three unknown offenders and that they had driven to a LaPorte County, Indiana, location. At that location, one of the three offenders struck the victim several times with a hammer. The three offenders were charged with the victim’s murder by the LaPorte County, Indiana, State’s Attorney. 2. That section 2(d) of the Act, defines a “victim” as a person killed or injured in this State. 3. That Cheryl Lacey was not a victim of a crime which occurred in the State of Illinois. 4.That the crime was not committed in the State of Illinois and the deceased was not a “victim” according to section 2(d) of the Act. 5. That the Claimant has not met a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.
It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is, hereby denied.
[*441] (No. 79-CV-OU8-Claim denied.)
In re APPLICATION OF DAVID DEBOLD.
Order filed February 21,1980.
SAMUEL J. RUFFOLO, for Claimant.
WILLIAM J. SCOTT, Attorney General (A LAN R. BouDREAU,Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
CRIME VICTIMS COMPENSATION Am-wrongful act or substantial prow ocation. Claim was denied where the evidence indicated victim was stabbed in the course of purchasing narcotics.
I PERcURIAM.
This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on February 12,1977. David Debold, victim, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 71 et se9.
This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the Court, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds: 1. That on February 12, 1977, the Claimant was stabbed by an unknown offender. The incident occurred during a fight concerning the Claimant’s attempt to purchase narcotics from the offender. The location of the incident was a hallway at 1538 S. Claremont, Chicago, Illinois. The Claimant was transported to St. Elizabeth’s Hospital and admitted for treatment of a stab wound to the chest. 2. That section 3(f) of the Act states that a person is entitled to compensation under the Act if the injury to or the death of the victim was not substantially attributable [*442] to the victim’s wrongful act or substantial provocation of the assailant. 3. That it appears from the investigatory report and the police report that the Claimant’s injury was sub, stantially attributable to his conduct in attempting to purchase narcotics. 4.That the Claimant has not met a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.
It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is, hereby denied.