Farrell v. State of Illinois — 6 Ill. Ct. Cl. 488

JOSEPH P. FARRELL, Claimant, v. STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent.

Case summary

Claimant sought compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act for a fractured leg sustained while marking traffic lines on a state highway. The court denied the claim because the claimant was paid his full wages during incapacity and returned to work at the same wage, showing no reduction in earning capacity.

Claim type: Personal Injury Negligence

Cases cited: Groveland Coal Co. v. Industrial Com., 309 Ill. 73; Vaught v. Industrial Com., 297 Ill. 109; St. L. & O'F. Coal Co. v. Industrial Com., 321 Ill. 117; Paradise Coal Co. v. Industrial Com., 301 Ill. 504; Old Ben Coal Co. v. Industrial Com., 293 Ill. 524

AI-generated summary from the opinion text — may contain errors. The opinion text and PDF above are the official record.

Headnotes

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-when provisions apply to the State. SAME-maintenance of highways is an extra hazardous enterprise. PERSONAL INJURY-when full recovery from injury will not entitle SAME-when claimant not entitled to hospital and doctor bills. Where REHEARING.-argument in support of petition for rehearing not per- SAME.-when rehearing will be denied. Where the petition for re- OSCAR E. CARLSTROM, Attorney General; FRANK R. EAGLE-

Hearing denied January 15, 1931. WORKMEN'SCOMPENSATION ACT-when provisions apply to the State. The provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act apply to the State when it is engaged in any enterprise or business declared by Section 3 to be extra hazardous. SAME-maintenance of highways is an extra hazardous enterprise. Under paragraph 1 of Section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act the maintenance of one of the paved highways of the State is an extra hazardous enterprise or business. PERSONAL INJURY-when full recovery from injury will not entitle claimant to an award. Where the evidence shows claimant has fully recovered from his injury and is able to earn in any suitable employment as much after his injury as he earned before it he is not entitled to an award, and the fact that he is not able to do the same work is not material. SAME-when claimant not entitled to hospital and doctor bills. Where claimant receives his average weekly wage from the State during the time he was incapacitated from work and such amount is sufficient to cover compensation, including doctor and hospital bills, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, no award will be made. REHEARING.-argument in support of petition for rehearing not permitted-reason for rule. Under the rules of the court argument in support of a petition for rehearing is not permitted for the reason that the State has no opportunity to be heard upon the petition. SAME.-when rehearing will be denied. Where the petition for rehearing discloses no reason for granting a rehearing the petition will be denied. ELLIS, WESTERN & BRITTAIN, for claimant. OSCAR E. CARLSTROM, Attorney General; FRANK R. EAGLETON, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.

MR. JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:

Claimant was employed by the State as a laborer in maintenance work on one of the State highways, near Elgin.

While engaged with other employees in marking the traffic line on the pavement he fell from a truck and fractured his right leg. The injury occurred June 10, 1927, and the next day he was taken to the Sherman Hospital at Elgin where he remained until August fifth following. He received surgical attention while at the hospital by Dr. W. S. Brown and also for a considerable time after he left. The hospital bill introduced in evidence is $201.50 and Dr. Brown's bill, also introduced, is $401.00. Claimant in his declaration asks an award for $4,000.00 to compensate him for his injury, basing his claim upon the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The provisions of this Act apply to the State when it is engaged in any enterprise or business declared by Section 3 of the Act to be extra hazardous. Under paragraph 1 of that section the maintenance of one of the paved highways of the State is an extra hazardous enterprise or business.

Claimant was receiving from the State at the time of his injury an average weekly wage of $30.25 and was paid at that rate during all the time he was incapacitated from work, the total payments amounting to $805.00. On October 31, 1927, he went back to work for the State at the same wage and worked until February 14, 1928, when he quit of his own volition, having secured other employment.

Sub-section (A) of Section 8 of the Workmen's Compensation Act provides the employer shall provide the necessary first aid medical and surgical services, and all necessary medical, surgical and hospital services thereafter, limited, [*190] however, to that which is reasonably required to cure or relieve from the effects of the injury. Sub-section (b) of section 8 provides the employee shall be paid 50 percent of his earnings during the period of his temporary total incapacity, but not less than $7.50 per week nor more than $14.00 per week. Sub-section (d) of section 8 provides that where the employee is partially incapacitated he shall receive 50 percent of the difference between the average amount which he earned before the accident and the average amount which he is earning or is able to earn in some suitable employment or business after the accident. "The object of this section of the statute is to compensate the injured employee for his reduced earning capacity, and if the injury does not reduce his earning capacity he is not entitled to compensation.

There is no intent expressed in the statute to allow compensation for pain and suffering. The phrase, 'or is able to earn in some suitable employment or business', was added to the section to prevent a person from loafing or refusing to work in order to collect compensation." (Groveland Coal Co. v. Industrial Com., 309 Ill. 73.) An employee is physically able to work when he can do so without seriously endangering his health or life. (Vaught v. Industrial Com., 297 Ill. 109; St. L. & O'F. Coal Co. v. Industrial Com., 321 Ill. 117.)

The evidence shows claimant has fully recovered from his injury and was able to earn and did earn as much after his accident as before. "When an employee is physically able to work and is able to earn in a suitable employment the same wages as he received before he was injured an award for partial incapacity is not justified." (Paradise Coal Co. v. Industrial Com., 301 Ill. 504.) Claimant testified that he is not able to do the same work since his injury that he could do before. That is not material. If he is able to earn in any suitable employment or business as much after his injury as he earned before it then he is not entitled to an award.

Claimant also testified his injury had decreased his earning power more than half. This testimony was objected to, and is not competent. (Old Ben Coal Co. v. Industrial Com.,

293 Ill. 524.)

Approximately twenty weeks intervened between the date claimant was injured and the date he returned to work. For that period the maximum amount he was entitled to receive as compensation was $280.00. It is conceded he was paid [pdf p. 512]

CORRECTION

THIS DOCUMENT

HAS BEEN REPHOTOGRAPHED

TO ASSURE LEGIBILITY

[pdf p. 513] The provided image is almost entirely blank, with no legible, readable text present: the only visible content is a few scattered, isolated tiny dots that do not form any recognizable characters, words, or other text elements. [*485]

It further appears to the court that in order that the complainant may have a just and fair consideration of its petitions for rehearing, that said petitions for rehearing be and shall be considered along with said other petitions for rehearings pending to certain other claims involving the same subject matter as to facts and law.

On June 14, 1931, the following additional order was filed:

Now this cause coming on to be heard upon the statements filed by claimants and statements filed by the Attorney General on behalf of the State, and the court having considered said statements and the petitions for rehearing herein heretofore filed.

And it appearing to the court that nothing contained in the statements filed by the claimants reveal sufficient cause or reason for the modification or change of the opinion heretofore filed in these cases, it is ordered by the court that the opinion heretofore filed be, and it is hereby confirmed and the cause dismissed.