Casey v. State of Illinois — 8 Ill. Ct. Cl. 754

SUSIE CASEY, Claimant, v. STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent.

Case summary

The claimant, widow of Sergeant Jesse Casey, sought compensation for his death after he contracted influenza during a field training camp. The court found the death occurred in the line of duty and awarded $4,000.00 under the Military Code.

Claim type: Line Of Duty Death

Statutes cited: Section Eleven (11) of Article Sixteen (16) of The Military Code of Illinois

AI-generated summary from the opinion text — may contain errors. The opinion text and PDF above are the official record.

Headnotes

ILLINOIS NATIONAL GUARD-Injury to member of-when award may be made. Where it clearly appears that member of Illinois National Guard contracted disease while in the performance of his duties, resulting in his death, an award may be made to his dependent under the provisions of the Military and Naval Code.

HARRIS B. GAINES, for claimant. OTTO KERNER, Attorney General; JOHN KASSERMAN, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.

Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE HOLLERICH delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimant, Susie Casey, is the widow of Sergeant Jesse Casey who, at the time of his death, was a member of Company F, Eighth Infantry, Illinois National Guard. Said Jesse Casey enlisted in said Company F on November 18, 1931, and continued to be a member thereof until the time of his death as hereinafter set forth.

In the performance of his duties as a member of said Company F, said Jesse Casey was attending the annual tour of Field Training at Camp Grant, Illinois which commenced on August 4, 1934 and continued to August 18, 1934. About midnight on the night of August 9, 1934, while Casey was asleep in his tent, it was blown down by a violent rainstorm.

Casey was unclothed at the time, and on account of his exposure to the inclement weather, became ill. On August 14th he presented himself to the Regimental Dispensary and complained of headache, backache, and general soreness of limbs.

He was running a temperature of 101.4, and his condition was diagnosed as acute influenza. He was taken to the Base Hospital and, his condition becoming worse, was removed to St. Anthony's Hospital at Rockford, where he died on August 20, 1934.

Adjutant General Black in a report on the case, said: "The record further indicates that the disease was contracted in line of duty."

Section Eleven (11) of Article Sixteen (16) of The Military Code of Illinois provides as follows:

"In every case where an officer or enlisted man of the National Guard or Naval Reserve shall be injured, wounded or killed while performing his duty as an officer or enlisted man in pursuance of orders from the Commander-in-Chief, said officer or enlisted man, or his heirs or dependents, shall have a claim against the State for financial help or assistance, and the State Court of Claims shall act on and adjust the same as the merits of each case may demand," etc. [*756]

Under this provision of the statute, and the facts hereinbefore set forth, (which facts are not disputed) the claimant is clearly entitled to an award for financial help or assistance as provided by the statute.

The evidence shows that Casey had been regularly employed by Swift and Company at the Union Stock Yards, Chicago, for more than fifteen years just prior to his death; that his average annual wages were Eighteen Hundred Dollars ($1,800.00); that he was an able-bodied and healthy man, and the sole support of the claimant.

If the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act were followed in fixing the amount of the award, claimant would be entitled to the sum of Four Thousand Dollars ($4,000.00). In making awards under the Military and Naval Code, we are not bound by the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, but in certain cases in which the provisions of such Act seemed to provide a just compensation, we have been guided thereby. In this case we are of the opinion that an award of Four Thousand Dollars ($4,000.00) is fair and reasonable and warranted by the evidence.

Award is therefore entered in favor of the claimant, Susie Casey, for the sum of Four Thousand Dollars ($4,000.- 00). [*757]

GENERAL OPINION, IN RE: UNIVERSITY OF

ILLINOIS

Opinion submitted March 1, 1933.

In compliance with the request of Hon. Sveinbjorn Johnson, Counsel for the University of Illinois, for an informal opinion by this court as to the right of various employees at the University of Illinois to an award for medical or/and hospital attention furnished such employees, by virtue of any liability under the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act, the court renders its opinion in the several matters, as follows:

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-University of Illinois employer under.

The University of Illinois is an employer within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

SAME-employees of University of Illinois. All employees of the University of Illinois are employees within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

SAME-word, enterprise therein applicable to University of Illinois. The University of Illinois is engaged in an enterprise within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

SAME-University of Illinois-each department or school of complete in itself considered separate enterprise-test of liability of University. The University of Illinois consists of a number of different departments or schools which are practically complete in themselves and is in the same position as an individual or corporation which is engaged in several different businesses or enterprises, some of which may be extra-hazardous and some not; therefore each such department or school must be considered as a separate business or enterprise and the liability of the University in each case depends upon whether that particular school or department comes within any of the provisions of Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, or is engaged in a business or enterprise which is extra-hazardous in fact.

SAME-same-business or enterprise not engaged in. The University of Illinois is not engaged in any business or enterprise which comes within the provisions of Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9 or 10 of Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

SAME-same-whether engaged in other business or enterprise question of fact. The business or enterprise in which the University of Illinois or the several schools or departments thereof is engaged may come within the provisions of Paragraphs 6, 7, 7½ or 8 of Section 3 and the question as to whether the University does come within the provisions of any of such paragraphs is a question of fact to be determined by the evidence in each particular case.

[*758] 238 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS.

Same farm work excepted from provisions of. All farm work done by farmers and others engaged in farming, tillage of the soil or stock raising, and all work done which is in its nature a part of farming, and which is done on a farm or country place, is excepted from the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

Per Curiam: In compliance with the request of Hon. Sveinbjorn Johnson, Counsel for the University of Illinois, for an informal opinion by this court as to the right of various employees at the University of Illinois to an award for medical or and hospital attention furnished such employees, by virtue of any liability under the Illinois ``Workmen's Compensation Act'', the court renders its opinion in the several matters, as follows: In determining whether the respective claims should be allowed we are mindful of the fact that such claims are not awards in the usual sense in which awards by this court are made and are not payable by appropriation in due course, but that such opinions are for the guidance of the University authorities, and that such claims, if paid, will be paid by the University authorities from funds at the disposal of the University.

Cases of the character here involved are not without their difficulties, and in these particular cases, decisions are made more difficult by reason of the very meager statement of facts submitted to us. In some of the cases submitted, it is necessary to supplement the given facts with the personal knowledge of the court as to the activities of the University and the several departments thereof in order to arrive at a conclusion. Ordinarily this would not be permissible, but inasmuch as this opinion is merely for the guidance of the University authorities, and does not constitute an award, we feel that such action is justified.

Although the several statements of facts do not so allege, we are advised that the University is an Illinois corporation, incorporated under a special charter in 1867, under the name of Illinois Industrial University;-the name being changed to University of Illinois in 1885. The several statements contain no information as to the charter powers of the corporation, but the case of North vs. Board of Education, 201 Ill. App. 449, hereinafter referred to, states that the Uni[*759]

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS. 759

versity was chartered "to furnish instruction to students in various branches of learning." Considering the several statements of fact as a whole, it appears that the University consists of a number of schools or departments which are practically complete in themselves.

Before setting forth the conclusions at which we have arrived, we will refer briefly to the principles of law involved, as set forth in the statutes and the decisions of the courts.

With reference to the manner in which the Workmen's Compensation Act should be construed, the Supreme Court, in the case of Chicago Cleaning Co. vs. Ind. Board, 283 Ill. 177-181, said:

"The Act is commendable legislation and should be liberally construed in order to give effect to the purpose and object in adopting such Act."

In the case of Newman vs. Ind. Com., 263 Ill. 190-193, the court said:

"The Workmen's Compensation Act is a humane law, of remedial nature, and wherever construction is permissible, its language should be liberally construed.

In the very recent case of Raymond vs. Ind. Com., 354 Ill. 556-591, the court approved the decisions in the Chicago Cleaning Co. case, and said:

"The Compensation Act is remedial in its nature and has always been liberally construed by this court for the purpose of effecting the intended benefits to the employee and of placing upon the industries affected thereby the burdens incident to such employment."

Section Three (3) of the Workmen's Compensation Act provides:

"The provisions of this Act hereinafter following, shall apply automatically and without election * * * to all employers and all their employes engaged in any department of the following enterprises or businesses which are hereby declared to be extra-hazardous, to-wit:

1. The erection, maintaining, removing, remodeling, altering or demolishing of any structure, except as provided in sub-paragraph 8 of this section. [*760] 260 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS.

2. Construction, excavating or electrical work, except as provided in sub-paragraph 8 of this section. 3. Carriage by land, water or aerial service and loading or unloading in connection therewith, including the distribution of any commodity by horse-drawn or motor driven vehicle where the employer employs more than two employees in the enterprise or business, except as provided in subparagraph 8 of this section. 4. The operation of any warehouse or general or terminal storehouses. 5. Mining, surface mining or quarrying. 6. Any enterprise in which explosive materials are manufactured, handled or used in dangerous quantities. 7. In any enterprise wherein molten metal, or explosive or injurious gases or vapors, or inflammable vapors or fluids, or corrosive acids are manufactured, used, generated, stored or conveyed in dangerous quantities. 7½. Any enterprise in which sharp edged cutting tools, grinders or implements are used, including all enterprises which buy, sell or handle junk and salvage, demolish or reconstruct machinery, except as provided in sub-paragraph 8 of this section. 8. In any enterprise in which statutory or municipal ordinance regulations are now or shall hereafter be imposed for the regulating, guarding, use or the placing of machinery or appliances or for the protection and safeguarding of the employees or the public therein; each of which occupations, enterprises or businesses are hereby declared to be extra-hazardous: Provided, nothing contained herein shall be construed to apply to any work, employment or operations done, had or conducted by farmers and others engaged in farming, tillage of the soil, or stock raising, or to those who rent, demise or lease land for any such purposes, or to anyone in their employ or to any work done on a farm or country place, no matter what kind of work or service is being done or rendered. 9. Any enterprise, business or work in connection with the laying out or improvement of subdivisions of tracts of land. 10. Any enterprise for the treatment of cross-ties, switch-ties, telegraph poles, timber or other wood with creosote or other preservatives. (Amended by Act approved June 10, 1929.)

Section Four (4) of the Act defines how the term "employer" shall be construed, and inasmuch as it covers every "public or private corporation", the University is clearly an employer within the meaning of the Act.

Section Five (5) defines how the term "employee" shall be construed, and under the second paragraph of said section, the several claimants in question are clearly employees within the meaning of the Act. [*761]

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS. 761

The University being an employer, and the several claimants being employees within the meaning of the Compensation Act, the question then arises as to whether the University at the time of the several accidents in question was engaged in any of the enterprises or businesses declared to be extra-hazardous, by such Act.

The question as to what constitutes an enterprise or business has frequently been considered by the Supreme Court. One of the earlier and leading cases upon the question is the case of Uphoff vs. Ind. Com., 271 Ill. 312, which arose under the Act of 1913. In that case the employer was a farmer who constructed a broom-corn shed and the claimant was injured while employed in that work. The court held that the building of such a structure did not constitute an enterprise or business within the meaning of Section Three (3) of the Act, and said:

"An enterprise is an undertaking of hazard; an arduous attempt.

Lexicographers define an enterprise as 'an undertaking; something projected and attempted; an attempt or project, particularly an undertaking of some importance or one requiring boldness, energy or perseverance; an arduous or hazardous attempt, as, a warlike enterprise'. The building of this shed might be classed under the head of something projected or attempted, but hardly as an important undertaking requiring courage or energy or one that was arduous or hazardous."

In Walsh vs. Ind. Com., 345 Ill. 366-369, the Supreme Court said:

"The term 'business' in common parlance, means an employment which occupies a substantial portion of the time and attention of the one engaged in it."

We appreciate that the Appellate Court in the case of North vs. Board of Trustees, 304 Ill. App. 447, held that the University is not an "enterprise or business" within the meaning of those words as used in the Compensation Act.

However, the Supreme Court, in the case of Board of Education vs. Ind. Com., 301 Ill. 611, held that a high school with a manual training department connected therewith was an enterprise within the meaning of the Compensation Act. In that case it was contended that a high school could not be regarded as an enterprise within the meaning of the Work[*762]362 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS.

men's Compensation Act, but the Supreme Court there held to the contrary and brought the case within the rule laid down in the Uphoff case, in the following language:

"The business in which the High School District was engaged was the conducting of a high school, including, among others, a manual training department It is not unreasonable to regard such an enterprise as a work of some importance, which might even be regarded as arduous."

Surely, if a high school with a manual training department connected therewith is an "enterprise", a State University, as well as the several schools and departments included therein, must also be considered as "enterprises".

Mr. Angerstein, in his work "THE EMPLOYER AND THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT", 1930 edition, (hereinafter referred to as "Angerstein") on page 33 sums up the rule as to what constitutes an enterprise or business, in the following language:

"It therefore seems clear that in order to constitute engaging in an enterprise or business within the provisions of Section 3 of the Act so that one engaging therein may be said to be within the provisions of the Act, the work being done must in fact be a business or enterprise, as such, an undertaking as a business for profit and not something merely incidental, occasional or merely temporary. Building a broom-corn shed by a farmer as a mere incident of farming was not within Section 3 but obviously if one engaged in the business of erecting such sheds generally for others for profit, it would be a business or enterprise. One having a private residence built or repaired would not be engaged in a business or enterprise, although one engaged in constructing homes for others would be in that business or enterprise. So also, if one was having a business building or apartment building constructed or repaired, and it was intended to rent it out or a part was rented for profit, the owner would be engaged in a business or enterprise. So also the owner of a factory or building used exclusively for his own purposes, would not be engaged in the business or enterprise of erection, maintaining, etc., of a structure."

From a consideration of these and other authorities bearing upon the question, it appears that the University is engaged in an enterprise within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act;-that is to say, it is engaged through its various schools and departments, in the business or enterprise of furnishing instruction to students in various branches of learning.

Attention is directed to the fact that the provisions of the present Workmen's Compensation Act, embrace all em[*763]

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS. 763

ployees engaged in any department of the various businesses or enterprises declared extra-hazardous by Section Three (3) of the Act, regardless of whether the duties of the injured employee are hazardous or not.

With reference to this question, Angerstein, on page thirty-four (34), Section seventeen (17), says: "If an employer is engaged in an enterprise or business within Section 3 of the Act, then all his employees engaged in any department of such enterprise or business are under the Act. Such employees, as well as such employers, have no right of election and no agreement that such employer and employee might enter into could take any such employee from under the Act.

Prior to amendment of Section 3, effective July 1, 1917, it was held in a number of cases that even though the employer was engaged in such extra-hazardous enterprise or business, yet an employee was not under the Act unless his actual duties were in the extra-hazardous part of the employer's business, or brought him in contact with such hazard, except in cases where the employer had affirmatively elected to come under the Act.

However, subsequent to such amendment, and under the Act as now in force, the law is clear that if the employer is engaged in any enterprise or business within the provisions of Section 3, then all his employees in any department of such business or enterprise, are under the Act even though their duties involve no hazards and do not bring them in contract with any of the hazardous parts of any such enterprise or business."

The rule above set forth is announced in the case of Illinois Printing and Publishing Co. vs. Ind. Com. 299 Ill. 189. and McNaught vs. Hines, 300 Ill. 167.

Attention is also directed to that class of cases where an employer is engaged in two separate businesses, one within the Act, and the other not within the Act. In cases of that kind the provisions of the Act apply to all employees engaged in any department of the business of the employer which is within the Act, but have no application to the employees engaged in the business not within the Act, unless, as to them, the employer has elected to come within the Act.

In the case of Peterson vs. Ind. Com., 315 Ill. 199-202, the employer was engaged in farming, and also operated a sawmill on the same tract of land. The employee was injured while working in the sawmill, and the court held that although the employer was not under the Act as to the work on the farm, yet the operation of the sawmill was an independent enterprise of a hazardous nature, and as to such [*764] 361 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS. enterprise the employer was under the Act. In that case the Court said: "It is not required by the Workmen's Compensation Act that one shall be exclusively engaged in one of the hazardous occupations enumerated in the Act to make him liable for compensation. A man may engage in two kinds of business, one not within the Workmen's Compensation Act and the other may be within the Act because it is extra-hazardous. (Vaughan's Seed Store vs. Simonini, 275 Ill. 477; Davis vs. Ind. Com., 297 Ill. 29). * * * * * We are of the opinion that plaintiff in error and the deceased at the time of the accident were both under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act."

The same conclusion was reached in the case of Davis vs.

Ind. Com., 297 Ill. 29, where the employer owned a hardware business and also owned an apartment building which he rented at a profit; also in the case of Walsh vs. Ind. Com., 345 Ill. 366, where the employer was in the small loan business, and also owned eight (8) or ten (10) houses which he kept in repair.

Angerstein, on page thirty-nine (39), sets forth the rule as follows: "The business itself is the determining factor. For illustration, an employer might own a factory containing power-driven machinery, etc., which automatically would bring it under the Act. All the employees of such factory would be under the Act regardless of what their duties were, just so long as were engaged in any department of the business, and this would include stenographers, salesmen, clerical help, etc. The same employer might own and operate a clothing store entirely separate and apart from the factory, in which store there were no appliances or machinery of any description. This clothing store, therefore, would not come under the Act automatically, and the employees, therefore, would not be under the Act unless and until the employer had filed his written acceptance of the Act with the 'Industrial Commission.'" The question as to whether a business which is extrahazardous in fact, but not specifically enumerated in Section Three (3) of the Act, comes within the provisions thereof, is also an important question in this connection. The case of Cinofsky vs. Ind. Com., 290 Ill. 522, arose prior to the time Section 7½ was added to the Act. The employer was engaged in operating a junk yard which, at that time, was not one of the extra-hazardous businesses enumerated in Section Three (3). The Court in that case, page 528, said: [*765]

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS. 765

"Counsel for plaintiffs in error argues that the business or enterprise in which plaintiffs in error were engaged did not bring it within the classification set forth in Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act as extrahazardous, and that as they had not elected to come under the Act they could not be held liable thereunder, unless it is shown, as a matter of fact, that the business was extra-hazardous. (Hahnemann Hospital vs. Industrial Board, 282 Ill. 316.) This court held in this last case that a hospital conducted under certain conditions might be a hazardous business while it would not be so under others. The mere receiving or buying of junk of a certain character might not be extra-hazardous, but that was not the whole of plaintiffs in error's business. The evidence shows that they were operating a junk yard,-that is, they were collecting, sorting and preparing junk and metals for market, and that in this work they were sometimes required to use shears driven by electric motor and an acetylene torch.

There can be no question that the preparation of this junk for sale was a necessary part of the business and that the work was of such a nature as to bring it within the rule of being extra-hazardous in fact; that plaintiffs in error should be held within the Act on that account under the reasoning of this court in Friebel vs. Chicago City Railway Co., 289 Ill. 76."

In two cases before the Industrial Commission, both of which involved employees of a detective agency, one acting as watchman of a building and the other assisting in patrol work, it was contended by the Respondent that the Industrial Commission had no jurisdiction to enter an award, because detective agencies are not enumerated in Section Three (3) of the Act. In each case the Industrial Commission awarded compensation, and the Circuit Court affirmed the award of the Commission. Petition for writ of error was filed in the Supreme Court in each case, and in each case it was denied.

The result of such denial was to affirm the findings of the Industrial Commission, and to hold inferentially that if a business is extra-hazardous in fact, it comes within the provisions of the Act, although not specifically mentioned therein.

The furnishing of instruction to students is not one of the enterprises or businesses which are enumerated as extrahazardous in Section Three (3) of the Compensation Act, and before any employee of the University is entitled to recover compensation under the Act, he must show that the University, or if he is engaged in an independent department, then the department in which he is working, is engaged in a business or enterprise which comes within some one of the [*766] 266 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS.

paragraphs of Section Three (3) of the Act, or that such business or enterprise is extra-hazardous in fact.

A brief consideration of the several paragraphs of Section Three (3) of the Act may help to clarify the situation: Paragraph 1. The erection, maintaining, removing, remodeling, altering or demolishing of any structure, etc. From what has heretofore been said, it follows that the University is not engaged in the business of erecting, maintaining, removing, remodeling, altering or demolishing of any structure.

It may be engaged in the doing of such work from time to time, but if so, such work is merely incidental to the general work of the University, and is not the business in which the University is engaged.

In the case of Jacobi vs. Ind. Com., 342 Ill. 210, the Supreme Court, in passing upon this question, said: "Where the building is maintained, occupied and used by its owner in conducting a business in which he is engaged, as an incident or adjunct to the business, the relation of his business to the Workmen's Compensation Act and his relation to his employees is to be determined by the business and not by the maintenance of the building."

In the case of Walsh vs. Ind. Com., 345 Ill. 366-370, the Supreme Court said: "The line of demarcation between maintaining a structure as an incident rather than as a business, and the business of maintaining a structure, is not readily defined, but we are of the opinion that a safe rule is, that where one maintains buildings or structures for profit, whether that profit be as compensation for his services or by way of rentals received, and such maintenance requires a substantial portion of his time and attention, he must be said to be engaged in the business of maintaining a structure within the contemplation of the Workmen's Compensation Act."

Consequently any employee of the University who sustains an injury while engaged in the erection, removal, remodeling, altering or demolishing of any structure, is not by virtue of paragraph One (1) of Section Three (3) brought under the Compensation Act.

Paragraph 2. The same rule applies to construction, excavating or electrical work as provided in paragraph Two (2) of Section Three (3) of the Act.

Paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 9, and 10. The same may be said of paragraph Three (3) with reference to carriage by land. [*767]

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS. 767

water or aerial service, etc.; paragraph Four (4) with reference to the operation of any warehouse, etc.; paragraph Five (5) with reference to mining, surface mining or quarrying; paragraph Nine (9) with reference to the laying out or improvement of subdivisions, etc.; and paragraph Ten (10) with reference to the treatment of cross-ties, etc.

Paragraphs Six (6), Seven (7), Seven and one-half (7½) and Eight (8) are somewhat different, however. Such paragraphs provide as follows:

"6. Any enterprise in which explosive materials are manufactured, handled or used in dangerous quantities. 7. In any enterprise wherein molten metal, or explosive or injurious gases or vapors, or inflammable vapors or fluids, or corrosive acids are manufactured, used, generated, stored or conveyed in dangerous quantities. 7½. Any enterprise in which sharp edged cutting tools, grinders or implements are used, including all enterprises which buy, sell or handle junk and salvage, demolish or reconstruct machinery, except as provided in sub-paragraph 8 of this section. 8. In any enterprise in which statutory or municipal ordinance regulations are now or shall hereafter be imposed for the regulating, guarding, use or the placing of machinery or appliances or for the protection and safeguarding of the employees or the public therein; each of which occupations, enterprises or businesses are hereby declared to be extra-hazardous: Provided, nothing contained herein shall be construed to apply to any work, employment or operations done, had or conducted by farmers and others engaged in farming, tillage of the soil, or stock raising, or to those who rent, demise or lease land for any such purposes, or to any one in their employ or to any work done on a farm or country place, no matter what kind of work or service is being done or rendered."

Paragraph 6. If, in the course of the performance of its regular business, or the exercise of its charter powers, any school or department of the University manufacturers, handles or uses explosive materials in dangerous quantities, then such school or department is automatically brought under the Act, and every employee of such department, regardless of his or her duties, is entitled to compensation under the Act for any accidental injury sustained by such employee, which arises out of and in the course of his or her employment.

Paragraph 7. If, in the course of its regular business, or the exercise of its charter powers, any school or department of the University manufactures, uses, generates, stores or conveys any molten metal, or explosive or injurious gases or vapors, or inflammable vapors or fluids, or corrosive acids in dangerous quantities, then such school or department is [*768] 10a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS.

automatically brought under the Act, and every employee of such department, regardless of his or her duties, is entitled to compensation under the Act for any accidental injury sustained by such employee, which arises out of and in the course of his or her employment.

Paragraph 7½. If, in the course of its regular business, or the exercise of its charter powers, any school or department of the University uses sharp-edged cutting tools, grinders, or implements, then such school or department is automatically brought under the Act, and every employee of such department, regardless of his or her duties, is entitled to compensation under the Act for any accidental injury sustained by such employee, which arises out of and in the course of his or her employment.

In this connection it might be well to consider the following quotation from Angerstein, appearing on page Fiftythree (53):

"The mere occasional or incidental use of a sharp-edged cutting tool, grinder or implement, should not be sufficient to bring an enterprise or business, not otherwise under the Act, within the provisions of paragraph 7½, but if such tools, even though hand tools, were customarily or regularly used and there was any hazard or danger in connection with their use, it would constitute an enterprise within the provisions of that paragraph."

The foregoing quotation is supported by the opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of Garren vs. Ind. Com., 310 Ill. 95.

In the case of Therien vs. Ind. Com., 351 Ill. 166, the employer was conducting a nursing home consisting of about forty (40) rooms and having two steam heating plants. It was contended, among other things, that the employer came within the provisions of paragraph 7½ of Section Three (3).

The Supreme Court, in disposing of that contention said:

"The only sharp edged cutting tools were those knives used for the purpose of cutting roasts which are ordinarily found in a private home. Such tools do not come within the purview of Section Three (3) as sharp edged cutting tools, grinders or implements * * *. No other appliances of the character described in the Act were used in the nursing home."

The court held in that case that the employer did not come within the provisions of paragraph 7½.

Paragraph 8. By virtue of paragraph eight (8) of Section Three (3), all employers and all their employees en[*49]

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS. 769

saved in any department of any enterprise in which statutory or municipal ordinance regulations are now or shall hereafter be imposed for the regulating, guarding, use or placing of machinery or appliances or for the protection and safeguarding of the employees or the public therein, come within the Act. Angerstein, in speaking of this paragraph, on page fifty-four (54), says:

"The provisions of this paragraph bring within the provisions of the Act many enterprises or businesses of many kinds or descriptions. Apparently it was intended as a general provision to bring under the Act practically every business or enterprise of an extra-hazardous nature that might not have been enumerated in the preceding paragraphs of Section 3.

Generally speaking, it brings under the Act every enterprise or business concerning which there are statutory provisions or municipal regulations for the safeguarding of employees or the public against accidental injuries or death. The one definite limitation upon the provisions of this paragraph is that only a statutory or municipal regulation for the protection and safeguarding of the employees or of the public therein against accidental injury or death is sufficient to bring a business or enterprise within the provisions of said Paragraph 8. A statutory or municipal regulation applying to a business or enterprise is not sufficient unless it directly relates to the safeguarding against accidental injury or death of the employees therein or of the public in connection therewith."

In Dietrich vs. Ind. Com., 286 Ill. 50, the employer was conducting a retail grocery store and butcher shop with no power-driven machinery. It was contended that the business was brought within the provisions of the Compensation Act by virtue of the Child Labor Law, the Women's Ten Hour Law, the Health, Safety and Comfort Act, and also by a municipal ordinance requiring meat markets to be licensed.

In that case the Supreme Court, on page fifty-two (52), said:

"These statutory and municipal regulations are not of the character referred to in Clause 8 of Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The title of that Act is "An Act to promote the general welfare of the people of this State by providing compensation for accidental injuries or death suffered in the course of employment within this State", etc. Compensation for accidental injuries or death is the subject of the Act and its language must be construed with reference to that subject. When it is said that it shall apply in any enterprise in which statutory or municipal ordinance regulations are imposed for the protection and safeguarding of the employee or the public therein, it refers to such regulation for the protection and safeguarding of employees or the public against accidental injuries or death.

The ordinance and the statutes upon which the plaintiff in error relies are -49 [*770] 220 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS.

not imposed upon the business in which the defendant in error was engaged for such purposes."

In the case of Boardman Dairy Co. vs. Ind. Com., 292 Ill. 254, the employee was a milk wagon driver, and it was contended, among other things, that the employer was under the Act by virtue of an ordinance regulating the width of stalls and stables in which horses were kept and the width of passageways and footways between the stalls. The court, following the Dietrich case, held that the ordinance was not of a character to bring the business under the Compensation Act.

In City of Rock Island vs. Ind. Com., 287 Ill. 76, the employee was working as a street sweeper and it was sought to bring the employer under the Act by reason of certain speed and traffic ordinances, but the Supreme Court held that such ordinances were not of the character contemplated by paragraph eight (8) and that the employer was not under the Act by virtue thereof.

In East St. Louis Board of Education vs. Ind. Com., 298 Ill. 61, the employee was working as a janitor in a two-story school building with a basement containing a steam boiler for heating purposes, and was injured while washing windows on the second floor of said building. The boiler was subject to city inspection and it was contended that the employer was thereby brought under the Compensation Act. The Supreme Court, in upholding such contention, said:

"It seems self-evident that the inspecting of a boiler in the basement of a schoolhouse containing many children is certainly the guarding of appliances for their protection, the same as would be true in the requirement of fire escapes. * * * It would seem necessarily to follow by the working of Sub-section 8 of Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act that this statute and the municipal regulations brought this building under the provisions of said section of the Act."

In Hannemann Hospital vs. Ind. Com., 292 Ill. 316, the evidence showed that the hospital building was a seven-story structure with two power-driven elevators, and was equipped with engines and high-pressure boilers, and a system of electric wiring and apparatus for signals throughout the building. There were city ordinances requiring elevators in such buildings, also with reference to fire escapes, the inspection of boilers, and the installation of electric wiring and appara[*771]

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS. 771

tus. The Supreme Court, in holding that such regulations brought the employer under the Act, said:

"The ordinance regulations of Chicago heretofore set forth as applying to buildings of the class to which appellee's building belong, and to the machinery, equipment and appliances therein and requiring inspection of the same, were unquestionably imposed for the protection and safeguarding of the employees and the public, and bring the business or enterprise in which appellee was engaged within the terms of Clause 8 above set forth."

In Ascher Bros. Amusement Enterprises vs. Ind. Com., 311 Ill. 258, the employee was working as an usher in a moving picture theatre in which the projecting machine was installed in a fireproof booth. The city ordinances required the booth to be constructed according to certain specifications, and provided for the inspection thereof by the fire marshal;- and the court held that such ordinance was enacted for the safeguarding of the employees and the public and brought the employer within the provisions of Paragraph eight (8).

Some of the statutory regulations which seem to be included within the terms of the classification of Paragraph eight (8) are the following:

The Health, Safety and Comfort Act, Cahill's Statutes, 1933, Chapter 48, Paragraph 143.

The Building Construction Act, Cahill's Statutes, 1933, Chapter 48, Paragraph 123.

The Blower Act, Cahill's Statutes, 1933, Chapter 48, Paragraph 133.

The Fire Escape Act, Cahill's Statutes, 1933, Chapter 38, Paragraph 248.

In speaking of the Fire Escape Act, Harper, in his "Workmen's Compensation," Page ninety-four (94), says:

"This Act requires fire escapes of a specified design, on all buildings four or more stories in height. It is believed that this Act would not operate to bring within the classification of the Compensation Act, any employers except those engaged in the 'occupation, enterprise or business,' of operating or conducting a building, to which the regulations of the Fire Escape Act are applicable. The compensation law was obviously not intended to apply to mere owners of buildings or to lessees thereof, and unless there is conducted in the building some industry covered by the classification of Section 3 of the Act, or unless the building is subject to the provisions of the fire escape law and is being conducted by the employer (either as owner or lessee) as an 'occupation, enterprise or business' it could not be properly included within the classification of hazardous enterprises, to which alone the provisions of Section 3 are applicable." [*772] 172 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS.

With reference to the exception in Sub-paragraph eight (8), as to work done by farmers and others engaged in farming, tillage of the soil or stock raising, or to any work done on a farm, the opinion of the court is fully set forth in the case of S. E. Bunting, University of Illinois No. 611, and under the very broad terms of the Illinois Compensation Act, any person engaged in farming, tillage of the soil or stock raising, or in the doing of any kind of work which is in its nature a part of farming, on a farm or country place, does not come within the provisions of the Act.

CONCLUSION.

From a consideration of the foregoing authorities, it seems that the following conclusions logically follow: 1. That the University is an employer within the meaning of the Act. 2. That all employees of the University are employees within the meaning of the Act. 3. That the University is engaged in an "enterprise" within the meaning of the Act. 4. That the University consists of a number of different departments or schools which are practically complete in themselves; that therefore it is in the same position as an individual or corporation which is engaged in several different businesses or enterprises, some of which may be extrahazardous and some not; that each department or school must therefore be considered a separate business or enterprise, and the liability of the University in each case depends upon whether that particular school or department comes within any of the provisions of Section three (3) of the Act, or is engaged in a business or enterprise which is extrahazardous in fact. 5. That the University is not engaged in any business or enterprise which comes within the provisions of Paragraphs one (1), two (2), three (3), four (4), five (5), nine (9), or ten (10) of Section three (3) of the Act. 6. That the business or enterprise in which the University, or the several schools or departments thereof, is engaged, may come within the provisions of Paragraphs six (6), seven (7), seven and one-half (7½), or eight (8); that [*773]

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS. 773

the question as to whether the University does come within the provisions of any of such paragraphs is a question of fact to be determined by the evidence submitted in each particular case. 7. That under the very broad terms of the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act, all farm work done by farmers and others engaged in farming, tillage of the soil or stock raising, and all work which is in its nature a part of farming, and which is done on a farm or country place, is excepted from the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, No. 608-AWARD NOT RECOMMENDED.

Opinion submitted March 14, 1934.

Informal opinion on request of Hon. Sveinbjorn Johnson, Counsel for the University of Illinois, as to liability of the State for medical attention furnished an employee, U. of I. NAME OF EMPLOYEE AND AMOUNT OF CLAIM.

O. M. Brewer, $2.00.

NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT.

Employed for the purpose of cleaning the buildings and equipment of the university. Work includes handling of lye needed in mopping floors. Mixing solution of lye and washing powder in mop bucket.

NATURE AND DATE OF INJURY.

Burn of inner lobe of right ear and face in region of mouth on July 29, 1933.

BY THE COURT.

Because the business of the University of Illinois is not the business of maintaining and operating buildings, it seems that the janitor service performed at the University buildings is not within the Workmen's Compensation Act. The case of Thurston vs. Industrial Commission, 351 Ill. 166, seems directly in point upon the facts submitted. No award is recommended. [*774] 224 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, No. 603-AWARD NOT RECOMMENDED.

Opinion submitted March 14, 1934.

Elizabeth Bruner, $2.00.

NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT.

Cook in Women's Residential Hall, a women's dormitory conducted and maintained by the U. of I. NATURE AND DATE OF INJURY.

Scalded or burned on top of foot while removing potatoes from a steamer on June 18, 1933.

BY THE COURT.

In operating a kitchen in the Women's Residential Hall, the State does not appear to be engaged in one of the enterprises or businesses designated as extra-hazardous by Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The injury in question does not appear to have been occasioned by the operation of any machinery, and upon the facts submitted and for the sole purpose of arriving at a conclusion for the guidance and action of the officials of the University of Illinois, the Court of Claims is of the opinion that the Workmen's Compensation Act should not be held applicable to the above named employee with reference to said injury.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, No. 611-AWARD NOT RECOMMENDED.

Opinion submitted March 14, 1934.

S. E. Bunting, $168.45. [*775]

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS. 776

NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT.

Laborer in Animal Husbandry Department, including all kinds of work connected with the operation of farms of the Agricultural Experimental Station. When this accident occurred he was engaged in feeding the silage cutter, which was one of the duties to which he was assigned.

NATURE AND DATE OF INJURY.

Thumb caught in feed table of gear when turning off water and thumb torn off. September 18, 1933.

BY THE COURT.

A decision authorizing an award cannot be justified on this claim.

Sub-section 8 of Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act provides in part as follows:

"Provided, nothing contained herein shall be construed to apply to any work, employment or operations done, had or conducted by farmers and others engaged in farming, tillage of the soil, or stock raising, or to those who rent, demise or lease land for any such purpose, or to any one in their employ or to any work done on a farm or country place, no matter what kind of work or service is being done or rendered."

It was the intention of the Legislature that the Workmen's Compensation Act should not apply in any sense or under any conditions to those engaged in farming, tillage of the soil or stock raising or to any work done on a farm or country place, no matter what kind of work or service is being done or rendered. The fact that the University operates its farm land for the purpose of education and not for profit can not justify an exception being made of employees of the University who are injured while being engaged in any manner in the agricultural work excepted under the Act. No reason appears why an employee of the State should be placed in any other or different or better position than an employee of the individual farmer, if the work is in fact done on the farm land. The fact that the University operates its farms as experimental stations does not make a change in the fact that the work done is in fact work done on a farm.

"A farm means any tract of land used for raising crops or rearing animals."

257 Southwestern, 220.

"A farm within the meaning of a statute giving the landlord a lien for rent, in standard and common acceptation, means a body of land usually [*776] 226 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS. under one ownership, devoted to agriculture, either to raising crops or pasture or both." 138 Pacific, 608.

People vs. Caldwell, 142 Ill. 434.

Williams vs. C. & N. W. Ry., 228 Ill. 596.

In passing upon a statutory provision similar to that in Illinois, but not so broad in its phrasings, the following was held in Indiana: "An employee of the State Girls School, whose duties were limited to work on a farm operated in connection with the school held to be a farm employee within the Workmen's Compensation Act."

Dowery vs. State, 149 N. E. 922.

An examination of Section 3 of the Illinois Compensation Act discloses that Sub-sections 1, 2, 3 and 7½ all contain the following words "Except as provided in sub-paragraph 8 of this section."

Consequently, even if the University was engaged in any business or enterprise within the sub-sections 1, 2, 3, 7½ or 8, an injury sustained in any such business or enterprise would not be compensable if the work done came within the exception set forth in Sub-paragraph 8.

In a Michigan case it appeared that a corporation, organized for the manufacture and sale of chemicals and pharmaceuticals, maintained a farm where it raised hay, rye and other farm products, the principal use, however, of the farm being in connection with the laboratory of the corporation, animals (from guinea pigs to horses) being kept on the farm for experimental purposes.

Held: The growing of grain and care of stock are the ordinary uses to which a farm is put, and any man employed to work on a farm and do the work ordinarily done there, regardless of the purpose, is a farm laborer.

Shaeffer vs. Parke Davis & Co., 159 N. W. (Mich.) 304.

The provisions of the Illinois Statute are more comprehensive than any other State to which the attention of the court has been called. In Nebraska the exception relative to farm work covers "employers of farm laborers." In Iowa the excluding words are "farm or other laborer engaged in agricultural pursuits." In Minnesota the words used are "farm laborers," in Utah "agricultural laborers," in Idaho [*777]

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS. 277

"agricultural pursuits," in Michigan "farm laborers," in Indiana "farm or agricultural laborers and employers of such persons," in New York "farm laborers." In Illinois the exclusion under Sub-section 8 covers not only the employer but the employee, and also any work done, etc. It therefore seems that where the facts show that the work was done on a farm or country place then the injury is not compensable.

Under the provisions of Sub-section 8 of Section 3 of the Act, and upon the facts submitted and for the sole purpose of arriving at a conclusion for the guidance and action of the officials of the University of Illinois, the Court of Claims is of the opinion that the Workmen's Compensation Act should not be held applicable to the above named employee with reference to said injury and that under same no award can be properly made.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, No. 612-AWARD RECOMMENDED.

Opinion submitted March 14, 1934.

Informal opinion on request of Hon. Sveinbjorn Johnson, Counsel for the University of Illinois, as to liability of State for medical attention furnished employee, University of Illinois.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE AND AMOUNT OF CLAIM.

Eugene B. Corbin, $3.00.

NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT.

Employed as mechanician, Department of Mechanical Engineering.

NATURE AND DATE OF INJURY.

Injured by a particle of aluminum dust lodging in right eye. October 27, 1933.

BY THE COURT.

Claimant, at the time of the injury, was working on a metal pattern and in so doing got a particle of aluminum dust in his right eye. His occupation was that of mechanician, and if the machinery used in said department is power driven or subject to the regulations contemplated by Sub-section 8 of Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, then the general duties incident to such work would be within the scope of [*778] 238 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS. the Act. Under the facts submitted and the foregoing assumption, and for the sole purpose of arriving at a conclusion for the guidance and action of the officials of the University of Illinois, the Court of Claims is of the opinion that the Workmen's Compensation Act should be held applicable to the above named employee with reference to said injury. An award is recommended under the provisions of Sub-section 8 of Section 3 of the Act.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS. No. 616-AWARD RECOMMENDED.

Opinion submitted March 14, 1933.

Informal opinion on request of Hon. Sveinbjorn Johnson, Counsel for the University of Illinois, as to liability of State for medical attention furnished employee, University of Illinois.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE AND AMOUNT OF CLAIM.

E. D. Farley, $4.00.

NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT.

Employed as assistant in Chemistry Department, employed in manufacture of special chemicals and handled explosives and inflammable materials.

Claimant was engaged in transferring powdered sodium from one flask to another at the time of the accident.

NATURE AND DATE OF INJURY.

Eyes burned and injured by flying particles of glass and chemical.

February 3, 1933.

BY THE COURT.

Under Sub-section 6 of Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, and upon the above facts submitted and for the sole purpose of arriving at a conclusion for the guidance and action of the officials of the University of Illinois, the Court of Claims is of the opinion that the Workmen's Compensation Act should be held applicable to the above named employee with reference to said injury. An award is recommended. [*779]

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS. 779

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, No. 595-AWARD RECOMMENDED.

Opinion submitted March 14, 1934.

F. A. Ferris, $15.50.

NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT.

Machinist at machine shop, Physical Plant. Does machine work on tools and other metals in the machine shop of the physical plant.

NATURE AND DATE OF INJURY.

Was assisting in lifting framework of iron. Bar slipped, causing frame to fall from horses upon which it rested, crushing toe. Fracture of the fourth toe of the left foot. March 13, 1933.

BY THE COURT.

An injury sustained by one while employed as a machinist in a machine shop, where sharp edged cutting tools, grinders and implements are used as per Sub-section 7½ of Section 3 would come within the Workmen's Compensation Act, and upon the facts submitted, and for the sole purpose of arriving at a conclusion for the guidance and action of the officials of the University of Illinois, the Court of Claims is of the opinion that the Workmen's Compensation Act should be held applicable to the above named employee with reference to said injury. An award is recommended.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, No. 600-AWARD RECOMMENDED.

Opinion submitted March 14, 1934.

Informal opinion on request of Hon. Sveinbjorn Johnson, Counsel for the University of Illinois, as to liability of State for medical attention furnished an employee, University of Illinois.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE AND AMOUNT OF CLAIM.

C. F. Gibbs, $223.42. [*780] 780 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS.

NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT.

Employed as assistant in chemistry department.

NATURE AND DATE OF INJURY.

Tendon of little finger severed, necessitating an operation. Was teaching class of students in chemistry which included use of dangerous chemicals and acids. Carried on research in chemistry in laboratory work. May 15, 1933.

BY THE COURT.

Under Sub-section 6 of Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, and upon the foregoing facts submitted and from additional facts applying to the employment herein, as evidenced by the Farley claim, No. 616, and for the sole purpose of arriving at a conclusion for the guidance and action of the officials of the University of Illinois, the Court of Claims is of the opinion that the Workmen's Compensation Act should be held applicable to the above named employee with reference to said injury. An award is recommended. In making this recommendation attention is called to Section 8-19-1-2 of the Act, relative to compensation claims.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, No. 604-AWARD RECOMMENDED.

Opinion submitted March 14, 1934.

Informal opinion on request of Hon. Sveinbjorn Johnson, Counsel for the University of Illinois, as to liability of the State for medical attention furnished an employee, University of Illinois.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE AND AMOUNT OF CLAIM.

W. E. Hanford, $5.00.

NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT.

Assistant in Chemistry Department.

NATURE AND DATE OF INJURY.

Was teaching class of students in chemistry which included use of dangerous chemicals and acids. Carried on research in chemistry in laboratory work. Received burns on face and left arm by acid. February 3, 1933. [*781]

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS. 781

By the Court.

Under Sub-section 6 of Section 3 of the Act, and from the foregoing facts and from additional facts stated in the Farley Claim No. 616, and for the sole purpose of arriving at a conclusion for the guidance and action of the officials of the University of Illinois, the Court of Claims is of the opinion that the Workmen's Compensation Act should be held applicable to the above named employee with reference to said injury. An award is recommended.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, No. 605-AWARD NOT RECOMMENDED Opinion submitted March 14, 1934.

Informal opinion on request of Hon. Sveinbjorn Johnson, Counsel for the University of Illinois, as to liability of State for medical attention furnished employee, University of Illinois.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE AND AMOUNT OF CLAIM.

Carl Mattingly. $6.00.

NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT.

Employed as brick layer in masonry repairs on the University buildings.

NATURE AND DATE OF INJURY.

Sprain of right wrist. June 16, 1933.

By the Court.

Because the business of the University of Illinois is not that of maintaining and operating buildings, it seems that the service of a brick-layer regularly employed in the maintenance and repair of brick work in the buildings on the University is not within Sub-sections 1 or 2 of Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The case of Thérien vs. Industrial Commission, 351, Ill. 166, seems directly in point.

No award is recommended. [*782] 792 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, No. 610-AWARD NOT RECOMMENDED.

Opinion submitted March 14, 1934.

J. M. McCloskey, $3.00.

NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT.

Laborer employed in Department of Horticulture; required to do all kinds of work connected with the activities of that department, such as planting trees and other plants, working on soil, spraying, laying walks through gardens and plantations. In connection with the latter work he works with concrete equipment and materials and this was the work in which he was engaged at the time of the accident. The Horticultural Department has charge of the arboretum and the gardens in which the president's house is located.

NATURE AND DATE OF INJURY.

Was working on new walks and was cut in left cheek by being struck in the face by a crank on a cement mixer while working in the grounds of the president. August 7, 1933.

BY THE COURT.

From the facts stated, it does not appear that the work of a laborer engaged in the Department of Horticulture in the activities stated comes within any of the Sub-sections of Section 3 of the Act, nor that such work is in fact extra-hazardous and that the University could in any sense be said to be "engaged in such business." From a consideration of the cases heretofore cited and the facts stated, the court is of the opinion that no award should be made on this claim.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, No. 607-AWARD NOT RECOMMENDED.

Opinion submitted March 14, 1934.

Informal opinion on request of Hon. Sveinbjorn Johnson, Counsel for the University of Illinois, as to liability of the State for medical attention furnished an employee, U. of I. [*783]

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS. 783

NAME OF EMPLOYEE AND AMOUNT OF CLAIM.

William Meek, $4.00.

NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT.

Laborer in Animal Husbandry Department, doing general work in the Horse Division of the Agricultural Experimental Station. Work includes supervision and handling of horses, handling of feed and doing general farm work. Work involves use of tools and machinery.

NATURE AND DATE OF INJURY.

Was lifting baled hay up over a four foot wall in barn mow letting it fall down to a truck below, causing pain and soreness in left side. July 7, 1933.

BY THE COURT.

The suggestions made under claim for S. E. Bunting, No. 611, are applicable to this claim. Under Sub-section 3 of Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, no award should be made, as the facts show that the work in which the claimant was engaged was that of general farm work in the Department of Animal Husbandry. No award is recommended.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, NO. 602-AWARD NOT RECOMMENDED.

Opinion submitted March 14, 1934.

Jesse Meyers, $5.00.

NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT.

Works as a plumber in the maintenance and repair of plumbing in all buildings of the University of Illinois.

NATURE AND DATE OF INJURY.

Was driving sleeve for sill cock through wall for outlet in north end of basement of new Agricultural Building and a piece of steel lodged in the left eyeball. June 21, 1933. [*784] 781 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS.

By THE COURT.

Because the business of the University of Illinois is not that of maintaining and operating buildings, as construed by the courts, it seems that the service of a plumber regularly employed in the maintenance and repair of plumbing work in the buildings of the University is not within the Workmen's Compensation Act. The case of Therien vs. Industrial Commission, 351 Ill. 166 seems directly in point upon the facts stated. No award is recommended: See Lombard College vs. Industrial Commission, 294 Ill. 548.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, No. 619-AWARD NOT RECOMMENDED.

Opinion submitted March 14, 1934.

Informal opinion on request of Hon. Sveinbjorn Johnson, Counsel for the University of Illinois, as to liability of State for medical attention furnished employee, University of Illinois.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE AND AMOUNT OF CLAIM.

D. V. Nalley, $10.00.

NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT.

Work involves loading and unloading of heavy materials and carrying same in and out of University buildings.

NATURE AND DATE OF INJURY.

Formation of large blood blister, bruise of flesh and fracture of first joint of third finger while loading pipe which was to be transported to men's new gymnasium. November 17, 1933.

BY THE COURT.

Apparently employee Nalley was employed as a general laborer in maintenance work about the buildings of the University. As heretofore stated in the case of Meyers, No. 602, and under the authorities heretofore cited, and the facts herein submitted, no award should be made. [*50]

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS. 785

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, No. 599-AWARD NOT RECOMMENDED.

Opinion submitted March 14, 1934.

C. A. Reynolds, $11.00.

NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT.

Does general work in the beef cattle division of the Agricultural Experimental Station. Work includes supervision and handling of cattle, handling of food and doing general farm work. Work involves use of tools and machinery.

NATURE AND DATE OF INJURY.

Jabbed end of baling wire in back of hand while feeding baled hay to cows. March 26, 1933.

BY THE COURT.

Under the facts submitted, it appears that the claimant was engaged in doing general farm work for the Agricultural Experimental Station of the University, and under Subsection 8 of Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, no award could be justified. See suggestions under claim of S. E. Bunting No. 611. An award is not recommended.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, No. 597-AWARD RECOMMENDED.

Opinion submitted March 14, 1934.

Informal opinion on request of Hon. Sveinbjorn Johnson, Counsel for the University of Illinois, as to liability of the State for medical attention furnished an employee, University of Illinois.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE AND AMOUNT OF CLAIM.

Waldo Shumway, $5.00.

NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT.

Employed as professor in zoology. Work includes handling of chemicals, animals and apparatus including sharp instruments. -50 [*786] 786 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS.

NATURE AND DATE OF INJURY.

Injured by drawing thumb across microtome blade, necessitating two stitches. March 28, 1933.

BY THE COURT.

Under Sub-section 7½ of Section 3 of the Compensation Act, claimant would appear to be entitled to an award. Upon the above facts submitted and for the sole purpose of arriving at a conclusion for the guidance and action of the officials of the University of Illinois, the Court of Claims is of the opinion that the Workmen's Compensation Act should be held applicable to the above named employee with reference to said injury. An award is recommended.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS. No. 614-AWARD RECOMMENDED.

Opinion submitted March 14, 1934.

Informal opinion on request of Hon. Sveinbjorn Johnson, Counsel for the University of Illinois, as to liability of State for medical attention furnished employee, University of Illinois.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE AND AMOUNT OF CLAIM.

Morse Singer, Jr., $2.00.

NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT.

Employed as mechaniclan. Department of Mechanical Engineering.

NATURE AND DATE OF INJURY.

Piece of cast iron became embedded in eyeball. July 19, 1933.

BY THE COURT.

The claimant, from the above facts, seems to have been employed as a mechaniclan in the Engineering Shop of the University. Assuming that the machinery used in said shop is power driven, where he does machine work, or subject to the regulations contemplated by Sub-section 8 of Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, and under the facts submitted for the sole purpose of arriving at a conclusion for the guidance and action of the officials of the University [*787]

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS. 787

of Illinois, the Court of Claims is of the opinion that the Workmen's Compensation Act should be held applicable to the above named employee with reference to said injury. An award is recommended under the provisions of Sub-section 8 of Section 3 of the Act.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, No. 601-AWARD RECOMMENDED.

Opinion submitted March 14, 1934.

E. W. Wharton, $3.00.

NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT.

Laborer in power plant of the University of Illinois. Work includes handling of coal, cleaning out of boilers and smoke stacks and assisting with machinery.

NATURE AND DATE OF INJURY.

Was assisting in cleaning soot from old smoke stack at the University power plant and some foreign particle lodged in right eyeball. May 18, 1933.

BY THE COURT.

If the operation of the power plant involves the use of power-driven machinery, an employee therein would seem to come within Paragraph 8 of Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act-(see Board of Education vs. Industrial Commission, 301 Ill. 611)-and an award is recommended, in this case, upon the facts submitted.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, No. 604-AWARD RECOMMENDED.

Opinion submitted March 14, 1934.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE AND AMOUNT OF CLAIM.

W. M. Wilson, $86.75.

NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT.

Research professor in civil engineering. Carries on research in engineering materials, including concrete arches, etc. Work involves supervision and the building of test structure of concrete and other materials.

NATURE AND DATE OF INJURY.

Was engaged in wrecking auxiliary structure used in connection with tests of reinforced concrete arches when he suffered compound fracture of fourth left metatarsal bone, June 14, 1933.

BY THE COURT.

This work is a part of the educational work of the University and is an item in its main business. Under Sub-section 2 of Section 3 and upon the above facts, this case would seem to be analogous to the manual training teacher's work in Board of Education vs. Industrial Commission, 301 Ill. 611, and an award is recommended.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS. NO. 598-AWARD RECOMMENDED.

Opinion submitted March 14, 1934.

Informal opinion on request of Hon. Sveinbjorn Johnson, Counsel for the University of Illinois, as to liability of the State for medical attention furnished an employee, University of Illinois.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE AND AMOUNT OF CLAIM.

A. E. Wood, $9.00.

NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT.

Employed to do machine work in Department of Chemistry, including the building and repair of mechanical and scientific apparatus and involves the use of lathes and other machines and sharp tools.

NATURE AND DATE OF INJURY.

One of the bones in his finger was broken by use of machine lathe April 6, 1933. [*789]

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS. 789

BY THE COURT.

From the foregoing statement it would appear that claimant would come within the Sub-section 7½ or 8 or both of Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, and upon the above facts submitted and for the sole purpose of arriving at a conclusion for the guidance and action of the officials of the University of Illinois, the Court of Claims is of the opinion that the Workmen's Compensation Act should be held applicable to the above named employee with reference to said injury. An award is recommended.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, No. 624-AWARD NOT RECOMMENDED.

Opinion submitted April 26, 1934.

Howard Canady, $10.00.

NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT.

Employed as laborer in maintaining the physical plant. Works as tinner's apprentice.

NATURE AND DATE OF INJURY.

Injured February 5, 1934, cornea of left eyeball injured by particle of metal while drilling holes in metal vent pipe at "The old boiler house."

BY THE COURT.

As the business of the University of Illinois is not that of maintaining and operating buildings, as construed by the courts, the service of a mechanic regularly employed in the maintenance and repair of the buildings would not bring such employment within the Workmen's Compensation Act. Upon the facts stated, (see Lombard College vs. Industrial Commission, 294 Ill. 548). No award is recommended. [*790] 790 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS. No. 625-AWARD NOT RECOMMENDED.

Opinion submitted April 26, 1934.

W. S. Freeman, $13.50.

NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT.

Farm laborer in Agronomy Department.

NATURE AND DATE OF INJURY.

While hauling straw from stack for spreading on wheat field on February 5, 1934, injured as result of strain or an attack of appendicitis.

BY THE COURT.

As this claim is for an employee who was engaged as a farm laborer, the employment is directly within the proviso of Sub-section 8 of Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which expressly excepts any work done on a farm or country place, and no award can be recommended. (See Bunting vs. the State, U. of I. No. 611. C. of C. Reports.)

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS. No. 622-AWARD NOT RECOMMENDED.

Opinion submitted April 26, 1934.

P. A. Johnson, $3.00.

NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT.

A welder using electric and acetylene torch in maintenance and repairs. Employed in the physical plant of the university. [*791]

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS. 791

NATURE AND DATE OF INJURY.

Bruises of the right eyeball and surrounding area on January 4, 1934, while putting an angle iron on one of the large sliding doors of garage in order to brace and straighten frame.

By THE COURT.

As the business of the University of Illinois is not that of maintaining and operating buildings, as construed by the courts, the service of a mechanic regularly employed in the maintenance and repair of the buildings would not bring such employment within the Workmen's Compensation Act. Upon the facts stated, no award is recommended. (See Lombard College vs. Industrial Commission, 294 Ill. 548.)

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, No. 618-AWARD NOT RECOMMENDED.

Opinion submitted April 26, 1934.

Raymond A. Kirkpatrick, $4.50.

NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT.

Laborer; Dairy Department in University Dairy Creamery; handles milk and other creamery products, ice and icing equipment incident to the operation of the creamery.

NATURE AND DATE OF INJURY.

On November 26, 1933, was chipping ice at the time of the accident in question; blunt end of ice pick penetrated the hand.

By THE COURT.

Presumably the University Dairy Creamery and the University Pasteurization Plant are one and the same.

In its general opinion relative to the University of Illinois matters, filed in 1934, this court referred to the opinion of the Attorney General rendered March 27, 1928, in file [*792] 192 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS.

matter No. 1466, wherein the Attorney General rendered an opinion that the University is conducting its pasteurization plant in the College of Agriculture not as a business, but as a method of teaching the ways and means for proper pasteurization of milk. Being therefore a part of the general educational scheme and the educational work being the business or enterprise in which the University is engaged, and that enterprise being one in which State and municipal regulations are imposed, as stated in Sub-section 8 of Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, an employee therein would be within the provisions of said Act.

However, if the work of such employee came within the further proviso of Sub-section 8 which excepts from the Act employees who perform "any work done on a farm or country place," such proviso would control and no award should be made. As the facts in the immediate matter do not fully appear, the recommendation for an allowance of the claim is made dependent upon the actual employment not being within the exception against work done on a farm or country place. (See Bunting vs. State, No. 611.)

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS. No. 617-AWARD RECOMMENDED.

Opinion submitted April 20, 1934.

Paul D. Lytle, $5.00.

NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT.

Laborer in the power plant. Duties consist of handling coal, care and repair of machinery and labor incident to rebuilding equipment.

NATURE AND DATE OF INJURY.

Injured October 17, 1933, while helping dismantle and scrap a coal tank in the boiler room preparatory to installation of a new tank. Bone and muscle of left chin bone bruised. [*793]

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS. 703

BY THE COURT.

If the operation of the power plant involved the use of power driven machinery, an employee therein would seem to come within the Sub-section 8 of Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. (See Board of Education vs. Industrial Commission, 301 Ill. 611.) And as the facts herein stated show that a part of the duties of the injured employee included the repair of machinery in the power plant, an award is recommended.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, NO. 627-AWARD NOT RECOMMENDED.

Opinion submitted April 26, 1934.

John Mumaw, $5.00.

NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT.

Employed as a carpenter in the Physical Plant of the University. Performs usual work incident to taking care of floors and wood work.

NATURE AND DATE OF INJURY.

Was sanding floors in the Engineering Hall. Piece of flint struck the cornea of the right eye on February 7, 1934.

BY THE COURT.

As the business of the University of Illinois is not that of maintaining and operating buildings, as construed by the courts, the service of a carpenter regularly employed in the maintenance and repair of the buildings would not bring such employment within the Workmen's Compensation Act. Upon the facts stated, no award is recommended. (See Lombard College vs. The Industrial Commission, 294 Ill. 548.) [*794] 794 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, No. 623-AWARD NOT RECOMMENDED.

Opinion submitted April 26, 1934.

C. A. Stanley, $4.00.

NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT.

Employed as janitor.

NATURE AND DATE OF INJURY.

Using an oil mop in the Chemistry Annex Building on February 1st, 1934; ran a large sliver in the left index finger.

BY THE COURT.

As the business of the University of Illinois is not that of maintaining and operating buildings, as construed by the courts, the service of a janitor employed regularly in the maintenance and repair of the buildings would not bring such employment within the Workmen's Compensation Act. The case of Therien vs. Industrial Commission, 351 Ill. 166, seems directly in point upon the facts stated. (See Lombard College vs. Industrial Commission, 294 Ill. 548.) No award is recommended.