John B. Tomasheski v. State of Illinois

BERGSTROM, The claimant, John B. Tomasheski, filed his complaint April 28, 1947, alleging that he received certain serious and permanent injuries to his person due to the negligence of the respondent while he was an inmate at , the Peoria State Hospital, Bartonville, Illinois.

He alleges that in June 1946, while an inmate in the State Institution, in Cottage 2-3, he went to the bathroom early one morning while no attendant was present, had an epileptic attack during which he grabbed an unprotected steam pipe, resulting in his sustaining serious burns. On July 23, 1947 complainant amended his complaint, changing Paragraph 6 to allege that his left hand was burned rather than his right 'hand, and substituting a new paragraph for Paragraph 11, which was made to allege that claimant had received surgical treatment at the Illinois Research Hospital at Chicago, and that because of the burns which he received it was necessary to amputate his right little finger.

The record in this case consists of the complaint with the amendments thereto, the answer of respondent, transcript of testimony on behalf of both claimant and respondent, waiver of brief and argument on behalf of claimant, statement, brief and argument of respondent, and reply argument on behalf of claimant.

The claimant contends that injuries he sustained are a result of negligent treatment of his burns by the doctors at the Peoria State Hospital and by the negligence of respondent in leaving the steam pipes uncovered. , [*145] With reference to his first contention, there is 110 evidence showing any negligence in‘ the medical treatment of claimant. The evidence shows that the usual and recognized method of treatment for burns was given the claimant and that the results were satisfactory under the circumstances.

With reference to the second contention of claimant that the accident occurred through the negligence of respondent, the pertinent- facts, as deduced from the evidence, are as follows: The Peoria State Hospital did not ordinarily hospitalize epileptics. Claimant was there as a voluntary patient. They did not refuse him admissioil, because the necessary treatment was available. He was in need of treatment, but his condition did not require personal supervision. He was physically able to help in the work at the cottage to which he was assigned.

Dr. Trigger testified that the pipes in question were off in one corner. They are not covered and had been there in this condition for about forty years, and that an accident had never happened at this particular place before.

He also testified on cross-examination, that at the State Hospital individuals had previously had epileptic attacks and got burned on radiators and pipes. From the claimant’s testimony, it is apparent that he does not recall exactly what occurred, and Dr. Trigger testified that a person does not remember what takes place during an epileptic seizure, and also that it is characteristic of such patients, during a seizure, to try and grab hold of some object. We can conclude from all the evidence, however, that claimant suffered an epileptic seizure and, while in this condition, grabbed hold of the hot steam pipes in the corner of said bathroom, and burned his hands as alleged. , The controlling issue to be determined from the ret[*146]ord is whether the accident in question was one which ail ordinary prudent person, under the circumstances, ought to have foreseen and could reasonably anticipate. The Attorney General, for respondent, argues that wliwe a condition is negligently permitted to exist, but some intervening act causes an injury to occur in coniiectioii with such a condition, the intervening act and not the existing condition is the proximate cause of the injury He alleges that the hot steam pipes were ail existing coiidition, and the epileptic seizure, an intervening act beyond the control of either the claimant or the respondent, mas the proximate cause. He cites the case of Merlo v.

Public Service Co., 381 Ill. 300, in which case electric wires, which were not protected by insulatioii, were held to be a dangerous condition, but the operation of a crane, which came in contact with the wires and resulted in the death of a workman, was held to be an intervening act which was the proximate cause of the death, and the company maintaining the electric wires was held not to be responsible for the death. He also cites the recent case of Motz~dyv. New York Certtral Railroad Co.. 385 111. 446, where the Supreme Court of Illinois, in determining the proximate cause of the accident, stated on pags 453, as follows: “The theory of the Appellate Cmirt that he was an the e x e r me of idue care /because he ha.d a raght to belzeve thlat hts brakes would stop ham an proper tame at the speed he was gohng. and that their faalure to act, unthmit negligence upon has part. renders the raalroad company laable, as also untenable. We luarve frequently held that, an orde7c for a plaantiff to recover, the defendant’s neglzgence must have proxzmately caused, or contributed to oause, the injuries, rather than ‘ derely caunng a co?liditaon provzdzng tan opportunity for other causal agencies to act. Merlo v. Publac Servzce Go., 381 Ill . 300; Braske v.

Vallage of Bumharm, SY9 Ill. 19.3; Illinois Central Razlroad Go. v. Oswald, 338 Ill . 270.) In the Merlo case we sad : ‘The test that should be laipplaed, an all Oases an determining the questaon of proxamate oause as whether the first wrongdoer might have reasonably anticzpated the mtervenamg cazise as a natural and probable resiclt of the first party’s [*147] own negligence,’ It would be an extreme application of the law to requzre a razlroad company operating at4 trains 012 @ed tracks, and required by the exagencaes of c o m e r c e to move its passengers and con& modataes rapadly, to antactpate [ut every grade crossing) there might be defective brakes upon. every automobile appronchang a crosszng, which would reliewe the dmver of the (exerase of due care, and m k r : the railroad compamy laable, whim not its negligence, but the traveler’s lack of due care, caused the acnderzt. “The dastanctzolz between a crossszng accdent occurring from lack of due oare upon the part of ithe platntiff, or because of an intervenang cause under ats control, or at least not under the control of the d e fed - ant, is so slzght as to make rules applicable t o t h m practically th6 same. We are of tha opanzon that the evidewe zn this case most faVoVable to the plaantaff fazls to show that he was In the eaerczse of due care, or that the alleged negligence of the dependant was the proxiwtate cause of tlue (a&dmt. Under such czrclimstances, as a matter of &aW, the plaintiff is mot entitled to recover.’’ Counsel for claimant, in his reply argument, calls attention to that part of the Merlo case, supra, where the court said: “ The test that should be applied ivt all cases, iv~ deterwaiqaimg the questiom of proximate cause, is whether the first wrofigdoer might have reasomddy a%- ticipated the intervening cause, as a natural and probable result of the first pavty’s ow??.uegligeme.”

It is funclamental in tort law that to prove negligence there must be shown a duty to the person injured, a breach of the duty and an injury proximately resulting from such breach.

If we should conclude that the uncovered pipes creates a condition so that an ordinary prudent person could have reasonably anticipated the accident in question, we must necessarily resolve the issues in favor of claimant. However, the record would not sustain this view except by a very narrow application of this rule The evidence shows that these particular steam pipes were in their present condition for a period of approximately forty years, and that no one was previously injured because of their existence. There is no evidence, in the record that the danger of their exposed condition [*148] mas ever brought to aiiyoite’s attention, as was done in the N e e r k g v. Illimois Ceuztral Railroad Co. case, 383 I11 366. where the dangerous condition present at the station was repeatedly called to the company’s attention.

The evidence also shows that the treatment of epileptic patients at this hospital was the exception and not the rule. It would be an extreme application of the law to require respondent to insulate all steam pipes in all public buildings, without regard to the persons who might come in contact with them. Considering the many years that these particular pipes had remained in their present condition without any resulting accident, it could not be reasonably concluded that they were a menace or hazard to the patients or workers at the Peoria State Hospital It is customary for persons having an epileptic seizure to fall wherever they might be at the time of an attack. This might have happened while the patient was in some other part of the hospital or grounds and under such circumstances that he could have injured himself by falling to the’ floor, on a piece of furniture, or any hard or sharp object which might have come in contact with his person. This is one of the inherent dangers always present to those unfortunate. enough to be suffering from this disease. To say that respondent would have to protect a person having this disease from all possibilities would create a greater duty on the part of respondent than me feel is justified. It ~voiild,in fact, make it an insurer of all such patients.

Considering the accident from the evidence and all the circumstances surrounding it, we are of the opinion that the accident is one that could not reasonably have been anticipated. The presence of the uninsulated steam pipes was merely a condition similar to the unprotected wires in the Merlo case, szqra, and the epileptic seizure [*149] an intervening act beyond the control of either the claimant or the respondent. It was the proximate cause of the injury.

The evidence is not clear as to the damage which was sustained by claimant, if any. At the time he entered 3 the hospital he was suffering from Dupuytren’s con- - tracture of both hancls, and they were seriously crippled from this disease. Undoubtedly, the condition was aggravated by the burns, but there is some indication from the evidence that his hands and fingers are in better con- - lition i i o ~ . than ~ ’ they were at the time he entered-the hospital, with the exception of his amputated little finger, which was undoubtedly affected by his pue-existing disease. He also testified that he Iiad not worked for two or three months prior to entering the hospital. R o ~ ever , in view of our findings that respondelit was not negligent, it is not necessary to further consider the question of damages.

For the reasons stated, an award is denied.